1、0OHSMS and Safety CultureWhat is an occupational health and safety management system(OHSMS)?One difficultly in evaluating the effectiveness of OHSMS lies in the different meanings given to the team .Finding agreement upon criteria for effectiveness, or methods of measure-ment and evaluation is espec
2、ially hard where basic disagreement exists upon what an OHSMS .1、The General Characteristics Of an OHSMSAll OHSMS owe something to the legacy of general system theory. Systems theory suggests that there should be four general requirements for an OHSMS, although how there requirements are met in prac
3、tice allows for considerable diversity. The four general requirements are as follows.1）System objectives.2）Specification of system elements and their inter-relationship; not all systems need have the same elements.3）Determining the relationship of the OHSMS to other systems (including the general ma
4、nagement system, and the regulatory system , but also technology and work organization ). 4）Requirements for system maintenance (which may be internal, linked to a review phase , or external , linked for example to industry policies that support OHS best practice; system maintenance may vary between
5、 systems).Several Australian authorities upon OHSMS have given definitions broadly consistent with these general system requirements. Thus Bottomley notes what makes an OHSMS a system “is the deliberate linking and sequencing of processes to achieve specific objectives and to create a repeatable and
6、 identifiable way of managing OHS. Corrective actions (are also )central to a systematic approach .”Warwick Pearse also emphasises systemic linkages, defining an OHSMS as “distinct elements which cover the key range of activities required to manage occupational health and safety. These are inter-lin
7、ked, and the whole thing is driven by feedback loops.”1Similarly, Gallagher defines an OHSMS as “a combination of the planning and review, the management organization arrangements, the consultative arrangements, and the specific program elements that work together in an integrated way to improve hea
8、lth and safety performance.”2、Voluntary Or Mandatory Implementation Methods One way that OHSMS differ arises from the various methods of implementation. Frick and Wren distinguish three typesvoluntary, mandatory and hybird. Voluntary systems exist where enterprises adopt OHSMS on their owe volition.
9、 Often this is to implement strategic objectives relating to employee welfare or good corporate citizenship, although there may be other motives such as reducing insurance costs. In contrast, mandatory systems have evolved in a number of European countries where legislation requires adoption of a ri
10、sk assessment system. Quasimandatory methods may also exist where external commercial pressures take the place of legislative requirements. Thus many businesses adopt OHSMS to comply with the requirements of customers and suppliers, principal contractors and other commercial bodies. Hybrid methods a
11、re said to entail a mixture of voluntary motives and legislative requirements. 3. Management Systems or Systematic ManagementFollowing from their distinction between voluntary and mandatory OHSMS, Frick and Wren also separate occupational health and safety “management systems”, and the “management s
12、ystems” of occupational health and safety. Specifically ,the former have been characterized as: market-based, promoted typically by consulting firms, and with usually highly formalized prescriptions on how to integrate OHSM within large and complex organizations and also comprehensive demands on doc
13、umentation.This “management systems” from must meet stringent criteria. Where these requirements of a “systems” are not met, then the term is said to be inapplicable. On the other hand, “systematic management” is described as “ a limited number of mandated principles for a systematic management of O
14、HS, applicable to all types of employers including the small ones”.2This approach stems from methods of regulation found in Europe as well as Australia, where businesses, including smaller ones, are encouraged or required to comply with a less demanding framework than “management systems”. One examp
15、le of this simpler regulatory framework might be the risk assessment principles within the 1989/391 European Union Framework Directive.Support for such a loose approach to OHSM also exists in Australia. One employer expert on OHS defined systems simply as “just a word for what you do to manage safet
16、y”. Consistent with this is Bottomleys all-encompassing approach which allows that “an OHSMS can be simple or complex, it can be highly documented or sparingly described, and it can be home grown or based on an available model”. An example of a relatively simple “systematic”approach to the managemen
