1、The Effect of a Generalized Appreciation of East Asian Currencies on Exports from China(节选)Gordon RSmith George Mason University, 2002Master of Business AdministrationOver the past several years, China has seen a significant rise in its trade andcurrent account surpluses. The International Monetary
2、Fund (IMF) estimates that by theend of 2007,Chinascurrentaccount surplus represented 11.1 percent of the countrysgross domestic product (GDP). At $361 billion, it was the largest surplus of any countryin the world, more than $100 billion greater than the country with the second largestsurplus, Japan
3、.With such a large overall surplus, it would seem that China would have a tradesurplus with just about every other country in the world. Interestingly, this is not the case.There appears to be a fairly clear delineation, as it regards Chinas trade accountsbetween those countries in East Asia and the
4、 rest of the worldOf Chinas seven largest trading partners in 2007 (countries/regions thatrepresented more than $100 billion in total trade value each), five were in East Asia.They were Japan, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Hong Kong, SouthKorea, and Taiwan. Excluding Hong Kong, the
5、 four remaining countries/regions, as agroup, recorded a trade surplus with China of more than $180 billion. That is, in terms of its trade accounts, China ran a substantial trade deficit with its major trading partners in East Asia.On the other side of the equation, China had a substantial trade su
6、rplus with its two largest trade partners, the European Union (EU) and the United States (U. S.). With a total value in trade of more than $600 billion (imports plus exports), the EU and U.S. Had a combined deficit with China of more than $270 billion.What this implies is that the trade deficits whi
7、ch China carries with its trading partners in East Asia are more than compensated by the trade surpluses that China carries with the rest of the world. It is the size of these trade surpluses that has become the focus of attention of a number of countries, especially the United States.China has rece
8、ived a great deal of scrutiny in the U.S. because of the size of its bilateral trade surplus. Several politicians and some economists have called for anappreciation of the RMB as a possible means of affecting Chinas trade surplus with the United States. This has come largely on the belief that China
9、 has intervened in the foreign exchange market in order to keep its currency artificially low with respect to the U.S.dollar. An appreciation of the RMB is seen as a way to increase the cost of, and thus reduce, Chinas exports. However, an appreciation of the RMB alone may not deliver the desired im
10、pact on all exports originating out of China. This is due to the intricate production and trade networks which exist in East Asia.Referred to as vertical intra-industry trade, manufacturing firms in East Asia have taken advantage of differences in a countrys factor endowments (e.g. access to raw mat
11、erials, low input costs, labor supply) to exploit efficiencies in cost and production. By utilizing foreign direct investment, firms located primarily in developed East Asia (e.g. Japan) have established production platforms throughout the rest of the region. In many cases, extensive trade relations
12、hips have been established between emerging Asia (e.g. South Korea, Taiwan), providing intermediate parts and components, and developing Asia (e.g. China), providing assembly and export operations. Therefore, the total value of final goods for export from East Asia is often a combination of value ad
13、ded from several different countries in the region.Though China maintains a sizeable percentage of trade in goods producedprimarily from its own domestic inputs, the majority of its exports have been produced primarily from inputs originating from other countries in East Asia. This accounts for the
