1、CONFLICTS TO COME | 15 SCENARIOS FOR 2030 CHAILLOT PAPER / 16115 scenarios for 2030Edited byFlorence GaubWith contributions fromNatasha E. Bajema, Lotje Boswinkel, Daniel Fiott, Franz-Stefan Gady, Zoe Stanley-Lockman, Kathleen J. McInnis, Nicolas Minvielle, Andrew Monaghan, Katariina Mustasilta, Ali
2、 Fathollah-Nejad, Patryk Pawlak, Tobias Pietz, Sinikukka Saari, Stanislav Secrieru, Simona R. Soare, Bruno Tertrais and Olivier WatheletCONFLICTS TO COMECHAILLOT PAPER / 161December 2020每 日 免 费 获 取 报 告1、每日微信群内分享7 +最新重磅报告；2、每日分享当日华尔街日报、金融时报；3、每周分享经济学人4、行研报告均为公开版，权利归原作者所有，起点财经仅分发做内部学习。扫一扫二维码关注公号回复：研究报
3、告加入“起点财经”微信群。 European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)100, avenue de Suffren 75015 Paris http:/www.iss.europa.eu Director: Gustav Lindstrom EU Institute for Security Studies, 2020. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated.The views exp
4、ressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.print ISBN 978-92-9198-973-7CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-20-005-EN-CISSN 1017-7566DOI 10.2815/101723online ISBN 978-92-9198-972-0CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-20-005-EN-NISSN 1683-4917DOI 1
5、0.2815/966219Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Belgium by Bietlot. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2020. Cover image credit: Daniel Cheung/unsplashCHAILLOT PAPER / 161December 2020CONFLICTS TO COME15 scenarios for 2030Edited byFlorence GaubWith
6、contributions fromNatasha E. Bajema, Lotje Boswinkel, Daniel Fiott, Franz-Stefan Gady, Zoe Stanley-Lockman, Kathleen J. McInnis, Nicolas Minvielle, Andrew Monaghan, Katariina Mustasilta, Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Patryk Pawlak, Tobias Pietz, Sinikukka Saari, Stanislav Secrieru, Simona R. Soare, Bruno Ter
7、trais and Olivier WatheletThe EUISS Chaillot Paper seriesThe Chaillot Paper series, launched in 1991, takes its name from the Chaillot hill in the Trocadro area of Paris, where the Institutes first premises were located in the building oc-cupied by the Western European Union (WEU). The hill is parti
8、cularly known for the Palais de Chaillot which was the site of the signing of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and housed NATOs provisional head-quarters from 1952 until 1959.The editorFlorence Gaub is the Deputy Director of the EUISS. She specialises in strategic foresight, as
9、well as security and conflict in the Middle East and North Africa.1CONTENTSINTRODUCTIONOn the future of conflict 2Florence GaubOn the use of science fiction for conflict foresight 9Nicolas Minvielle and Olivier WatheletTHE PEOPLE GO TO WAR: OF GRIEF AND GRIEVANCESMarx goes Gulf 17The rise of the wor
10、king classAli Fathollah-NejadGreen terror? 21The environment fights backKatariina MustasiltaThe digital road to hell 25The people versus techStanislav SecrieruI 30Culture in the crosshairsTobias PietzChickens coming home to roost 34Mercenaries strike backSinikukka SaariTHE BIG FIGHT: THE RETURN OF C
11、ONVENTIONAL WARAt long last 41The US-Russian warAndrew MonaghanGlobo-cops last fight 46China and the US clash in AfricaKathleen J. McInnisThe Viber invasion 51How Russia occupied MontenegroFranz-Stefan GadyTaiwan attrition 55China crosses the RubiconBruno TertraisEvery trick in the book 60A story of
12、 Russia and LithuaniaNatasha E. BajemaTHE INGENIOUS CONFLICT: OF ISSUES AND METHODSHunt for the unmanned Red October 71The rise of the underwater droneZoe Stanley-LockmanPolar power play 76Chinese-Russian relations on iceBruno TertraisVirtual Congo 81Or the limits of technological superiorityDaniel
13、FiottSyria 85The Chinese reloadLotje BoswinkelIrans Code Revolution 91The fight for human cyber rightsPatryk PawlakPolicy considerations 96Conflict in the age of lost innocenceSimona R. SoareAbbreviations 103Notes on the contributors 1042There is arule of thumb in foresight: the larger the human fac
14、tor in the field whose future you are trying to anticipate, the more difficult it will be to get it right. The reason is simple: our-selves. No other future factor is as stubborn to predict, or as hard to understand as the human being. Quite in contrast to the bold claims of rational choice theory,
15、human behaviour is not easily modelled, whether at personal or state level. Nowhere does this become more apparent than in the diverse and contradictory body of knowledge seeking to understand why conflicts among humans emerge, continue or end, and how they are being fought. As one study put it, “hi
16、story is littered with mistaken predictions about the future of warfare”.1Because conflict is deeply existential, de-stroying lives and livelihoods, it is also aphe-nomenon that many researchers have tried to understand better in order to make it more pre-dictable and, indeed, they should continue t
17、o do so. After all, despite claims that conflict will soon disappear altogether, it is still very much present today and the last decade in particu-lar has seen an increase in the number of violent conflicts around the world.2 Since 2010, nearly 900,000 lives were lost to politically motivated viole
18、nce, and in 2019 alone the world witnessed 121 active conflicts.1 Raphael S. Cohen et al., The Future of Warfare in 2030: Project Overview and Conclusions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), https:/www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2849z1.html.2 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nat
19、ure: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Penguin, 2011); Aaron Clauset, “Trends and fluctuations in the severity of interstate wars”, Science Advances, February 2018, https:/advances.sciencemag.org/lens/advances/4/2/eaao3580#toc.3 Tate Ryan Mosley, “We are finally getting better at predicting organ
20、ized conflict”, MIT Technology Review, October 24, 2019, https:/ Matina Halkia et al, ”The Global Conflict Risk Index: Artificial Intelligence for Conflict Prevention”, JRC Technical Reports, 2020, https:/publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC118746/ai_gcri_technical_report.pdf.There
21、 have been broadly three approach-es used to anticipate conflict: those looking at push-factors (including aspects such as socio-economic development, political insti-tutions and arms acquisitions), those looking at pull-factors (including the regional or in-ternational context), and those trying to
22、 un-derstand the shape and tactics of conflicts to come. Whereas the insights of the first two are primarily useful to policymakers interested in conflict prevention, the latter is useful to those preparing for the worst-case scenario, war.The first area, looking primarily at internal causes for con
23、flict, has made remarkable pro-gress over the last decade thanks to Big Data and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Models such as the Early Warning Project or Uppsala Universi-tys ViEWS, Lockheed Martins Integrated Cri-sis Early Warning System, or the EUs Conflict Early Warning System (CEWS) use histori
24、cal data on conflicts and their (assumed) drivers and statistical inferences and machine learning techniques to forecast future conflict trends.3 Working within awindow of 1-36 months be-fore conflict onset, their predictive accuracy can reach 80% but they are better at forecast-ing the continuation of aconflict or spill-over of conflicts than anticipating new conflicts.INTRODUCTIONON THE FUTURE OF CONFLICTbyFLORENCE GAUB