17、t of occupational health and safety is to be found in “Small Business Safety Solutions”-a booklet for small business published by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.This advocates a four step process as follows:Step1: Commitment to a Safe Workplace(framing a policy based on consultation
18、).Step2: Recognising and Removing Dangers(using a danger identification list)Step3:Maintaining a Safe Workplace (including safety checks, maintenance, reporting dangers, information and training, supervision ,accident investigation, and emergency planning).Step4: Safety Records and Information (incl
19、uding records and standards required to be kept by law)It is debatable whether such a framework for “systematic management” in a small business can include all the elements of planning and accountability that are essential to a “management system” in a large business.4 . System Characteristics : man
20、agerialist and Participative ModelsWithin “management systems” two different models can be found . The first variant stems from what Nielsen terms “rational organisation theory” ( Taylorist and bureaucratic models of organisation ) . Rational organisation theory is associated with top down manageria
21、list models of OHSMS such as Du Pont . Some authorities now 3consider most voluntary systems to be managerialist . Thus Frick. et al . observe that “ . . . most voluntary OHSM systems define top management as the ( one and only ) actor”. Conversely, an alternative participative model of “management
22、systems” can be traced to socio-technical systems theory, which emphasises organisational interventions based on analysis of the inter-relationships of technology , the orientation of participants , and organisational structure . The strengths of this typology are two-fold . First , it is grounded i
23、n the literature that discusses alternative approaches to managing OHS and different control strategies , and it reflects the principal debates in that literature . Second , it can be operationalised through empirical tests to see which type of OHSMS performs best . The typology also faces a difficu
24、lty in the fact that the “ safe place control strategy “ is mandatory in Australia and should be found in all workplaces . There in not , therefore . a clear choice between two mutually exclusive control strategies ; the workplace with dominant safe person characteristics should also be implementing
25、 safe place characteristics . 5 . Degree of Implementation: Quality LevelsFrick and Wren expand upon their distinction between mandatory and voluntary OHSMS to further identify three levels of systems objectives , drawn from the literature on product quality control , that represent different levels
26、 of achievement and measures of OHSM performance. 6 . degree of Implementation: Introductory and Advanced Systems The idea that there may be different levels of OHSM has been interpreted another way in Australia where performance levers in some programs are explicitly developmental ( the business gr
27、aduating up an ascending ladder as it demonstrates compliance with the requirements of each successive lever ) . One example of Australian program with developmental steps is the South Australian Safety Achiever Business System ( SABS ) ( formerly known as the Safety Achiever Bonus Scheme ) . The pr
28、ogram specifies five standards ( commitment and policy , planning implementation , measurement and management systems review and implementation ) linked in a continuous improvement cycle . Three “levels”of 4implementation are then prescribed cumulatively introducing all five standards from a basic o
29、r introductory program to a continuous improvement system . Different evaluation standards are prescribed for each level .7. OHSMS Diversity and Evaluation : A Summary While, in general, this Report advocates care in defining OHSMS with respect to the problems outlined above , for the purpose of thi
30、s project an inclusive approach to the phenomena is to be adopted .In particular , the term OHSMS will be used broadly to encompass both the highly complex formal systems adopted voluntarily by some businesses as well as the more rudimentary mandatory or advisory frameworks offered to and implemente
31、d by small business.So far , we have shown that OHSMS can vary upon a number of dimensions relating to method of implementation , system characteristics , and degree of implementation . Such variance is important because it affects evaluation and measurement of OHSMS performance . Measures appropria
32、te for one dimension of a system will be irrelevant to another . Evaluation of OHSMS effectiveness may need to take account of what systems are expected to do . Are they to meet complex system or simple design standards ? Are they implemented at the behest of management or external OHS authorities ?
