1、第四讲、运用实验方法进行经济学研究 主讲人：陈叶烽 （北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院） 2011年12月2日 四川 成都 （欢迎讨论， ）,西南财经大学实验经济学短期课程“实验的设计和具体操作”专题讲座,讲解内容,一、实验经济学方法论的争议二、实验经济学能做什么？三、在国内进行实验研究的优劣点分析四、具体实验研究案例展示之公平的本质研究（结合11月29日听课师生作为被试参与的实验，需实验完成后补充更新此部分PPT）五、具体实验研究案例展示之人类合作之谜研究（结合11月30日听课师生作为被试参与的实验，需实验完成后补充更新此部分PPT ）,一、实验经济学的方法论争议,1.归根到底经济学研究人的决
2、策行为，但是行为决策如何观察得到数据呢？ 一手数据还是二手数据？：一手数据更容易被接受蔡洪滨AER论文田野实验 柯荣住关于信任的文章：调查数据李实老师的调查问卷其二就是LAB 2.关于实验经济学的方法论争议：学生作为被试是否有代表性？ 是否反映了其真实的世界行为？等等 3.为何实验论文很少用到计量，或者很少用到复杂的计量方法？,支持派VS质疑派,质疑派：Henrich et al.（2010） The weirdest people in the worldLevit and List(2007) What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social
3、Preferences Reveal About the Real World? 支持派：Falk and Heckman(2009) Lab experiments are a major source of knowledge in the social sciencesCroson and Gchter (2010) The science of experimental economics其他如Simth (2010) Gchter (2010) 等等,实验经济学方法论的争议举例1,实验经济学方法论的争议举例2,作为一门成熟学科的标志1：实验经济学经典文献的被引次数,Fehr and
4、Schmidt（1999） Quarterly journal of Economics A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation 4160 Rabin (1993) American Economic Review Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics 2759 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Econometrica Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk 19423 Hol
5、t and Laury (2002) American Economic Review Risk aversion and incentive effects 1369 Gth et.al (1982) Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organizations An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining 1847 Berg et.al (1995) Games and Economic Behavior Trust, reciprocity, and social history 1838 Ledyar
6、d (1995) The Handbook of. Experimental Economics Public goods: A survey of experimental research 1915,作为一门成熟学科的标志2：实验经济学的学术共同体,学术团体:ESAusing controlled experiments to learn about economic behavior （1986 Vernon Smith） 实验经济学期刊：Experimental Economics （1998） 学术会议：经济学实验室,作为一门成熟学科的标志3：实验研究在顶级期刊的发表数（以AER20
7、11年5期期刊为例）,Vol. 101, No. 1, February 2011 Is Tiger Woods Loss Averse? Persistent Bias in the Face of Experience, Competition, and High Stakes (pp. 129-57) Devin G. Pope and Maurice E. Schweitzer The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence (pp. 411-29) Pedro Dal B
8、 and Guillaume R. Frchette Vol. 101, No. 2, April 2011 Reference Points and Effort Provision (pp. 470-92) Johannes Abeler, Armin Falk, Lorenz Goette and David Huffman Contracts as Reference PointsExperimental Evidence (pp. 493-525) Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder The Economics of Crede
9、nce Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition (pp. 526-55) Uwe Dulleck, Rudolf Kerschbamer and Matthias Sutter Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender (pp. 556-90) Thomas Dohmen and Armin Falk,作为一门成熟学科的标志3：实验
10、研究在顶级期刊的发表数（以AER2011年5期期刊为例）续2,Vol. 101, No. 2, April 2011 Heterogeneity in Risky Choice Behavior in a Broad Population (pp. 664-94) Hans-Martin von Gaudecker, Arthur van Soest and Erik Wengstrom The Rich Domain of Uncertainty: Source Functions and Their Experimental Implementation (pp. 695-723) Moh
11、ammed Abdellaoui, Aurlien Baillon, Laetitia Placido and Peter P. Wakker Search Dynamics in Consumer Choice under Time Pressure: An Eye-Tracking Study (pp. 900-926) Elena Reutskaja, Rosemarie Nagel, Colin F. Camerer and Antonio Rangel Coordination in the Presence of Asset Markets (pp. 927-47) Shimon
