1、阿丁斯坦萨茨论塔木德式思维（From “The Essential Talmud“）这是一篇相当长的论文，分三个部分，第一部分是“The Talmudic way of Thinking“，第二部分是”Strange and Bizarre Problems“,第三部分是“Methods of Study“。我一直认为这篇论文是描述塔木德式思维的最好的文章，拉比阿丁.斯坦萨茨毋庸置疑是一个极优秀的塔木德学者。我曾试图在互联网找过这篇东西，但可惜没有电子档，今天我把电子档发在这里，为一些对塔木德有兴趣的读者做一个参考。我想如果我把它们翻译成汉语，而且你又能读懂，那么你也一点能读懂英语。而如果你读
2、不懂译本，那么我翻译就没有任何意义了。所以我放了纯英文本。附注：这篇论文后来放在了他的“The Essential Talmud“ 一书里。阿丁.斯坦萨茨（Adin Steinsalz）论塔木德式思维（From “The Essential Talmud“）这是一篇相当长的论文，分三个部分，第一部分是“The Talmudic way of Thinking“，第二部分是”Strange and Bizarre Problems“,第三部分是“Methods of Study“。我一直认为这篇论文是描述塔木德式思维的最好的文章，拉比阿丁.斯坦萨茨毋庸置疑是一个极优秀的塔木德学者。我曾试图在互联
3、网找过这篇东西，但可惜没有电子档，今天我把电子档发在这里，为一些对塔木德有兴趣的读者做一个参考。我想如果我把它们翻译成汉语，而且你又能读懂，那么你也一点能读懂英语。而如果你读不懂译本，那么我翻译就没有任何意义了。所以我放了纯英文本。附注：这篇论文后来放在了他的“The Essential Talmud“一书里。 The Talmudic way of ThinkingTHE TALMUD IS UNIQUE not only in its subject matter but also, and perhaps to an even greater extent, in the way it
4、discusses its themes. The same issues are handled in other ways by later halakhic and kabbalistic works. Many scholars have pondered the question of whether the Talmud has a logic of its own, and whether it would be possible to arrive at different conclusions on the basis of the same premises and as
5、sumptions if another logical method were employed. On various questions, as in the halakhic midrashim, it is possible to discern special patterns of analysis, exegetic rules that do not always correspond to the theories of other logical systems. But the question is whether talmudic scholarship creat
6、ed a unique Logical structure or merely utilized unique methods of demonstration. Dissimilar subjects sometimes call for varying techniques, and measures that are valid in one sphere may prove ineffective in others. In actual fact, it is possible to find classification of subjects by methods of anal
7、ysis and discussion even in the Talmud itself. For example, laws of sacrifice constitute a separate area regarding both subject matter and evidence. Of another category of teachings, regarded by tradition as “halakhah delivered by Moses on Sinai,“ it was said that the topic could not be discussed on
8、 the basis of any of the regular methods of study of halakhic midrash, however logical. Furthermore, in various spheres ein lemedim min ha-din (in other words, logical manipulations) could not be relied upon as a source of halakhah, but other methods, sanctioned by tradition, were utilized.Despite a
9、ll these limitations, the talmudic way of thinking and discourse may be regarded as a unique framework that can be understood from different standpoints but cannot be studied by other means. A basic factor is the attitude toward abstraction. n the Talmud, as in most areas of original Jewish thought,
10、 there is deliberate evasion of abstract thinking based on abstract concepts. Even matters that could easily be discussed through abstraction are analyzed, sometimes cumbersomely, by other methods, based mostly on unique logical systems aided by models. The Talmud employs models in place of abstract
11、 concepts. We have already noted the models cited in laws of damages, such as “horn“ or “foot,“ which serve neither as examples nor as parables but operate like modern mathematical or scientific models. The model is utilized in accordance with a series of clearly defined steps, approved by tradition
12、. Kal va-homer, for example, is a method applied to a certain model in order to adapt it to another model. Thus there is a high degree of mechanical thought, and no attempt is made to clarify prac6cal or logical problems per se; they are seen rather as complete entities, and their conclusions are of
13、 practical or logical significance, though it is not always possible to understand the convoluted methods of the operation itself.On the basis of these assumptions, it is possible to comprehend the method of danirn efshar mi-she-i efshar (deducing the possible from the impossible). According to this
14、 method we choose a certain passage and draw halakhic conclusions on another issue, employing one of the methods permissible in this context. Anyone contemplating the text will immediately discern that the basic inference is “impossible,“ since the first case, which is our model, appears to be found
15、ed on essentially different considerations. An example of such a discussion is the question of whether religious conversion is valid without circumcision. One of the sages wanted to demonstrate the truth of this assumption, citing the fact that women may be converted without undergoing circumcision.
