1、 1 How Strategic Anti-Missile Defense of the United States Could be Made to Work Theodore A. Postol Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy Science Technology and Society Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Voice: 617 253-8077; FAX: 617 258-5750; e-mail: postolmit.e
2、du Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey March 28, 2011 MIT Science, Technology, and National Security Working Group 2 An Important Observation About What Drives the US Missile Defense Program Extremely Important US Missile Defense Policy is shaped mostly by US DOMESTIC POLITICS 3 A Comment on
3、the State of US Domestic Politics Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize Winner in Economics and New York Times Columnist Commenting on the US debate over economic priorities: “what we have is a political culture in which one side sneers at knowledge and exalts ignorance, while the other side hunkers down and pr
4、etends to halfway agree.” Paul Krugman, Dumbing Deficits Down, New York Times, March 10, 2011 4 An Important Observation About What Drives the US Missile Defense Program The same observation applies to Missile Defense 5 Why Should the US Consider an Alternative to Its Current Missile Defense Program
5、? 1. Current Missile Defenses Will Never Be Reliable. The sensor trechnologies used by current missile defenses will never be able to tell the difference between warheads and decoys. 2. Paradoxically, Foreign Military Planners Will Assume Worst-Case US Capabilities and Will React As If US Missile De
6、fenses Might Work. US missile defenses will unleash powerful bureaucratic forces that foreign political leaders cannot always contend with. Even when foreign leaders are well informed about its limitations, they are subject to accusations of not being willing to defend their countries from this exte
7、rnal threat. Perceived threats from US missile defenses also create powerful tools for bureaucracies aiming to increase their access to resources, power, and influence. Witness the vast expansion in the US nuclear arsenal in-part fueled by claims that the Moscow Anti-Missile Defense posed a major th
8、reat to US nuclear deterrence. 6 Why Should the US Consider an Alternative to Its Current Missile Defense Program? 3. Foreign Reactions to US Missile Defenses Might Result In: China Expanding Its Currently Modest Long-Range Missile Forces Russia Refusing to Engage in Further Arms Reductions. Iran an
9、d North Korea Rendering US Ballistic Missile Defenses Useless by Developing Simple and Robust Countermeasures. India Continuing to Mimick the Mistakes of the United States by Expanding Its Missile Defense Program. Pakistan Further Reacting (It is Already Expanding Its Nuclear Materials Stockpiles) t
10、o Threats from Indias Missile Defense Program. 7 Why Should the US Consider an Alternative to Its Current Missile Defense Program? Hence, Current US Missile Defense Programs Could Lead to the Worst of Two Worlds. Defenses That Dont Work and Foreign Reactions to the Missile Defenses As If They do Wor
11、k. The End Result Would Then Be a Reduction in US Security 8 Why Should the US Consider an Alternative to Its Current Missile Defense Program? The alternative missile defense to be described would work, unlike the current sytems under development. It would be highly intimidating against the adversar
12、ies it is aimed at. It would pose no threat to the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and China. However, it will not be built, because the argument that long-range ballistic missiles from rogue states threaten the security of the United States is derived from domestic political infighting, not from
13、 a true belief that there is a threat. If the threat were perceived as truly real, we would be racing to build this alternative, which would be a highly workable defense. 9 How Current US Missile Defenses Are Supposed to Work 10 Basic Functional Architecture of a Baseline and Expanded National Missi
14、le Defense Early Warning Radars NMD or THAAD Interceptors THAAD Ground-Based Radars Estimated Trajectory from Early Warning Radars Communication Lines 11 Notional GMD Engagement of a Ballistic Missile Attack from North Korea Intercept Point Initial Shemya Acquisition Initial Clear Acquisition Interc
15、eptor Launched Shemya Track Initiation (150+ Seconds) 12 The Rise of the “Phased Adaptive Approach” as a Replacement for the European Missile Defense System 13 The Phased Adaptive Approach Simply Replaces a Small Number of Heavy Ground-Based Interceptors with Numerous Light Sea-Mobile 14 Orbital Sci
