1、HANDBOOK OFNEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICSHANDBOOK OFNEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICSEdited byUniversity of Paris (Pantheon-Sorbonne), FranceandMARY M. SHIRLEYThe Ronald Coase InstituteChevy Chase, MD, U.S.A.CLAUDE MNARD 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin HeidelbergCover Design: WMX Design GmbH, Heidelberg, Germany
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5、 Law. ISBN: 978-3-540-77660-4 Mary M. Shirley President The Ronald Coase Institute 5610 Wisconsin Ave., Suite 1602 Chevy Chase, MD 20815 USA mshirleycoase.org Claude Mnard Centre dEconomie de la Sorbonne (CES) Universit de Paris (Panthon-Sorbonne) 106 Bd de lHpital 75647 Paris Cedex 13 FRANCE Claude
6、.Menarduniv-paris1.fr ContentsContributors ixAcknowledgement . xiiiIntroductionClaude Menard and Mary M. Shirley . 1Section I The Domain of New Institutional Economics1. Institutions and the Performance of Economies over TimeDouglass C. North . 212. The Institutional Structure of ProductionRonald H.
7、 Coase 313. Transaction Cost EconomicsOliver E. Williamson 41Section II Political Institutions and the State4. Electoral Institutions and Political Competition: Coordination,Persuasion and MobilizationGary W. Cox 695. Presidential versus Parliamentary GovernmentJohn M. Carey . 916. Legislative Proce
8、ss and the Mirroring PrincipleMathew D. McCubbins . 1237. The Performance and Stability of Federalism:An Institutional PerspectiveBarry R. Weingast . 149vvi ContentsSection III Legal Institutions of a Market Economy8. The Many Legal Institutions that SupportContractual CommitmentsGillian K. Hadfield
9、 . 1759. Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market ExchangesPaul H. Rubin . 20510. Market Institutions and Judicial RulemakingBenito Arrunada and Veneta Andonova 22911. Legal Institutions and Financial DevelopmentThorsten Beck and Ross Levine . 251Section IV Modes of Governance12. A New Institutional A
10、pproach to OrganizationClaude Menard . 28113. Vertical IntegrationPaul L. Joskow . 31914. Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in FirmsGary J. Miller . 34915. The Institutions of Corporate GovernanceMark J. Roe 37116. Firms and the Creation of New MarketsErin Anderson and Hubert Gatignon . 401Secti
11、on V Contractual Arrangements17. The Make-or-Buy Decisions: Lessons from Empirical StudiesPeter G. Klein . 43518. Agricultural ContractsDouglas W. Allen and Dean Lueck 46519. The Enforcement of Contracts and Private OrderingVictor P. Goldberg . 491Section VI Regulation20. The Institutions of Regulat
12、ion. An Application toPublic Utilities.Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi 515Contents vii21. State Regulation of Open-Access, Common-Pool ResourcesGary D. Libecap 54522. Property Rights and the StateLee J. Alston and Bernardo Mueller . 57323. Licit and Illicit Responses to RegulationLee Benham 591
13、Section VII Institutional Change24. Institutions and DevelopmentMary M. Shirley 61125. Institutional and Non-Institutional Explanations ofEconomic DifferencesStanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff . 63926. Institutions and Firms in Transition EconomiesPeter Murrell 66727. Social Capital, Social
14、 Norms and the NewInstitutional EconomicsPhilip Keefer and Stephen Knack . 70128. Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature andDynamics of Institutions Supporting ExchangeAvner Greif 727Section VIII Perspectives29. Economic Sociology and New Institutional EconomicsVictor Nee and Richard Swedberg
15、78930. Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper thanMarkets and HierarchiesElinor Ostrom . 819Subject Index . 849Author Index 867ContributorsALLEN, DOUGLAS W.Burnaby Mountain Professorof EconomicsSimon Fraser UniversityALSTON, LEE J.Professor of Economics, DirectorProgram on Environment andBehav
16、ior, Institute of BehavioralSciencesUniversity of Colorado andNational Bureau of EconomicResearchANDERSON, ERINJohn H. Loudon Chaired Professor ofInternational Management andProfessor of MarketingINSEADANDONOVA, VENETAProfessor of Business AdministrationInstituto Tecnologico Autonomode MexicoARRUNAD
17、A, BENITOProfessor of Business OrganizationUniversitat Pompeu FabraBarcelonaBECK, THORSTENSenior Financial EconomistDevelopment Research GroupThe World BankBENHAM, LEEProfessor of EconomicsWashington University in St. Louis andThe Ronald Coase InstituteCAREY, JOHN M.Associate ProfessorDepartment of
18、GovernmentDartmouth CollegeCOASE, RONALD H.Clifton R. Musser Professor Emeritusof EconomicsThe University of ChicagoCOX, GARY W.Professor of Political SciencesDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of California, San DiegoENGERMAN, STANLEY L.Professor of Economics and HistoryDepartment of Economi