16、 Against this, it may be argued that it is biologically impossible to perform circumcision on a woman. But this does not alter the validity of the halakhah, according to this sage, since he says: “Although it is impossible, it is an impressive piece of evidence.“ In other words, the evidence is base
17、d on a certain model and operates accordingly, without taking other aspects into consideration.Such methods of demonstration are utilized in our own century in various areas, but are not usually employed in everyday matters. The talmudic sages, on the other hand, applied exacting methods to every su
18、bject under the sun. The fact that their thought processes operated in such ways explains the structure of their world, which contains many models and in which abstract concepts are replaced by many illustrative examples (none of which can be taken at face value) elaborated in a variety of ways. The
19、 great advantage of employing such models, as opposed to abstract concepts, lies, inter alia, in the ability constantly to supervise the validity of methods of demonstration. The elemental and relatively simple modal serves as the basis for examination and enables us to draw inferences or examine wh
20、ether we have diverged from the fundamental issue through abstract thinking on unclear issues. The weakness of all abstract thought lies in the fact that it is constantly creating new terms and concepts, and since they cannot be defined except by use of similarly abstract terms, we can never know wh
21、ether they constitute a departure from the subject or are still relevant. Therefore we almost never find abstract terms in the Talmud, even when they would seems to be vital to the discussion and when any other legal system would have introduced them. Words such as authority, discipline, framework,
22、and spirituality have only recently been translated into Hebrew from other languages and philosophies. The Talmud very rarely employs such terms, although it frequently deals with the problems defined by these words in ways that differ greatly from those of other philosophical or legal systems,Anoth
23、er unique aspect of talmudic discussion is the attitude toward fundamental issues. The basic talmudic view is always that the subject under discussion is not “law,“ in the socio-legal meaning of the term, but the clarification of facts and actual situations of intrinsic importance. This attitude pro
24、duces consequences that are clearly evident in the Talmud itself. One of these is the lack of differentiation between important and minor issues, between the useful and the irrelevant. No value is placed on the practical or basic significance of a certain problem. The objective is to arrive at the t
25、ruth, which cannot be classified into components by order of importance. When it is necessary to discuss the solution to practical questions, certain restrictive measures are employed that determine the form of pure halakhic discussion. But the Talmud does not deal exclusively with legal solutions t
26、hat can be put into practice; any problem that calls for clarification and involves the search for the truth is regarded as worthy of analysis. It has already been noted that the Talmud often considers situations that not only border on the implausible but could under no circumstances have practical
27、 implications, since they are of strictly historical significance. Study of a remote and irrelevant subject may sometimes produce conclusions of practical value, but these are incidental, and the main objective is truth. Thus the scope of discourse is wider than even that of “pure science,“ since no
28、t only purely theoretical issues but even irrefutably disproved methods are examined thoroughly. As even an incorrect method may prove significant for the attainment of truth, its intrinsic value and veracity are studied closely. It is related that one of the sages once made a remark that implied co
29、ntempt for a totally rejected halakhic method. After the inner logic of the method had been explained to him, he visited the graves of the originators of the method to beg forgiveness for having slighted them.Another aspect of this same ardent search for truth is the method of demonstration. Attempt
30、s are often made to attain degrees of certainty, that are usually attainable only in the sphere of mathematics. The sages are not content with proving that an explanation is reasonable or highly probable in accordance with the simplest method. This may suffice in the natural sciences, or in the sphe
31、re of practical legislation, but the talmudic intellectual method is not content with such achievements. It endeavors to prove the validity of its conclusions beyond a shadow of a doubt and to preclude any alternative explanation. This is why the Talmud contains so many methods of rejection. After a
32、 certain rabbi has offered reasonable proof, another sage (or even the selfsame man) will seek an alternative interpretation of the issue. This second method, however tenuous and unlikely, can lead to the rejection, of the original method and to a renewed attempt to find irrefutable proof. This meth
33、od of argumentation is referred to in the Talmud as shinuya, and although the alternative argument is often highly improbable and based on tortuous logic, the Talmud will not accept the original evidence as long as it is imperfect or incomplete.The most striking aspect of talmudic pilpul (dialectica
34、l reasoning) is this inability to accept simple and apparently satisfactory proof, and the continued search for incontrovertible evidence. The quest for the flawless explanation sometimes leads to tenuous conclusions that may restrict halakhah to a very limited area. This method is not deliberately
35、encouraged, and attempts are always made to arrive at intellectually satisfactory explanations that adhere to the original texts. We often find a comment implying that if a tanna went to the trouble of formulating a comprehensive halakhah, he did not intend it to be applied only to one unusual case.
