1、 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLEThis article was downloaded by: Curtin University LibraryOn: 19 October 2008Access details: Access Details: subscription number 778558588Publisher RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mo
2、rtimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UKJournal of Applied Communication ResearchPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http:/ Agents: The Forgotten Publics in Crisis Communication and IssuesManagement ResearchDamion Waymer; Robert L. HeathOnline Publication Da
3、te: 01 February 2007To cite this Article Waymer, Damion and Heath, Robert L.(2007)Emergent Agents: The Forgotten Publics in Crisis Communication andIssues Management Research,Journal of Applied Communication Research,35:1,88 108To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00909880601065730URL: http:/dx.doi
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6、e liable for any loss,actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directlyor indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.Emergent Agents: The ForgottenPublics in Crisis Communication andIssues Management ResearchDamion
7、Waymer Hurricane Katrina; Emergent Agents; Transcendence;Issues Management; Public Relations; SecurityMany crises arise when key stakeholders are harmed by organizations (in)actions, yet,in public relations and crisis communication research and literature, we rarely areexposed to the voices of many
8、forgotten publics. Almost overwhelmingly, crisiscommunication research and literature, which are dominated by the managerialperspective, serve as a manual for ways that organizations can handle crises at hand,avoid legal sanctions and punitive damages, and address displeased publics. In suchanalyses
9、, there is little or no attention to the voices of the affected publics, those whoseinterests are part or most of the reason why the subject organization is suffering a crisisand in need of responding to public and media inquiry. In this essay, we advance theview that crisis communication research,
10、strategy, and responses will continue to beDamion Waymer (Ph.D., Purdue University) is Assistant Professor of Communication at the University ofHouston. Robert L. Heath (Ph.D., University of Illinois) is Professor of Communication at the University ofHouston. Correspondence to: Damion Waymer, Univer
11、sity of Houston, School of Communication, 101Communication Building, Houston, TX 77204, USA. E-mail: dwaymeruh.eduISSN 0090-9882 (print)/ISSN 1479-5752 (online) # 2007 National Communication AssociationDOI: 10.1080/00909880601065730Journal of Applied Communication ResearchVol. 35, No. 1, February 20
12、07, pp. 88C1108Downloaded By: Curtin University Library At: 17:25 19 October 2008deficient until the perspectives of the publics affected by the crises are taken intoaccount fully. By focusing on these affected publics and their advocates, we hope to addboth complexity and clarity to this literature
13、 by providing communication scholarswith a lens through which to study the smaller nuances that surface when emergentagents discourses are incorporated into the larger landscape of crisis situations.In this document, we use the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina as the case foranalysis. Specifical
14、ly, we rhetorically analyze the discourses of U.S. Senators MaryLandrieu and Barrack Obama. We use their official statements, press releases, andPodcasts about the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina and the nation as texts foranalysis. The Katrina crisis enabled these two individuals to emerge fro
15、m the shadowsof the Senate. This emergence, in turn, contributes further to the crisis challenges thatthe Bush administration faces.We chose to focus on Senators Landrieu and Obama for the following reasons.First, we believe that many of their statements can be interpreted as representations ofthe f
16、eelings and opinions of many Katrina sufferers. Specifically, Senator Landrieu isan elected official who is supposed to represent the interests of her constituents.Second, we believe that statements from the two Senators helped procure larger sumsof money for Katrina sufferers and restoration effort
17、s from the Bush administrationthan would have been allocated if public utterances and actions were not in evidence.Third, their statements helped to ensure that funds allocated for Katrina sufferers andrestoration efforts were not misappropriated or mishandled. Fourth, despite MayorNagins being Loui
18、sianas most animated and colorful advocate for Katrina suffers,Senator Landrieus voice, from a national perspective, was likely to have a greaterimpact in the Senate and on the Bush administration than the Mayors and those ofmost other Louisiana government officials. Moreover, due to her Democratic