14、large trade deficits China has with countries like Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. A significant percentage of these goods are exported to the EU and the U.S., which helps to explain the large trade surpluses China maintains with these countries/regions. Therefore, given the value added to Chinas ex
15、ports from other countries in East Asia, an appreciation of the alone may not have the same impact as a generalized appreciation of currencies. This generalized appreciation would include not only the RMB ,but also the currencies of those countries which are Chinas primary suppliers of parts and com
16、ponents. This would go a lot further in affecting those goods produced primarily from Chinese inputs, as well as those goods produced primarily from inputs originating from other countries in East Asia.The U.S. Trade Deficit and ChinaThese issues highlight just some of the potential outcomes which c
17、ould resultfrom a consistent and growing U.S. trade and current account deficit. However, thepotential problems dont end here. Another issue for the U. S. is the primary driver behind its trade deficit; the deficit in the trade of goodsSplicing the trade deficit into goods and services, had it not b
18、een for a favorable run of trade surpluses in the services sector, the trade deficit would have easily eclipsed 6 percent of GDP by the end of 2005. On a year-to-year basis, trade in goods as a group has represented more than 100 percent of the total trade deficit from as early as 1976, the first ye
19、ar of the current string of consecutive trade deficits. Even when deflating the dollar value of the trade in goods and taking it as a percentage of real GDP, the percentages are roughly the same as those obtained using nominal data When disaggregated into its component parts, and accounting for ener
20、gy products within the industrial sector, a large part of the trade deficit is in consumer goods . These goods, which have little income producing value, represent more than 35 percent of the trade deficit. Capital and industrial supplies (excluding energy products), which are primarily used as inve
21、stment for building and supporting income producing assets, account for less than 5 percent of the total trade deficit. The U. S. is apparently going into debt with the rest of the world in order to increase its levels of personal consumption.While the U. S. deserves much of the focus for its large
22、trade deficit, most of the attention over the past several years has fallen on China. Of the nations that the U. S. Is most indebted to in terms of trade, China is the largest. In 2006, the U.S. trade deficit in goods and services with China was $229.4 billion, or approximately 30 percent of the tot
23、al U. S. trade deficit with the rest of the world. This is more than ten percentage points higher than the percentage of the deficit represented by all the countries in Europe, more than 50 percent of the entire trade deficit with those countries in the Asia and Pacific region, and three times as la
24、rge as any other single nation with which the U. S. engages in trade .China has also gained a significant amount of attention with regards to the size and composition of its foreign exchange reserves. By the end of 2006, the Peoples Bank of China (PBoC) held more than $1 trillion dollars in foreign
25、exchange reserves.This growth has come largely on the heels of Chinas rapidly expanding export economy. Since 2003, Chinas economy has grown in real terms by more than 10 percent per year, facilitated by large inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). When combined with its trade surplus, China ha
