1、New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social DilemmasNew Issues and Paradigmsin Research on Social DilemmasEdited byAnders BielDaniel EekTommy GrlingMathias Gustafssonall ofPsykologiska InstitutionenGteborg UniversityGteborg, SwedenISBN: 978-0-387-72595-6 e-ISBN: 978-0-387-72596-3Library of Congre
2、ss Control Number: 2007929478 2008 Springer Science+Business Media, LLCAll rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written permission of the publisher (Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 233 Spring Street, New York, NY 10013, USA), except for bri
3、ef excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden.The use in this publication of trade nam
4、es, trademarks, service marks and similar terms, even if they are not identifi ed as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights.Printed on acid-free paper. 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Anders BielPsykologiska InstitutionenGteborg UniversityGte
5、borg, SwedenTommy GrlingPsykologiska InstitutionenGteborg UniversityGteborg, SwedenDaniel EekPsykologiska InstitutionenGteborg UniversityGteborg, SwedenMathias GustafssonPsykologiska InstitutionenGteborg UniversityGteborg, SwedenContents1. The Conceptual Framework of Social Dilemmas 1Anders BielIntr
6、oduction . 1New Issues 2The Individual . 2The Group . 2Society . 5New Paradigms . 6A Theoretical Framework . 72. A New Look at the Theory of Social Value Orientations: Prosocials Neither Maximize Joint Outcome nor Minimize Outcome Differences but Prefer Equal Outcomes 10Daniel Eek and Tommy GrlingIn
7、troduction . 10Theories of Social Value Orientations 11An Alternative Equality Hypothesis . 12Empirical Evidence in Support of the Equality Hypothesis . 13Do Prosocials Maximize Joint Outcomes? . 13Do Prosocials Minimize the Differences in Outcomes? . 17Moderating Factors . 21Discussion and Conclusi
8、ons . 233. A Classification of Games by Player Type . 27Gary BornsteinIntroduction . 27U-U vs. I-I: The “Discontinuity Effect” . 28Summary . 30G-G vs. G: Intergroup vs. Single-Group Games 31The Intergroup Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) Game . 31Summary . 33vG-G vs. I-I: Intergroup vs. Inter-Individual Game
9、s 34The Game of Chicken . 34Price Competition . 35Summary . 36Competition Between Different Types of Players 37Summary . 38Concluding Comments 384. How Do We React to Feedback in Social Dilemmas? . 43Eric van Dijk, David de Cremer, Laetitia B. Mulder, and Jeroen StoutenHow Do We React to Feedback in
10、 Social Dilemmas? . 43Explicit Feedback 44Effects on Cooperation 44Collective Failure Does Not Always Lead to Defection 46Feedback, Ostracism, and Exit . 48Emotional Reactions to Feedback . 48Feedback and Structural Solutions . 49Implicit Feedback 51The Case of Sanctioning Systems . 51Implicit Feedb
11、ack: The Case of Emotions . 52Conclusion. 535. Group-Based Trust in Social Dilemmas 57Margaret Foddy and Robyn DawesIntroduction . 57Previous Research on Group-Based Trust 59Unilateral Trust in an Ingroup Member 60Trust when the Situation is Interdependent 61Overview of the Design 63Procedure. 63Res
12、ults . 65Discussion . 686. Promoting Cooperation in Social Dilemmas via Fairness Norms and Group Goals . 72Ali Kazemi and Daniel EekIntroduction . 72Distributive Fairness and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas . 73Resource Dilemmas and Fairness . 74Public-Good Dilemmas and Fairness 75Comparing Fairness
13、Conceptions in Resource and Public-Good Dilemmas 75vi ContentsExplaining the Importance of Fairness in Social Dilemmas 76Fairness Norms and Group Goals in Social Decision Making . 77Preferences for Public-Good Allocations . 79Promoting Unselfish Public-Good Allocations via Group Goals and Distributi
14、ve Fairness . 80Fairness Mediates the Effects of Group Goal on Public-Good Allocations 82Generalizing Effects of the Group Goal on Profit Allocations to Cost Allocations 84Discussion and Conclusions . 85Extensions and Implications . 86A Note on the Public-Good Dilemma Paradigm 877. Bringing Back Lev
15、iathan into Social Dilemmas 93Mizuho Shinada and Toshio YamagishiIntroduction . 93The Structural Approach to Solving Social Dilemmas 95Research on Sanctions and Sanctioning Behavior 97Altruistic Punishment 99Motivations Behind Sanctions 101Group Size. 104Punishments and Rewards 106Social Sanctions 1
16、09Net Benefits of Sanctions 110Future Directions. 111The Dark Side of Sanctions 112Social Value Orientations 113Ingroup, Outgroup, and Sanctions 114Direct and Indirect Effects of Sanctions . 1158. Effectiveness of Coercive and Voluntary Institutional Solutions to Social Dilemmas . 124Yuval Samid and
17、 Ramzi SuleimanIntroduction . 124Method 131Participants 131Experimental Conditions. 131Procedure. 131Results . 133Non-Coercive Authority 133Moderately Coercive Authority 134Exploitative Authority . 134Dominating Authority . 135Contents viiSummary . 136Discussion . 1389. A Recursive Model for Changin
