1、Committee on Prevention of Proliferation of Biological Weapons in States Beyond the Former Soviet UnionOffice for Central Europe and EurasiaDevelopment, Security, and CooperationPolicy and Global AffairsTHE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001NOTICE: The project that
2、is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committee responsible for the repo
3、rt were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance.This study was supported by Contract No. DTRA01-02-D-0003 between the National Academy of Sciences and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this p
4、ublication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations or agencies that provided support for the project.International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-13176-6 (Book)International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-13176-6 (Book)International Standard Book
5、Number-13: 978-0-309-13703-4 (PDF)International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-13703-9 (PDF)Library of Congress Control Number: 2009926975A limited number of copies are available from the Office for Central Europe and Eur-asia, National Research Council, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 2000
6、1; (202) 334-2376.Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, N.W., Lockbox 285, Washington, DC 20055; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313 (in the Washington metropolitan area); Internet, http:/www.nap.edu.Copyright 2009 by the National Academy of
7、 Sciences. All rights reserved.Printed in the United States of AmericaThe National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use
8、for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone is president of the National Academy of Sciences.The National Acade
9、my of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advi
10、sing the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. Charles M. Vest is president of the National Academy of Engineering.The I
11、nstitute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examina-tion of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academ
12、y of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Harvey V. Fineberg is president of the Institute of Medicine.The National Research Council was organized by the Nationa
13、l Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academys purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating a
14、gency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Ralph J. Cicerone and D
15、r. Charles M. Vest are chair and vice chair, respectively, of the National Research Council.www.national-academies.orgCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF PROLIFERATION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN STATES BEYOND THE FORMER SOVIET UNIONAdel A. F. Mahmoud, Chair, Princeton UniversityDavid A. Ashford, U.S. Departmen
16、t of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Sao Paulo, BrazilGail H. Cassell, Eli Lilly and CompanyClaire Cornelius, U.S. Army Veterinary CorpsTimothy Endy, State University of New York, Upstate Medical UniversityHarvey Rubin, University of Pennsylvania School of MedicineRichard L.
17、 Witter, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service (retired)ConsultantSusanna K. Partridge, Centers for Disease Control and PreventionNational Research Council StaffGlenn E. Schweitzer, Director, Office for Central Europe and EurasiaPatricia Koshel, Senior Program Officer, Scienc
18、e and Technology for Sustainability ProgramAnne Harrington, Director, Committee on International Security and Arms ControlKelly Robbins, Senior Program Officer, Office for Central Europe and EurasiaMerc Fox, Senior Program Assistant, Office for Central Europe and EurasiaAcknowledgmentsThis report ha
19、s been reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Academies Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the
20、 institution in making its published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manu-script remain confidential to protect the integrity of the process. We wi
21、sh to thank the following individuals for their review of this report: Carol Blair, Colorado State University; John Clements, Tulane University; Scott Dowell, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; David Franz, Midwest Research Institute; Christopher Howson, March of Dimes; Michael Imperiale, U
22、niversity of Michigan; James LeDuc, University of Texas at Galveston; Henry Metzger, National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases; Alfred Watkins, the World Bank; and Tilahun Yilma, University of California at Davis.Although the reviewers listed above have provided many cons
23、tructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations, nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Mary Jane Osborn, Uni-versity of Connecticut, and Rita Colwell, University of Maryland. A
24、ppointed by the National Academies, they were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with institutional procedures and that all review comments were carefully consid-ered. Responsibility for the final content of this report rests e
25、ntirely with the authoring committee and the institution.In addition to the formal reviewers of the report, there were many others iiiii ACKNOWLEDGMENTSwho offered their time and expertise over the course of the studys develop-ment. Appendixes A and B identify many of the individuals and organizatio
26、ns that provided important insights for the committee. Also, we would like to single out the excellent support provided by Shawn Cali, manager of the Bio-logical Threat Reduction Program, who responded on short notice to many requests from the committee for information.Adel A. F. Mahmoud, Chair Nati
27、onal Research Council Committee on Prevention of Proliferation of Biological Weapons in States Beyond the Former Soviet UnionGlenn E. Schweitzer, Director Office for Central Europe and Eurasia,National Research CouncilContentsSummary 1Introduction 131 Security Context for Geographical Expansion of t
28、he Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense 252 Capacities of Developing Countries to Counter Biological Threats 473 Applicability of Biological Threat Reduction Approaches in the Former Soviet Union to Other Developing Countries 594 Biosecurity-Related Activities of Other Or
29、ganizations 915 Policy and Program Coordination and Integration 1116 Recommendations 119Appendixes A Presenters at Committee Meetings 129B Organizations that Provided Background Information 131C Summary Reports of Field Visits 133D Organizations Considered by the Biological Threat Reduction Program