33、 Are objectives the simple ones such as reducing direct lost-time injuries or do they include satisfying multiple stakeholders ? Are they at an early or established stage of development ; and which of several different configurations of control strategy and management structure/style is adopted ? Dr
34、awing upon the review above , the diagram below sets out five key dimensions on which OHSMS vary that need to be considered in evaluation and measurement . 8. OHSMS Diversity : 5 Key Dimensions for Evaluation While all systems must meet the general requirements for an OHSMS , diversity may occur alo
35、ng five key dimensions as follows :Implementation method (voluntary , mandatory or hybrid) ;Control strategy (safe person/safe place) ;Management structure and style (innovative or traditional) ; Degree of implementation (from meeting basic specifications to meeting 5stakeholder needs) ; Degree of i
36、mplementation(form introductory stage to fully operational) .OHSMS is a process of continuous development of innovation, is a process of continuous improvement. In the process, the enterprise culture constantly adjust the original management idea, realize enterprise safety culture reengineering. 1.
37、What Is Safety Culture?The UK Health and Safety Executive defines safety culture as “ . . . the product of the individual and group values, attitudes, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organizations health and safety programs
38、.” A more succinct definition has been suggested: “Safety culture is how the organization behaves when no one is watching.”Every organization has a safety culture, operating at one level or another. The challenges to the leadership of an organization are to: 1) determine the level at which the safet
39、y culture currently functions; 2) decide where they wish to take the culture; and 3) chart and navigate a path from here to there. 2. Why Is Safety Culture Important?Management systems and their associated policies and procedures depend upon the actions of individuals and groups for their successful
40、 implementation. For example, a procedure may properly reflect the desired intent and be adequately detailed in its instructions. However, the successful execution of the procedure requires the actions of properly trained individuals who understand the importance of the underlying intent, who accept
41、 their responsibility for the task, and who appreciate that taking an obviously simplifying but potentially unsafe shortcut would be, quite simply, wrong. The values of the group (e.g., corporation, plant, shift team) help shape the beliefs and attitudes of the individual, which in turn, play a sign
42、ificant role in determining individual behaviors. A weak safety culture can be (and likely will be) evidenced by the actions and inactions of personnel at all levels of the organization. For example, the failure of a critical interlock might have been caused by the 6mechanic who failed to calibrate
43、the pressure switch and falsified the maintenance records. Alternatively, it might have been caused by the plant manager who denied the funding requested to address staffing shortages in the instrument department.Audits too frequently reveal ostensibly complete, sometimes sophisticated, management s
44、ystems within which one or more elements are falling well short of achieving their desired intent. Previously, we might have attributed such failures to a general concept of “lack of operating discipline.” Certainly, the failure to maintain high standards of performance might be a contributor to the
45、 problem. However, deficiencies in other safety culture features likely contributed to the situation. Industry has gradually accepted the importance of identifying the management system failures that lead to incidents and near misses (i.e., identifying root causes). For example, let us suppose that
46、an incident occurred because a control room operator, leaving at the end of the shift, failed to alert the oncoming operator of a serious, off-standard condition in the process. This problem might be diagnosed generally as a communications problem, with a specific root cause identified as “Communica
47、tions between shifts less than adequate.” Perhaps, however, perfunctory shift turnovers are the rule rather than the exception, and this circumstance is generally known to supervision. In this circumstance, another root cause related to supervisory practices, “Improper performance not corrected,” mi
48、ght be identified. This analysis so far leaves a number of questions unanswered, such as “Why do operators shortcut the turnover process and why do they feel comfortable in doing so?” or “Why do supervisors tolerate a practice that jeopardizes the safety of the facility?” We can attempt to answer th
49、ese questions by seeking to understand the values, beliefs and attitudes that shape individual actions and inactions (i.e., by seeking to understand the safety culture). By identifying and addressing the pathologies within the safety culture (or, more appropriately, by proactively seeking to maintain a culture free of such weaknesses), we are effectively addressing the root causes of what we typically regard to be the root causes of safety performance problems.Regardless of whether one is seeking to establish a new safety management 7system, repair an existing underperforming sy