36、 But such a comment is in place only when the subject itself obliges the scholar to arrive at bizarre conclusions, In the Talmud, as in various spheres of exact science and knowledge, there is little room for *common sense,“ which in such cases would mean superficial understanding that fails to fath
37、om the depths of the problem.Also unique to talmudic thought is the underlying principle of many of the debates-the constant attempt to adapt methods and opinions to one another. In every case the tendency is to avoid controversy, to reduce to the minimum differences between methods and points of vi
38、ew. The sages will do everything possible to locate the common denominator. For example, it is often possible to interpret the method of a certain mishnah according to the views of one of the tannaim that fit in with the phrasing and inner logic of the text. But the sages usually try to find explana
39、tions for each mishnah and halakhic maxim to which all methods are applicable, although this sometimes obliges them to adopt the interpretation that seems least plausible from other points of view. The inner logic on which this approach is founded seems to operate in other spheres as well, and shoul
40、d be regarded as implying that halakhah does not consist of remote and detached statements but is based on experience, on the facts of life, not conjectures.It is a basic assumption in modern science, as in the Talmud, that those engaging in research should be regarded as honest seekers of truth. Th
41、us if there is a contradiction between die conclusions of two different experiments, attempts should be made to find a generally applicable theory, that takes note of all the experiments. It is always possible that a scholar may have erred in his logical or practical methods, but it is desirable to
42、avoid clashing with any of the methods, even though this attempt at consensus or compromise sometimes entails the construction of an extremely involved intellectual edifice. The same approach is adopted reward the methods of various scholars. It is assumed that each attempted to explore all the poss
43、ible intellectual processes in his quest for the true answer, and that every one of his statements should be accepted as true and integrated, insofar as possible, with the statements and rulings of other scholars. Therefore, even when it is obvious that there are differences of opinion, the sages tr
44、y to reconcile the methods and minimize the differences. It was customary to choose two seemingly incompatible methods and ask the authors to defend them against one another, to demonstrate that the two were in accord on most details. If the experiment proved successful, it was possible to show that
45、 the discrepancy between the conclusions was not the result of widely divergent approaches but was based on a subtle difference between the basic theories or a mere matter of taste.These methods of exposition do not aspire to historicity, since they make no attempt to reconstruct the mental processe
46、s of the early scholars. But this is not the main issue. Since we regard each ruling as a scientific experiment, each halakhah as the determination of an empirical fact, it follows that we must strive to explain matters in the most complete way and to arrive at the truth.Strange and Bizarre Problems
47、 ACQUAINTANCE with the basic talmudic methods furthers our comprehension of an ostensibly odd phenomenon - the bizarre and outlandish issues sometimes debated therein. The problems that are clarified with great thoroughness and seriousness are largely of practical and prosaic interest, and in some c
48、ases their solution has practical implications. But the Talmud also relates to questions that are extremely unlikely to arise in everyday life and to some that may not be totally unrealistic but appear absurd because details of infinitesimal importance are discussed with a gravity out of all proport
49、ion to their significance. Those cognizant of the Talmuds patterns of thinking are aware that hypothetical elucidation of an elemental problem can never be regarded as insignificant. Some questions may be insoluble within the talmudic text, but in seeking an answer the scholar presents a certain case, a model, with whose aid he tries to clarify the nature of the problem. There is yet another argument in favor of these discussions. Since the Talmud in general is not primarily concerned with practical application, almost all problems are granted equal weight. It is not the urgent need of a