16、ences Ground-Based Interceptor and Raytheon Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle 15 Navy Aegis Concept of Operation Ship Radar Inadequate, Land Radar Marginal, and Interceptor Acceleration and Speed Low 16 The US Domestic Politics of Missile Defense Before Obama took office he expressed skepticism about whet
17、her existing science could produce workable missile defenses. Once he became President, he decided to “give his opponents what they want” by “pretending his administration had a better idea of how to build such defenses.” (The Phased Adaptive Approach) The Obama Administration now says that the bett
18、er idea is the “Phased Adaptive Approach” to missile defense. In reality, the “Phased Adaptive Approach” has no technical merit. 17 What are the true and expected capabilities of the PAA? The PAA uses no new technologies relative to the European Missile Defense System that was “put aside” on Septemb
19、er 17, 2010 by the Obama Administration. PAA interceptors home on targets using the same infrared technology that makes the unproven GMD interceptors vulnerable to simple infrared countermeasures. The PAA radars do not have sufficient average power and aperture area to reliably acquire and track tar
20、gets in combat. The radars also provide very limited discrimination capability, as demonstrated by the catastrophic failure of the Sea-Based X-Band radar during the FTG-06 GMD test on January 31, 2010. All the X-Band radars being used by the PAA, like the FBX, depend on the same science and technolo
21、gy to achieve discrimination. 18 The SM-3 Block IA Has Only Been Tested on Short Range Trajectories Yet the Department of Defense Claims that the System is “Proven and Effective” and Can Be Modernized to Deal With Much More Challenging Targets. Like the GMD, It Has Never Been Tested Against Credible
22、 Decoys or Other Simple Countermeasures 19 PAA Tests Essentially Use Modified Two-Stage Surface-to-Air Missiles, Warheads and SM-3 Interceptors SM-3 Block IA/B GMD Interceptor SM-3 Block IIA/B Iranian Sejjil 2000km Range Navy Target Missiles for SM-3 Tests Minuteman/Trident/MX Warhead First Stage So
23、lid Propellant Second Stage Solid Propellant 1.7m 1.7m 7.4m 3m 18.21 Launch Gross Weight with 1000 kg Warhead is 21,500 kg SM-3 Block IA / IB PAA Test Targets and Interceptor 20 Current Testing of Missile Defense Systems 6 Foot Man 21 All the Interceptors in the GMD and PAA Systems Home on Targets U
24、sing Infrared Telescopes 22 All of the Missile Defense Kill Vehicles Use the Same Infrared Technology to Identify and Home on Targets 8.5 in 8.5 in 55 in Ground-Based Kill Vehicle Navy Large-Aperture High Divert-Speed SM-3 Block II Kill Vehicle 23 The Same Basic Physics Governs the Homing of All the
25、 Kill Vehicles 55 in Ground-Based Kill Vehicle Navy SM-3 Block IA Kill Vehicle Focal Plane Array Cooled Baffle Reflective Mirror All the Kill Vehicles Use a Telescope and Infrared Sensors for Homing on Targets 24 What the US Defense Planner Expects the Kill Vehicle to See 25 What the Defense Planner
26、s Expect the Infrared Sensor on the Homing Interceptor to See 26 What the US Kill Vehicle Might Actually See 27 What the Infrared Sensor on the Homing Interceptor Might Actually See! 28 EXTREMELY IMPORTANT INFORMATION NEEDED BY THE INTERCEPTOR TO IDENTIFY WHICH OBJECT IS THE WARHEAD The interceptor
27、must know how the warhead looks relative to other objects in its field of view This information is essential for matching what it sees to what it expects to see. If the warhead appears different from what is expected, the interceptor will not be able to identify it relative to other objects. If the
28、other objects match, or nearly match, the expected appearance of the warhead, then the interceptor will not be able to identify the warhead relative to the other objects. If all the objects look different from what is expected, and all the objects look different from each other, then the interceptor
29、 will not be able to identify the warhead relative to the other objects. HENCE, all an adversary needs to do to defeat the interceptor is to alter the appearance of the warhead and surround it with other unidentifiable objects 29 False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agen
30、cy Test Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975, Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT) Booster Fragmentation 30 False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975, Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT) Figure 8.4. The Signature of
31、Fragmented Tanks experiment cut the Stage II of Titan II ICBM B-27 (62-008) into the numerous pieces shown above. The resulting debris cloud was used to test the ability of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile radar system to discriminate between debris from the upper stage and the reentry vehicle.