19、Partyaffiliation, Landrieu was likely to have more freedom in her speech and actions thanRepublican Louisiana Senator David Vitter when seeking funds and support forLouisianas most vulnerable citizens.In addition to the preceding reasons for choosing the two individuals noted, wechose to analyze Sen
20、ator Obamas discourse because he is currently the only U.S.Senator of African descent. Since the federal governments slow response was to somean issue of race, Obama might have felt compelled to speak on behalf of the manyblack, voiceless faces, as well as appease his strong African-American constit
21、uency inIllinois. Obama, however, transcended racial issues in his discourse. In our view,Senator Obamas discourse and his physical location (in a Midwest state) helped toshift discussions about Katrina from a terrible disaster affecting some citizens in theSouth to a national conversation. To illus
22、trate this point further, take into accountthat Chicago is a Midwestern city that experiences snow and occasional tornados;however, it is not likely to experience the mass destructiveness of a Category 5hurricane or an earthquake registering 8 on the Richter Scale. Thus, Obamasdiscourse reminds us t
23、hat the discussions surrounding Katrina should not fade intoconversations that frame these events as a Ray Nagin and New Orleans issue or aLouisiana problem; these conversations should be national in scope and shouldaddress national safety and security.Emergent Agents 89Downloaded By: Curtin Univers
24、ity Library At: 17:25 19 October 2008By displaying transcendence and discovering common ground in what might be,might otherwise become, or might already have been perceived as a polarized issue ofrace, Senators Landrieu and Obama sagely responded to this national disaster bycleverly appropriating th
25、e administrations favored term security in their discourse.In this essay, we show how Senators Landrieu and Obama appropriated and stretchedthe traditional dividing lines in such a way that the term resonated with publicsentiments about the governments responsibility to its citizens. Simply put, our
26、analysis demonstrates ways that the rhetorical strategy of transcendence can be usedby affected publics and their advocates to modify the narrative of being in control(see Heath, 1997) that the organizations experiencing the crises want to employconsistently. Moreover, our analysis reveals how a fai
27、lure to respond to an initial crisissituation (silence or inadequate communication and action) can lead to a new crisisof organizational legitimacy.We first establish the foundation from which to consider natural disasters, such asHurricane Katrina, as legitimate crisis situations by weaving togethe
28、r scholarlyliterature pertaining to natural disasters with communication literature thatillustrates what counts as a crisis, as well as the manner in which crises threatenorganizational legitimacy. Next, through a review of the crisis management literature,we identify what we consider to be the mana
29、gerial bias in crisis communicationresearch. We then establish the import of including the often overlooked publicsdiscourses and demonstrate how this managerial bias leads to deficient crisismanagement theories, strategies, and responses. We do this, in part, by analyzingselected texts from Senator
30、s Mary Landrieu and Barrack Obama. We conclude bydrawing implications for the study of crisis communication, issues management, andpublic relations.Natural Disasters as Crisis Communication SituationsCrises are predictable yet untimely events that have possible and/or actualconsequences for the orga
31、nization suffering the crisis, that organizations reputation,and its multiple publics, stakeholders, and their interests (Benoit, 1997; Brinson Coombs, 1995, 1999; Hearit, 1994; Heath, 1997; Seeger, Sellnow, Seeger the failure of anadequate response precipitates a crisis.Adequacy of PreparationOn Mo
32、nday August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina*the sixth strongest storm everrecorded in the Atlantic basin*made landfall in Louisiana and Mississippi.Hurricane Katrina, with estimated damage costs between $70 billion and $130billion, was the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history. Millions of Gul
33、f Coastresidents encountered both forced evacuation and forced displacement as a result ofthis hurricane, but none were harmed to the magnitude of the citizens of NewOrleans. Many lost lives, homes, and livelihood. Routines were dramaticallydisrupted, families torn apart, and futures threatened, inc
34、luding the possibility,even certainty, that many would never return to their homes.The assumption that preparation could have been no better is largely hollow. Manyknowledgeable voices predicted storms of this magnitude and the accompanyingdamage, as did producers of a National Geographic special. D