26、s faced significant inflationary pressure due to the potential increase in the supply of money in the economy. In spite of this phenomenon, Chinas inflation rate through 2006 remained relatively benign, rising above 2 percent only once since 2000. The conversion of dollars into Yuan into RMB 一 denom
27、inated bonds has provided a substantial barrier to the growth of RMB over the past several years.As for the composition of Chinas foreign exchange reserves, no official breakdown is available, however several estimates have been offered. In terms of dollar reserves, the general range of approximatio
28、ns has been between 60 and 75 percent.Setser (2007) estimates that Chinas dollar reserves peaked at around 80 percent in 2003 but have fallen to around 70 percent since that time.Though 70 percent in reserve holdings represents a substantial percentage in a single currency, it doesnt capture the sig
29、nificant increase in dollar holdings that havetaken place in China since 2000. As an example, in terms of fixed income dollardominated assets, China has been an aggressive buyer of U. S. Treasury securities over the past several years. using data from the US treasury departmenti, China purchased an
30、average of $48.2 billion of treasury securities per year from 2000 to 2007. In addition, over the same time period, Chinas average yearly increase in Treasury securities purchased was 30.3 percent. In the process, the relative size of Chinas position in terms of official holdings of U.S. Treasury se
31、curities rose from 6.4 percent in 2000 to 18.6 percent in 2007.While most of East Asia has been a significant buyer of dollar-denominated fixed income securities, due in part to the speculative runs that took place in the currency markets at the turn of the century, Chinas rapid growth in this area
32、stands out by comparison. In June 2000, Japan dwarfed the other major East Asian holders of U.S. Treasury securities, including China, by more than 370 percent. By June 2007, while Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand had all doubled their holdings, Chinas total holdings had grown by 5
33、times their original amount. Within that time, the relative gap in U.S. Treasury security holdings between Japan and China had narrowed to a little more man 50 percent.The growth and size of Chinas dollar reserves have had a direct impact on the foreign exchange rate between China and the United Sta
34、tes. From 2000 to 2004, the exchange rate between the Chinese Yuan and U. S. dollar remained essentially unchanged at approximately 8.28 Yuan to 1 U.S. Dollar. Only since 2005, when the Chinese government made a decision to move their foreign exchange rate policy to a basket of currencies and allow
35、the RMB some movement against the dollar did the Yuan actually begin to appreciate, reaching 7.97 Yuan to the dollar by the end of 2006. This represented a small adjustment compared to a number of estimates for the RMBs real bilateral undervaluation with the dollar of 15 to 40 percent.The Issue of E
36、xchange RatesAll these factors in combination; large trade surpluses with the U.S., a significant percentage of reserves in U. S. dollars, a rapidly growing economy, and a relatively stableand undervalued RMB, have raised important questions regarding the means by which China has achieved its unprec
37、edented growth. There is some belief that China has engaged in unfair trading practices by keeping its exchange rate artificially low. During a trip to China in late 2006, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke referred to the exchange rate value of the RMB as an “effective subsidy“ for Chinese-based firms focus