12、Kogan, Anthony M. Kwasnica and Roberto A. Weber Real-Time Search in the Laboratory and the Market (pp. 948-74) Meta Brown, Christopher J. Flinn and Andrew Schotter Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players (pp. 975-90) Steven D. Levitt, John A. List and Sally E. Sadoff,作为一门成熟学科的标志3
13、：实验研究在顶级期刊的发表数（以AER2011年5期期刊为例）续3,Vol. 101, No. 2, February 2011 The Willingness to PayWillingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,“ Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations: Comment (pp. 991-1011) Andrea Isoni, Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden The Willingness
14、 to PayWillingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,“ Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations: Reply (pp. 1012-28) Charles R. Plott and Kathryn Zeiler Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment (pp. 1029-40) Christoph Brunner, Colin F. Camerer
15、and Jacob K. Goeree Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Reply (pp. 1041-44) Reinhard Selten, Thorsten Chmura and Sebastian J. Goerg,作为一门成熟学科的标志3：实验研究在顶级期刊的发表数（以AER2011年5期期刊为例）续4,Vol. 101, No. 3, May 2011 Do Residential Customers Respond to Hourly Prices? Evidence from a Dynamic Pricing
16、 Experiment (pp. 83-87) Frank A. Wolak Using Field Experiments in Environment and Resource Economics Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies? The Case of Exogenous Market Experience (pp. 313-17) John A. List The Persistence of Treatment Effects with Norm-Based Policy Instruments: Evidence
17、from a Randomized Environmental Policy Experiment (pp. 318-22) Paul J. Ferraro, Juan Jose Miranda and Michael K. Price Can Tailored Communications Motivate Environmental Volunteers? A Natural Field Experiment (pp. 323-28) Omar Al-Ubaydli and Min Lee Using Artefactual Field Experiments to Learn about
18、 the Incentives for Sustainable Forest Use in Developing Economies (pp. 329-33) Maarten Voors, Erwin Bulte, Andreas Kontoleon, John A. List and Ty Turley Teacher Mobility Responses to Wage Changes: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment (pp. 460-65) Torberg Falch Social Preferences and Fairness No
19、rms as Informal Institutions: Experimental Evidence (pp. 509-13) Pamela Jakiela,作为一门成熟学科的标志3：实验研究在顶级期刊的发表数（以AER2011年5期期刊为例）续5,Vol. 101, No. 4, June 2011 Participation (pp. 1211-37) Gary Charness and Martin Dufwenberg Face Value (pp. 1497-1513) Catherine C. Eckel and Ragan Petrie Group Size and Incen
20、tives to Contribute: A Natural Experiment at Chinese Wikipedia (pp. 1601-15) Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang and Feng Zhu Corrigendum: Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment (page 1636) Jose Apesteguia and Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Vol. 101, No. 5, A
21、ugust 2011 An Experimental Component Index for the CPI: From Annual Computer Data to Monthly Data on Other Goods (pp. 1707-38) Tim Erickson and Ariel PakesVol. 101, No. 6, October 2011 Nudging Farmers to Use Fertilizer: Theory and Experimental Evidence from Kenya (pp. 2350-90) Esther Duflo, Michael
22、Kremer and Jonathan Robinson The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection (pp. 2562-89) Roy Chen and Yan Chen,二、实验经济学能做什么？,引子 Gary Charness, Ninghua Du, and Chun-Lei Yang，2010，“Trust and Trustworthiness Reputations in an Investment Game”, Games and Economic Behavior,实验经济学能做什么？,检验经济学理论
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