35、iscussing the natural,act of God, manifestation of risk as crisis, Lerbinger (1997) has reasoned: Disasterscaused by nature are considered acts of God because they are generallyuncontrollable and the public tends to accept them fatalistically (p. 57). Never-theless, Lerbinger (1997) emphasized how e
36、mergency management planning andresponse are important elements of a natural crisis and, therefore, the adequacy of theresponse. Those affected can well ask whether authorities took the proper measures topredict, avoid, and prepare to mitigate the damage, and respond to aid recovery.In a similar vei
37、n, Seeger and Ulmer (2002) have observed: For organizations, crisisrepresents a fundamental threat to the very stability of the system, a questioning ofcore assumptions and beliefs, and risk to high priority goals, including organizationalimage, legitimacy, profitably and ultimately survival (p. 126
38、). In this particular case,if multiple stakeholders believe that the federal governments preparation for thisstorm was inadequate, threats to its legitimacy and questions concerning itscompetence are likely to arise, as others have noted (Hearit, 1995, 1997; Sethi, 1977).Emergent Agents 91Downloaded
39、 By: Curtin University Library At: 17:25 19 October 2008Hearit (1995) suggested that the first criterion*competence*must be satisfiedfor those responding to a crisis to achieve and maintain legitimacy (p. 2). In ourview, the federal governments planning and initial response to the crisis posed byKat
40、rina was inadequate, if not downright incompetent.The analysis of Katrina can focus on planning and communication prior to a stormof that magnitude, the response during the manifestation of the risk (communicationand emergency response), and the reaction following the storm (restoration andcommunica
41、tion). This approach to crisis deals with three stages: pre-crisis, crisis, andpost-crisis. Millar and Heath (2004) featured this three-part approach and offeredvarious best practices and research propositions to guide future research and crisisplanning and response. Three of these principles guided
42、 the current research project:(1) Vigilant preparation (by self-reflective organizations) can reduce the likelihood of acrisis and increase the responsiveness of the organization to demonstrate its ability toestablish control over its operations (Heath, 2004b, p. 35). (Pre-crisis)(2) Researchers can
43、 investigate the types of narratives that are used to explain crises andthe extent to which conflicting narratives divide some stakeholders from others inregard to the way in which each crisis is understood and evaluated (Heath, 2004c, p.151). (Crisis)(3) Communication results from the need for sens
44、e making, which is a collective co-created activity. Crisis creates rhetorical problems that demand that sense be made ofdecisions and events. The organization suffering the crisis is expected to understandand respond to the various kinds of sense that are being made. Savvy practitionersunderstand t
45、hat stakeholders are capable of creating, and motivated to create, theirown sense of the situation. Responses are likely to be more successful when theyacknowledge the mutuality of sense making. (Heath, 2004a, 249). (Post-crisis)Adequacy of ResponseKatrina demonstrated the relevance of these proposi
46、tions and accompanying manage-rial and communication planning. One of the most dramatic, not to mention tragic,aspects of the storm was that early during the event looting received more attentionthan the dire health and safety issues inflicted on New Orleanss population, whichcould not respond well
47、with the resources available. The city lacked a coordinated planto help victims find shelter, and lacked communication infrastructures by whichcitizens could request help and report dire and emerging consequences of the stormsdamage. Citizens often lacked transportation and financial resources to re
48、duce thelikelihood that they were in harms way. To these stakeholders, their government wasdisplaying behavior that threw its legitimacy into question.Threats to organizational legitimacy occur when perceived responsibility andresponse are not congruent. Sethi (1977) referred to this disparity as th
49、e legitimacygap. Moreover, organizations that face social legitimacy crises due to exigencies thatare a result of policies that interest groups charge to be unethical and irresponsible areviewed generally to have violated the values of honesty, responsibility, and/or self92 D. Waymer people were dying; long policydiscussion of what to do and what not to do was not an option; and these agents andagencies needed to act