18、g Justice Concerns in Social Dilemmas 142David A. Schroeder, Alicia F. Bembenek, Kimberly M. Kinsey, Julie E. Steel, and Andria J. WoodellJustice Concerns in Social Dilemmas . 143Distributive Justice Concerns 144“Triggers” for Change . 145Procedural Justice Concerns . 145Increasing Distributive Sati
19、sfaction 146Reducing the Uncertainty . 146Engaging the Group Members 147Introducing Specific Allocation Solutions and Possible Sanctions 147Reactions to Violations: Restorative and Retributive Justice . 150Restorative Justice . 152Retributive Justice . 153When Restoration and Retribution “Miss the M
20、ark” . 155Implications of the Recursive Model for Understanding Decisions in Social Dilemmas 15610. The Emergence of Generalized Exchange by Indirect Reciprocity . 159Rie Mashima and Nobuyuki TakahashiPrevious Solutions to Generalized Exchange . 159Theoretical Framework . 160Representation of Strate
21、gies . 161Definition of “Goodness” 162Summary of the Theoretical Background . 165An Empirical Study . 166Method 166Results . 168Discussion . 171Appendix A . 17211. The Herdsman and the Sheep, Mouton, or Kivsa? The Influence of Group Culture on Cooperation in Social Dilemmas . 177Shirli KopelmanCultu
22、re and Appropriateness Framework . 179Culture and Identity 180Culture and Recognition of the Situation . 181Culture and Rules 183Discussion . 184viii Contents12. Will Lessons from Small-Scale Social Dilemmas Scale Up? . 189Michael McGinnis and Elinor OstromMatching Institutions to Physical Worlds .
23、190The World of Private Goods . 190The World of Common Pool Resources . 190Prior Research on Robust CPR Institutions 192The Global Relevance of Research on Local CPR Regimes 195Dilemmas of Extending Design Principles to the Global Scale . 197Limits to Direct Generalization 198Cross-Sectoral Foundati
24、ons of Institutional Design . 200Institutional Adjustments Needed in Scaling Up Sustainable Regimes . 202A Continuing Need for Creativity 20713. Effect of Information Structure in a Step-Level Public-Good Dilemma Under a Real-Time Protocol . 212 Chi Sing Ngan and Wing Tung AuProtocols of Play . 212I
25、nformation Structure 214Criticality. 214The Logic of Critical Mass . 215Method 216Participants 216Design . 216Procedure. 216Results . 218Contribution Rate 218Public-Good Provision 218Timing of the Decisions 219Discussion . 220Effectiveness of the Real-Time Protocol 221Criticality. 222Irrational Deci
26、sion-Making Behaviors 225The Management of Time in the Real-Time Protocol 22714. Toward an Analysis of Cooperation and Fairness That Includes Concepts of Cooperative Game Theory . 230Axel Ostmann and Holger MeinhardtCooperation and Fairness 230Games 232Core and Convexity . 236Example Games 238The CP
27、3 Game 239Contents ixThe HSW1 and HSW2 Games . 241Fairness Solutions . 242Experimental Results Reconsidered . 245Efficiency and Compliance . 245Geometric Localization of Results . 246Summary and Discussion 24815. Using Genetic Algorithms for Simulation of Social Dilemmas 252Ilan FischerIntroduction
28、. 252Genetic Algorithms . 253Simulation . 256Initialization of the Vector Populations 256Transformation and Recombination of Individual Patterns 257Evaluation and Selection of a Sampled Subgroup 257A Time-Use Social Dilemma 258Conclusions . 26216. Toward a Comprehensive Model of Social Dilemmas . 26
29、5Robert GiffordThe Problem, and the Nay-Sayers 265Toward a Comprehensive Model 266Complementary and Supplementary Ideas . 271Index 281x ContentsContributorsWing Tung Au, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, ChinaAlicia F. Bembenek, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, U.S.A.Anders Bi
30、el, Gteborg University, Gteborg, SwedenGary Bornstein, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, IsraelRobyn Dawes, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, U.S.A.David De Cremer, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The NetherlandsEric van Dijk, Leiden University, Leiden, The NetherlandsDaniel Eek,
31、 Gteborg University, Gteborg, SwedenIlan Fischer, University of Haifa, Haifa, IsraelMargaret Foddy, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, CanadaTommy Grling, Gteborg University, Gteborg, SwedenRobert Gifford, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, CanadaMathias Gustafsson, Gteborg University, Gteborg
32、, SwedenAli Kazemi, University of Skvde, Skvde, SwedenKimberly M. Kinsey, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, U.S.A.Shirli Kopelman, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, U.S.A.Rie Mashima, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JapanMichael McGinnis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, U.S.A.Holger
33、Meinhardt, University of Karlsruhe, Karlsruhe, GermanyLaetitia B. Mulder, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The NetherlandsChi Sing Ngan, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, ChinaAxel Ostman, University of Saarland, Saarland, GermanyxiElinor Ostrom, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, U.S.A.
