1、英文原文题目 Financial derivatives and the rise of circulation中文译名 金融衍生工具和流通量的上升英文原文出处 作者：爱德华里布马；本杰明李出版社：经济和社会 34 卷出版时间：2005 年 8 月 3 号译文（英译中）：金融衍生工具和流通量的上升流通的社会结构性成因激增的短期投机资本,通过这种承受风险的衍生物的流通而变得具体和富有生气, 似乎从正在进行的全球经济的基本社会结构的变革中反映，放大和升华(Eatwell and Taylor 2002)。上述现象更是使重要性日益增强的流动性与金融机构及工具的发展特别是在流动性资本方面的关系得到了不
2、断的发展(Pryke and Allen 2000)。这似乎是现代资本主义的内在动力强迫他们趋向于追逐更高的，更具全球范围意义的生产标准，那似乎是在产生那样一种能够连接自身成为社会结构价值的，逐渐上升的复杂标准。虽然在当时并没有发现,从二十世纪七十年代开始欧美工业生产的潜力已经耗尽了(Brenner 1998)，需要一定的空间来补救和修复(Harvey 2000; James 2001)。 许多行业需要探索新的途径来对更边缘的地区进行一体化（特别是南亚地区），以此来支撑受过度的产品生产和过多的资本积累强制驱动的，从而引发的关键性矛盾。正如斯皮罗所说(1999)，欧美资本主义所产生和吸收的资本量
3、（尤其是欧佩克成员国），在大部分现有的工业部门，已经超过了它能有利润的进行资本再投资的需求量。因此哈维(1982)所评论说“如果平衡被重新恢复，需要一个过程，即通过运行生产系统消除过剩的资本，那么资本过度积累的趋势将被自动抵消。”宗主国响应的一个关键性方面是欧美公司全球性的重组，开始把大量工业原材料的生产和原件的制造外包给那些较先进的发展中国家的较发达地区。通常是南亚，特别是中国是这次重组的主要受惠者(Singh 2002)。那些先进地区边缘的内陆地区也包括整个国家，比如巴基斯坦，也成为了原材料和手工劳动产品（例如：纺织品）的外包中心。尽管还有一些国家，特别是虽然不是只在沙哈拉以南的非洲地区，
4、他们参加这个过程仅仅给人以边缘的和偶然的感觉。正如邦德（2001）的分析师认为，像莫桑比克和乍得这样的国家，似乎被全球经济所孤立除了那些最受剥削的方面。生产的这一改组接连产生了那些传统解决办法不能解决的问题(Hoogvelt 1997)。与先前的国际贸易的形式形成对比，这种从二十世纪七十年代开始的重组活动，引发并导致了生产过程在基本投入阶段的破裂(Jones 2000)。契约化外包服务（在给定的时间范围内提供产品的协议）的增值和机构化，使得那些公司必须去解决的风险增加了，并且风险被重新配置。新的、表面上看来，更不容易控制的风险，例如政治风险、交易对手风险和货币风险，即将出现。为了规避这些风险，
5、正如希勒（1993）评论的那样，金融机构开始为企业客户开发衍生物及其市场。为了使那些衍生物变得富有效率，它们的市场需要是易变现的（具有流动性的） ，使公司负责人能够依照他们的需求来购买和销售。流动性需求连同这些市场自我扩张的结构，为吸收那些在宗主国过度积累的资本提供了新的出路和机会，孕育新的机构，比如对冲基金和新的银行业部门，那专门研究如何对管理投机资本。而且，因为资产池的不断扩大，及金融技术人员塑造出新的衍生工具合约来扩大投机资本的范围和最大限度的发挥投机资本的杠杆作用，加之新技术的运用使得在全球范围内不分昼夜的进行交易成为可能，这种资本的经济力量正在以指数方式增长。那些数字确实的让人惊奇：
6、每年进行交易的金融衍生工具的价值已经接近一百万亿美元，而绝大多数在未受管制的场外交易市场（OTC） 。根据美国财政部(2003)，那些银行集团企业，JP 摩根大通，目前已经有一个衍生成的有根基的能够控制超过两万亿美元外国货币的阵地，超过绝大多数国家的国民生产总值。因此生产的最重要的产物是迅速的成为连通性物流的生产活动，通信网络，金融工具和技术，用来援助和扩大其流通性。投机资本，金融衍生品和风险根据提示，金融衍生品是这个循环社会结构的一个组成部分，具有三个相互关联的因素。三个因素中首先是投机资本，这是一个巨大的，任意的，非生产导向性的和不断的扩大资金池移动性的，游动的，存在于绝大多数投资银行(例
7、如：高盛)，私自拥有对冲基金(e.g. LTCM)和特别是那些最大公司的财务部门（例如：通用电气财务公司）手中。这些银行、基金和部门坐落在文化和精神上，要不然的话就是欧洲和美国的地缘政治景观。第二个因素是金融衍生产品及其市场。这套联动体系在许多方面参与全球市场，其中最有意义的是扩大了这些产品的销售。这是重要的，因为金融衍生产品是投机资本在全球市场上所运用的最重要的工具。金融衍生产品在本质上是基于货币价格（即利率）或国家间货币的关系进行变动。从市场角度出发，它们似乎是必要的和自然的，因为它们被与在全球化当中其核心作用的流动性有关的风险所激发。最后一个因素是最近铸造成的和具有决定性的风险概念：是新
8、的，因为风险被从不确定的和限定的实体领域所抽取出来，因为它构成了这种产品和衍生物的价格。这些因素的构造和组合构成了金融流通文化的分子结构。虽然三者本身多不是新的，他们的组合，重新定义，制度化和技术放大在世界经济的运作方式上产生了根本性的转变，以流通的范围不断的扩大和自主性不断的增强为特点。因此衍生金融工具是重要的，因为它们是市场上承担投机资本的有效形式(Saber1999)，因为它们是流通最终的结构形态。全球化危机。投机资本采用这种形式，因为衍生工具将客观的各种风险统一为单一的工具，那些来自合并风险的几乎无限制的杠杆效应和被用于对冲和投机的能力。核心是客观化的过程，因为衍生产品不具备具体的形态
9、，但是社会想象的对象利用语言所具有的分类能力将那些有特色的和有独立关系的联系起来。因此客观化在这里是指通过当代金融界所表现出来的过程，像一个没有指挥的的管弦乐队一样运作，使一个社会的复杂融合具体化，政治的和经济的关系变为一个单一的可辨认的标的（衍生合约） ，然后似乎是不依赖于这些关系，因为这些关系不是那些标的或工具明显表现的一个部分。衍生工具看起来似乎是一个简单的合约，它允许买者和卖者进行投机和套期保值，虽然，就像它分析的展示那样，这将会变得清楚，这仅仅是一个相当复杂现象的表现。Financial derivatives and the rise of circulationThe socio
10、-structural genesis of circulationThe explosive rise of short-term speculative capital, embodied in and animated by the circulation of the risk-bearing derivative, seems to reflect, amplify and arise from ongoing transformations in the basic socio-structures of the globalizing economy (Eatwell and T
11、aylor 2002). This much more than economic transformation turns on the evolving relationship between the rising importance of circulation and the development of financial institutions and instruments that specialize in the circulations of capital (Pryke and Allen 2000). It appears that the internal d
12、ynamic of modern capitalism that compels it to drive towards higher, more globally encompassing levels of production seems to be generating such progressively ascending levels of complexity that connectivity itself is becoming a socio-structuring value. Though it went unnoticed at the time, beginnin