19、cs and HistoryUniversity of Rochester and ResearchAssociate, National Bureau ofEconomic ResearchGATIGNON, HUBERTClaude Janssen Chaired Professor ofBusiness Administration and Professorixx Contributorsof Marketing,INSEADGOLDBERG, VICTOR P.Thomas Macioce Professor of LawCo-Director, Center for Law and
20、Economic StudiesColumbia UniversityGREIF, AVNERThe Bowman Family Endowed Professorin Humanities and SciencesDepartment of EconomicsStanford University, and Senior FellowStanford Institute for InternationalStudiesHADFIELD, GILLIAN K.Professor of Law and Co-DirectorCenter for Law, Economics andOrganiz
21、ationUniversity of Southern CaliforniaJOSKOW, PAUL L.Elizabeth and James Killian Professorof EconomicsMassachusetts Institute ofTechnologyKEEFER, PHILIPLead Research EconomistDevelopment Research GroupThe World BankKLEIN, PETER G.Associate Professor of Agribusinessand Associate DirectorContracting a
22、nd OrganizationsResearch InstituteUniversity of MissouriKNACK, STEPHENSenior Research EconomistDevelopment Research GroupThe World BankLEVINE, ROSSCurtis L. Carlson Professor of FinanceCarlson School of ManagementUniversity of MinnesotaLIBECAP, GARY D.Anhenser Busch Professor,Entrepreneurial Studies
23、, Economicsand Law;Director Karl Eller CenterUniversity of Arizona; and ResearchAssociate, National Bureau ofEconomic ResearchLUECK, DEANBartley P. Cardon Professor ofAgricultural Williamson 2000).New institutional economics abandons the standard neoclassical assump-tions that individuals have perfe
24、ct information and unbounded rationality andthat transactions are costless and instantaneous. NIE assumes instead that indi-viduals have incomplete information and limited mental capacity and becauseof this they face uncertainty about unforeseen events and outcomes and incurtransaction costs to acqu
25、ire information. To reduce risk and transaction costshumans create institutions, writing and enforcing constitutions, laws, contractsand regulationsso-called formal institutionsand structuring and inculcatingnorms of conduct, beliefs and habits of thought and behavioror informal in-stitutions. They
26、develop modes of organization embedded in these settings thatprovide different incentives that vary in their capacity to motivate agents. Fornew institutionalists the performance of a market economy depends upon the for-mal and informal institutions and modes of organization that facilitate privatet
27、ransactions and cooperative behavior. NIE focuses on how such institutionsC. Menard and M. M. Shirley (eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 118.C2005 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.12 Claude Menard and Mary M. Shirleyemerge, operate, and evolve, how they shape the different arrangem
28、ents thatsupport production and exchange, as well as how these arrangements act in turnto change the rules of the game.Because NIE considers choices to be embedded in institutions, it has a muchbroader reach than neoclassical economics, which has been largely concernedwith prices and outcomes. But u
29、nlike old institutional economics, NIE doesnot abandon neoclassical economic theory. While new institutionalists rejectthe neoclassical assumption of perfect information and instrumental rationality,they accept orthodox assumptions of scarcity and competition. Both Arrow andWilliamson have attribute
30、d the rising influence of NIE to its acceptance of thesuccessful core of neoclassical economics. As Kenneth Arrow observed, unlikethe older institutionalist school, New Institutional Economics does “. . . not con-sist of giving new answers to the traditional questions of economicsresourceallocation
31、and the degree of utilization. Rather it consists of answering newquestions, why economic institutions emerged the way they did and not other-wise.”(1987, p. 734).NIE tries to answer questions that neoclassical economics does not addressand this has given NIE a distinct identity and a strong followi
32、ng. As North haspointed out (North 2004, forthcoming) neoclassical economics was not createdto explain the process of economic change, much less political or social change.Institutionalists in contrast aim to understand change by understanding humanincentives and intentions and the beliefs, norms an
33、d rules that they create inpursuit of their goals (see North 2004, forthcoming).Answering new questions requires institutionalists to devise new methodolo-gies. Elinor Ostrom points out that unlike much of social science institutionalanalysis cannot simply hold constant other institutions because “t
34、he impact onincentives and behavior of one type of rule is not independent of other rules”(Ostrom, chapter 30). There are numerous examples of these interaction effectsthroughout this Handbook. For instance, the section on state institutions illus-trates how electoral procedures, political party nor