30、as Stakeholders in the Program 143ixx CONTENTSE Selected Department of Defense Entities with Relevant Programs 145F Selected U.S. Government Departments and Agencies with Relevant Programs 151G Activities of International Organizations 159H International Health Regulations 167I Selected Foundations
31、173J Interagency International Bio-Engagement Working Group 177K Relevant Studies 179L Biographies of Committee Members 183SummaryThe National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 called for a study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) on the prevention of proliferation of biological weapons. The
32、study was to consider several issues concerning U.S. cooperation in this field with developing countries other than states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) within the framework of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program that is administered by the Department of Defense (DOD). Specifically, Co
33、ngress requested that the study (a) assess the capacity of developing countries to control dual-use technologies, (b) assess coopera-tive nonproliferation approaches used in the FSU that could be used in other countries, (c) review other international programs that may contribute to non-proliferatio
34、n, and (d) recommend steps for integrating DODs nonproliferation activities with other relevant U.S. government programs outside the FSU.1 DOD has supported biological nonproliferation activities in seven coun-tries of the FSU during the past 12 years at a cost of about $800 million within the frame
35、work of the CTR Program. These activities, referred to as the Bio-logical Threat Reduction Program (BTRP), are scheduled to continue in the FSU for at least 5 years. At present, the largest activity is establishment of the 1 For the purposes of this summary as well as the full report, biologicalweap
36、ons include any biological pathogens and associated toxins that could be deliberately misused to cause significant harm to humans or agricultural resources. Biosecurity encompasses all direct and indirect mea-sures that contribute significantly to (a) preventing inappropriate persons from gaining ac
37、cess to materials, equipment, or technology that could be used in producing biological weapons; or (b) detecting, characterizing, or responding to outbreaks of diseases that involve biological pathogens. It encompasses, but is much broader than, biosafety. Biosafety covers the application of knowled
38、ge, techniques, and equipment to prevent personnel, laboratory, or environmental exposure to po-tentially infectious agents or biohazards. “Developing countries” include more than 130 low- and middle-income countries outside the FSU, as defined by the World Bank. COUNTERINGBIOLOGICALTHREATSThreat Ag
39、ent Detection and Response (TADR) system. This system is devoted to upgrading capabilities of partner governments to detect, characterize, and respond to outbreaks of infectious diseases, and particularly diseases associated with especially dangerous pathogens. BTRP also assists partner governments
40、in developing biosecurity policies and regulations at the national level and pro-vides training and technical assistance at the facility level. Finally, it supports cooperative research programs.DOD anticipates reaching an annual level of BTRP expenditures of about $250 million during the next 5 yea
41、rs, including funding for activities in devel-oping countries beyond the FSU. In this regard, DOD has begun considering efforts directed to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, although no commitments to these countries have been made.This summary sets forth principal fin
42、dings and recommendations of the study using primarily information available as of November 30, 2008. The importance of strengthening existing health and agriculture disease surveillance and response capabilities of partner governments, which overlap in many ways with systems for preventing and redu
43、cing the impact of bioterrorism incidents, is a recurring theme of this summary and the full report. Poor countries cannot afford a separate surveillance system for pathogens of bioterrorism concern and a surveillance system for other disease agents. Also, several U.S. government departments and age
44、ncies have relevant international activities and capabilities, and the importance of BTRP operating within an interagency framework is an essential aspect of much of the discussion. The full report elaborates on the findings and recommendations and presents additional observations.SECURITY CONTEXTIn
45、 low-income countries and many areas of middle-income countries, the primary security issue for hundreds of millions of people is survivalenough food and water, adequate shelter, and tolerable levels of diseases. Unemploy-ment and underemployment are high in many areas of the world. Sometimes impove
46、rished populations also must cope with insurgents, terrorists, and gangstersand even full-scale warsthat force them to move to unfamiliar sur-roundings. Neither the governments nor the populations in these circumstances can give priority to combating bioterrorism, which until now has not become a si
47、gnificant threat in their countries. However, they do know that naturally occurring diseases cause suffering and deaths and can have debilitating impacts on society (see Box S-1).Meanwhile, many international specialists have highlighted the urgency of addressing bioterrorism on a broad scale (see B
48、ox S-2). An attack with roots in a developing country could claim victims within or outside the country. It could be a serious setback for positive aspects of the countrys political and economic agendas by diverting resources to yet another impediment to development. SUMMARY More broadly, the worldw
49、ide psychological impact of a major bioterrorism incident would be traumatic.The infrastructure required to support a bioterrorism attack is relatively small, but the infrastructure for countering an attack is complex. A variety of factors are important in detecting and responding both to naturally
50、occurring and to malevolently instigated outbreaks of diseases. Some pathogens found in nature, as well as other genetically engineered disease agents, could be dispersed by terrorist organizations or by individuals motivated by personal animosity or financial considerations. Major responsibilities