13、g in the 1970s EuroAmerican industrial manufacturing had begun to exhaust much of its productive potential (Brenner 1998) and to require a spatial remedy or a fix (Harvey 2000: xxx; James 2001: 204). Industries of many types needed to discover new ways to incorporate more marginal regions (particula
14、rly South Asia) to shore up critical contradictions instigated by its compulsion to overproduce goods and over-accumulate capital. As Spiro (1999) has shown, EuroAmerican capitalism was generating and absorbing (especially from OPEC members) more capital than it could profitably reinvest in the majo
15、rity of existing industrial sectors. So Harvey observes that if equilibrium is to be re-established, then the tendency towards overaccumulation must be counterbalanced by processes that eliminate the surplus capital (1982: 193) circulating through the production system.A key dimension of the metropo
16、litan response was a global restructuring in which EuroAmerican companies began to outsource much of the production of industrial materials and component manufacturing to the more developed regions of the more advanced developing nations. Southeast Asia generally and China in particular were the mai
17、n beneficiaries of this restructuring (Singh 2002: 241-6). The hinterlands of the advanced periphery as well as entire countries, such as Pakistan, became outsourcing centres for raw materials and manual labour production (e.g. textiles). Still other states, particularly though not only in sub-Sahar
18、an Africa, participated in this process in only the most marginal and episodic sense. Analysts such as Bond (2001) have argued that countries such as Mozambique and Chad seem isolated from all but the most exploitative aspects of the global economy.This reorganization of production has continued to
19、generate problems of connectivity immune to traditional solutions (Hoogvelt 1997: ch. 3). In contrast to previous forms of international trade, this reorganization that began in the 1970s arose from a fragmentation of the production processes at the level of basic inputs (Jones 2000). The proliferat
20、ion and institutionalization of contractual outsourcing (an agreement to supply a product over a given time span) reconfigured and increased the risks that corporations had to deal with. New and seemingly less easily manageable risks-such as political, counterparty and currency risks-appeared on the
21、 horizon. To hedge against these risks, financial institutions began, as Shiller (1993) observes, to develop derivatives and their markets for their corporate clientele. In order for these derivatives to be effective, their markets needed to be liquid, the principals able to buy and sell as their ne
22、eds demanded. The demand for liquidity together with the self-expansive structure of these markets furnished a new avenue and opportunity for absorbing the over-accumulation of capital in the metropole, giving birth to new institutions, such as hedge funds and new banking divisions, that specialized
23、 in managing speculative capital. And, as the pools of capital expanded, as financial technicians cast new derivative contracts to expand the reach and maximize the leverage of speculative capital, and as new technologies permitted instantaneous around-the-clock trading worldwide, the economic power
24、 of such capital grew exponentially. The numbers are truly staggering: the value of the financial derivatives now traded annually approximates 100 trillion dollars, the vast majority in the unregulated over-the-counter market (OTC). According to the US Treasury (2003), the banking conglomerate, JP M