35、ms and constitutional lawsand structures interact with one another to shape the incentives of politicians andvoters and, ultimately, to influence policy decisions and organizational choices.NIEs breadth and innovation have fostered a multi-disciplinary approach.Institutional analysts adapt useful co
36、ncepts and methodology from politicalscience, sociology, law, anthropology, cognitive science, evolutionary biology,and any other discipline that sheds light on the rules, norms and beliefs thatgovern human interactions in the process of production and exchange. A numberof the authors in this Handbo
37、ok are not economists, but all are social scientistswho share an interest in the scientific analysis of institutions.2. WHY A HANDBOOK ON NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS?New institutional economics (NIE) has grown rapidly over the last three decades.Since the term was first coined by Oliver Williamson i
38、n 1975 (1975) the subjectIntroduction 3has exerted rapidly increasing influence over scholarly research.1This influenceis not limited to economists. Increasing numbers of legal scholars, politicalscientists, sociologists, anthropologists, management specialists, and othersare doing research in new i
39、nstitutional economics. NIE is also attracting newresearchers, from many different countries.The time is ripe for a synthetic book that provides interested readers withan overview of recent developments and broad orientations of new institutionaleconomics. Much institutional research is published in
40、 journals that may not befamiliar to others working in the field, and new institutionalists may be unawareof discoveries from disciplines other than their own. This Handbook acquaintsreaders with the scope of NIE, the recent trends, and the progress made byscholars from other fields. Also, young res
41、earchers may want guidance aboutwhat the topic means and how it is being researched. This volume, written bysome of the foremost NIE specialists, gives new researchers an introduction tothe topic and a reference book for their research.2The book opens with three chapters that give the reader a sense
42、 of the scope ofnew institutional economics and the issues fundamental to the study of economicinstitutions (Section I). One branch of NIE focuses on the macro institutionsthat shape the functioning of markets, firms, and other modes of organiza-tion: the state (Section II) and the legal system (Sec
43、tion III). Another branchconcentrates on the micro institutions that govern firms (Section IV) and theircontractual relations (Section V). New institutionalists are also much concernedwith the interactions between state and firm (Section VI). Increasingly institu-tional economics has also focused on
44、 how institutions, both macro and mi-cro, change: how they emerge, evolve and die (Section VII). Because NIE isaddressing new questions or new aspects of old questions its future is beingshaped by new methodologies and a multifaceted, multidisciplinary approach(Section VIII).3. THE DOMAIN OF NIEDoug
45、lass North argues in his chapter that one of NIEs main inputs to economicshas been to remove the fiction of the frictionless market by adding institutions,but that NIE has the potential to perform an equally, or more powerful ser-vice: changing neoclassical economics from a static to a dynamic theor
46、y. Tounderstand economic change and how to improve economic performance it isnot enough to understand the basic rules of the game or even customs, normsand habits, North maintains. We must also understand what people believeand how they arrive at those beliefshow people learn. North has been lead-in
47、g the movement to study the broader institutional framework that shapes thefunctioning of markets, to add beliefs and norms to the study of institutions,1Our thanks to Rudolf Richter for dating the use of the term.2Useful background on NIE can be found in Furubotn and Richter, 1998.4 Claude Menard a
48、nd Mary M. Shirleyand to incorporate aspects of cognition in order to understand institutionalchange.Ronald Coases chapter on the institutional structure of production hearkensback to his seminal work that lies at the heart of New Institutional Economics:“The Nature of the Firm” (1937) and “The Theo
49、ry of Social Cost” (1960)(reprinted in Coase 1988). Coase describes his unwillingness to treat the firmas a “black box” that takes prices at one end and produces outputs at the other.This unwillingness led him famously to ask why firms exist, why are not alltransactions done through the market? He famously answered that firms existto economize on transaction costs. We find firms when it is cheaper to or-ganize activities under a governing hierarchy than to try to conduct them inthe market place and pay the costs to search, negotiate, monitor and enforce