38、ed primarily on export trade, this has been the contention by several representatives in congress ,precipitating legislation aimed at offsetting the perceived advantage of the current exchange rate by applying duties and tariffs on Chinese imports. In addition, increasing pressure on the White House
39、 to address the trade deficit and exchange rate issues with China have resulted in both action taken against China through the World Trade Organization and the imposition of countervailing duties on coated paper imported from China.In spite of all this legislative wrangling, economists have thus far
40、 been split on the appropriate response that the U. S. should take in regards to this situation. A number of economists have investigated the effect that an appreciation of the RMB would have on Chinas trade surplus. Up to this point, the results have been inconclusive. A major part of the reason in
41、volves the unique trading and manufacturing relationships that China and the rest of East Asia have with one another. The triangular trading pattern, in which intermediate goods are exported to China from other East Asian countries, manufactured into final goods, and then exported to the rest of the
42、 world, has become an established model for business operations in East Asia.Given the extensiveness and fluidity of the trading relationships in East Asia, an appreciation of the RMB alone may do little to affect Chinas trade surplus. Ageneralized, integrated appreciation of the RMB and the currenc
43、ies of Chinas supply chain providers, which are predominantly countries in East Asia, could potentially have a more beneficial and significant impact on the exports originating out of China. Ageneralized appreciation would affect the prices of all goods in East Asia, bothintermediate and final goods
44、. This would correspondingly impact the prices of Chinasexports, both those goods produced primarily with Chinese inputs and those goodsproduced primarily with inputs from Chinas East Asian trading partners. 东亚国家货币普遍升值对中国出口的影响（节选）Gordon RSmith乔治梅森大学,2002工商管理硕士在过去的几年中，中国的对外贸易和货币经常账户盈余获得了显著的提升。国际货币基金组
45、织预测到 2007 年底，中国的经常账户盈余将占到中国国内生产总值的 11.1%。中国拥有世界上最大的顺差 3610 亿美元，比顺差位列世界第二的日本还要多 1000 亿美元。拥有这样一个大的整体盈余，这似乎表示，中国与世界上的几乎每一个其它国家都保持着贸易顺差。有趣的是，事实上却并非如此，似乎存在着一个相当明确的界定，认为中国的贸易收入在东亚和世界其它国家之间。2007 年，中国的七大贸易伙伴（总贸易额超过 1000 亿美元的国家或地区）中，有五个国家是来自东亚，它们分别是日本、东南亚国家联盟、香港、韩国和台湾。除了香港以外，其余四个国家或地区作为一个整体，它们与中国的贸易顺差超过了 180
46、0 亿美元。也就是说，在贸易收入方面，中国与东亚的主要贸易伙伴保持着一个巨大的贸易赤字。在等式的另一个方面，中国与它最大的两个贸易伙伴：欧盟和美国保持着巨大的贸易顺差。在总价值超过 600 亿美元（进口和出口）的贸易中，欧盟和美国加起来与中国有着超过 2700 亿美元的贸易赤字。上述事实意味着,中国与东亚贸易伙伴的贸易赤字被中国与世界上其它国家更多的贸易顺差所补偿了,正是这些贸易顺差的规模成为了一些国家关注的焦点,例如美国。中国因为双边贸易顺差的大小受到了美国很大的争议，一些政治学家和经济学家呼吁人民币升值企图以此作为影响中国对美国贸易顺差的一种可能手段，这种说法在很大程度上来自于信仰中国在外
47、汇市场上进行干预以维持人民币对美元的人为低价，人民币升值被视为增加成本最终减少中国出口的一种方法。然而，仅仅单靠人民币升值恐怕不能把所需要的影响传递给所有来自中国的原产出口商品，这是由于存在于东亚的错综复杂的贸易和生产网络。简称为垂直产业内贸易，东亚的制造公司利用国家的要素禀赋（例如获得原材料、低投入成本、劳动力供给的权利）在成本和生产上的差异来提高效率。通过利用国际直接投资，首先选址于发达东亚地区（例如日本）的公司已经建立了遍布其它地区的生产平台。在很多情况下，提供中间零部件的亚州新兴国家（例如韩国和台湾）和提供装配和出口业务的亚州发展中国家（例如中国）之间建立了广泛的贸易关系。因此，来自东
48、亚的最终产品的出口总值往往是来自于该地区几个不同国家增加值的结合。尽管中国在主要是由本国投入生产出来的产品贸易上占有很大的比例，其出口的大部分已经靠来自东亚其它国家的投入来生产。这就是为什么中国和台湾、韩国、日本等国家保持着巨大的贸易赤字。而这些商品的绝大部分又被出口到了欧盟和美国，这就可以解释为什么中国和欧盟、美国保持着巨大的贸易顺差。因此，考虑到东亚其它国家赋予中国出口的增加值，仅仅靠人民币升值所带来的影响恐怕不能和广义上的货币升值所带来的影响一样。这个广义上的升值将不仅仅包括人民币，而且也包括作为中国零部件主要提供商的国家的货币。这对于主要由中国投入生产出来的产品和由东亚其它国家投入生产
49、出来的产品的影响将更为深远。这篇文章只是突出了一个持续增长的美国贸易和经常账户赤字可能导致的潜在后果。然而，潜在的问题并没有在这里结束，美国的另一个问题是其贸易赤字背后的主要驱动力：货物贸易赤字。结合货物和服务的贸易赤字，如果不是服务贸易顺差的良好运行作为一个支持因素，2005 年底贸易赤字将很容易超过国内生产总值的百分之六。连续几年，货物贸易作为一个整体，已经占据了所有贸易赤字超过百分之百，而早在 1976 年，连续的贸易差额就已经出现了。即使扣除货物贸易的美元价值，并把它作为实际国内生产总值的一部分，这个百分比也几乎与使用标准数据所得到的大致相同。当分解它的组成部分，并考虑工业部门内的产品贸易时，贸易赤字的很大一部分来源于消费品。这些货物，生产的价值带来的收入很少，却占据了超过贸易赤字的百分之三十五。资本和工业用品（不包括能源产品） ，主要用于投资建设和支持产生收入的资产，占据所有贸易赤字不到百分之五。显然，美国为了增加其个人消费水平，将与世界其它国家陷入债务。然而当美国要求充分关注其贸易赤字时，在过去几年中关注的焦点已经转移到了中国。在贸易上使美国陷入负债的国家里，中国排第一位。在 2006 年，美国与中国在货物和服务贸易上的赤字达到了 2294 亿美元，或者说接近美国与世界其它国家贸易差额的百分之