25、organ Chase, presently has derivatively based positions that control over two trillion dollars in foreign currency, more than the gross national product of all but a few nations. So productions most important product is fast becoming the production of connectivity-the logistics, communication networ
26、ks, financial instruments and technologies used to aid and amplify connectivity.Speculative capital, financial derivatives and riskAs intimated, financial derivatives are part of a socio-structure of circulation that has three interconnected elements. The first of these elements is speculative capit
27、al. This is a huge, discretionary, non-production directed and continually expanding pool of mobile, nomadic, opportunistic capital that resides in the hands of major investment banks (e.g. Goldman Sachs), privately owned hedge funds (e.g. LTCM) and the financial divisions of especially the largest
28、corporations (exemplified by GE Capital). These banks, funds and divisions are located in the cultural and mental if not always geopolitical landscapes of Europe and the United States. The second element is the financial derivative products and markets. This set of linked institutions participates i
29、n global markets in many ways, the most significant of which is increasingly the marketing of these products. This is important because financial derivatives are the principal instrument that speculative capital uses in the global marketplace. Financial derivatives are essentially wagers on changes
30、in the price of money (i.e. interest rates) or relationships among national currencies. From the viewpoint of the market, they appear to be necessary and natural because they are motivated by the risks associated with the connectivities lying at the heart of globalization. The final element is a new
31、ly minted and determinative conception of risk: new because risk has here become abstracted from the concrete universe of uncertainties and determinative because it constitutes the basis for the production and pricing of derivatives. The construction and combination of the elements constitute the mo
32、lecular structure of what we call the culture of financial circulation. Though none of the three elements is itself new, their combination, redefinition, institutionalization and technological amplification are producing a fundamental shift in how the world economy works, characterized by the growin
33、g power and autonomy of the sphere of circulation.Financial derivatives are therefore important because they are the functional form that speculative capital assumes in the marketplace (Saber1999: 128-9); and because they are the structural form that circulates andglobalizes risk. Speculative capita
34、l takes this form because derivatives unify in a single instrument the objectification of various types of risk, the almost unlimited leveraging of those amalgamated risks and the capacity to be used for hedging and speculation. The process of objectification is central because derivatives are not c
35、oncrete, but socially imaginary objects that use the classifying powers of language to tie together sets of distinctive and separate relations. So objectification here denotes the process by which the contemporary financial community, operating much like an orchestra without a conductor, concretizes
36、 a complex amalgamation of social, economic and political relations into a single recognizable object (derivatives contract) that then appears to be independent of these relations because these relations are not part of the manifest appearance of the object or instrument. The derivative appears to be simply a contract that permits buyers and sellers to speculate or hedge, though, as the analysis unfolds, it will become clear that this is simply the appearance of a considerably more complex phenomenon.