34、Yuval Samid, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa, IsraelDavid A. Schroeder, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR, U.S.A.Mizuho Shinada, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JapanJulie E. Steel, Rhodes College, Memphis, TN, U.S.A.Jeroen Stouten, University of Leuven, Leuven, BelgiumRamzi Suleiman,
35、University of Haifa, Haifa, IsraelNobuyuki Takahashi, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, JapanAndria J. Woodell, Central Oregon Community College, Bend, OR, U.S.A.Toshio Yamagishi, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japanxii ContributorsChapter 1The Conceptual Framework of Social DilemmasAnders BielIntroducti
36、onAn important topic concerning human nature and motives directing human behavior has guided social dilemma research over the years. Is human nature, as many theorists assume, basically selfish and human behavior driven by egoistic incentives, or should a more truthful account also include that huma
37、ns sometimes cooperate for the best of fellow humans? On theoretical as well as empirical grounds (e.g., Caporael et al., 1989; Dawes, 1980; Komorita Frey, 1997). Hence, the battle over human motives has partly been settled. Still, situational fac-tors can influence whether humans answer their selfi
38、sh motives in the affirmative or cooperate to the benefit of the group or society at large. Earlier research on social dilemmas has advanced our knowledge of situational conditions that make a difference (e.g., Messick et al., 1983; Komorita Ostrom et al., 2002). The present volume will hopefully ma
39、ke additional contributions.Social dilemmas capture significant problems in society such as tax evasion, scarcity of natural resources, and human contributions to climate change. These problems are often adhered to in the research community, motivating the studies that are presented. As a consequenc
40、e, those concerned with the problems, either as policy makers or as victims, may request that scientists have something to say about poten-tial solutions to social dilemmas. To live up to expectations, properties of relevance for behavioral decisions in social dilemmas should be incorporated in the
41、research design in that findings can be generalized to situations where the phenomenon under investigation naturally occurs. Contributions to this volume present research on new concepts and propose original methods in response to this request. They span from cooperative motives on the individual le
42、vel to methods for studying aggregate-level consequences of individual-level processes.1A. Biel et al. (eds.), New Issues and Paradigms in Research on Social Dilemmas. Springer 20082 A. BielNew IssuesThe IndividualEarlier research has pinpointed several factors that may determine whether people coop
43、erate or defect. Some of these reside within the individual, e.g., his or her value orientation (Messick decisions are taken independently without 1 The Conceptual Framework of Social Dilemmas 3the possibility to make binding agreements. Bornstein pits these three types of agents against 4 types of
44、opponents: the same 3 as above and nature, creating 12 different prototypical decision situations. While several of these combinations have been commonly studiedfor example, individual versus nature (individual decision making), individual versus individual (prisoners dilemma), and non-cooperative g
45、roups versus nature (social dilemma)less regard has been paid to many of the other combinations. In his chapter, Bornstein makes it very clear that many interdependent decision-making situations involve conflicts of interest, and often between “asymmetric” parties; that is, different types of agents
46、 in his taxonomy. This aspect of decision making in social dilemmas has so far been almost totally neglected.Another aspect of research on group decision making in social dilemmas that has been partly neglected is that in real life, groups often share a history. Members of a group know something abo
47、ut the behavior of the others, thereby reducing social uncertainty. In their chapter, van Dijk et al. review how group members react to feedback on past behavior of the group. They distinguish between explicit feed-back, what the group has done in the past, and implicit feedback. The latter refers t
48、o information about certain characteristics of the dilemma that could be used to draw inferences about former behavior. If a reporting system has been introduced, it may signal that group members are not to be trusted. For example, my own university wishes to introduce a data system where each emplo
49、yee reports most of his or her doings to the central administration. Besides being inefficient, it signals that the administration does not trust that our inner motivation will support us in carrying out our duties. While previous research has mainly concentrated on explicit feedback, their review shows that effects of implicit feedback have been overlooked along with emotional reactions to feedback and their effects on judgment and behavior in social dilemmas.In a similar vein, Foddy and Dawes scrutinize trust in a group context. In social dilemmas,