32、From David K. Stumpf , “Titan II, A History of a Cold War Missile Program,” The University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, Copyright 2000, pages 200-201 6 Ft Man and Minuteman Warhead Booster Fragmentation 31 False Targets Cloud Created by a “Simple” One-Stage Ballistic Missile 32 Conclusion from U
33、S Navy Videos of “Successful Intercepts Simple countermeasures that disguise the location of the warhead from the infrared homing sensors are very easy to implement and Will Drastically Reduce the Chances of Hitting a Target These Could Be Used as Decoys or to Surround Warheads Disguising Them as Ba
34、lloons Balloons that Have Been Flown in Space 33 The Kill Vehicle Must Determine Which of These Are Warheads and Which are Decoys from 50 (SM-3) to Several Hundred (GMD) Kilometers Range! 34 Why the SM-3 Missile Defense Could Appear to Be Threatening Even Though Its Capabilities are Obviously Limite
35、d 35 Basic Functional Architecture of a Baseline and Expanded National Missile Defense Early Warning Radars NMD or THAAD Interceptors THAAD Ground-Based Radars Estimated Trajectory from Early Warning Radars Communication Lines 36 Navy Aegis Concept of Operation Ship Radar Inadequate, Land Radar Marg
36、inal, and Interceptor Acceleration and Speed Low 37 Locations of the Vertical Launch System Boxes on Two Different Variants of the DDG-51 Navy Destroyer 38 Basic Characteristics of the Vertical Launch System Components SM-3 Block IIA 21” Diameter 4,000 5000 lb Interceptor 39 Aegis Block IA Intercept
37、or and Vertical Launch Cannister 40 Basic Operational Characteristics of the Vertical Launch System Components 41 Basic Operational Characteristics of the Vertical Launch System Components SM-3 Block IA/B Weight 3300 lbs; Block IIA/B 5100 lbs; Mk 57 Max Encanistered 9020 lbs Mk 57 Max Encanistered 9
38、020 lbs Mk 57 Max Encanistered 9020 lbs 42 Variants of the Aegis SM-3 Interceptor and Kill Vehicles Burnout Speed Burnout Speed Burnout Speed 3 km/sec 4.5 km/sec 5.5 6 km/sec 43 44 Variants of the Aegis SM-3 Interceptor and Kill Vehicles Model Interceptor Parameters Kill Vehicle Weight 132? lbs Thir
39、d Stage Motor I sp 289 sec Weight 600 lbs Fuel Load 0.90 Second Stage Motor I sp 280 sec Weight 2000 lbs Fuel Load 0.85 First Stage Motor I sp 220 sec Weight 1200 lbs Fuel Load 0.75 SM-3 Block IA/B SM-3 Block IIA SM-3 Block IIA 13.5” Diameter 21” Diameter 45 Capabilities of the Future 4.5 km/sec and
40、 5.5 km/sec Variants of the SM-3 Block IIA and Block IIB Interceptors to Engage ICBMs 4 km/sec Burnout Speed 4.5 km/sec Burnout Speed SM-3 Block IA SM-3 Block IIA SM-3 Block IIB 3.3 km/sec Burnout Speed 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 10000 9000 8000 7000 6000 Range (km) Altitude (km) 1000 2000 3000 4000
41、 5000 6000 7000 46 Capabilities of the Future 4.5 km/sec and 5.5 km/sec Variants of the SM-3 Block IIA and Block IIB Interceptors to Engage ICBMs Locations of All Missiles Shown at One Minute Intervals 10,000 Kilometer Range ICBM 5.5 km/sec SM-3 Block IIB 4.5 km/sec SM-3 Block IIA 4 km/sec Burnout S
42、peed 4.5 km/sec Burnout Speed SM-3 Block IA SM-3 Block IIA SM-3 Block IIB 3.3 km/sec Burnout Speed 47 Kinematic Capabilities of Future 4.0 km/sec and 4.5 km/sec Variants of the SM-3 Block II Interceptors to Engage ICBMs 48 49 50 The End Result of the Phased Adaptive Approach and the US Domestic Poli
43、tical Failures that Led to It Military planners have the responsibility of looking towards future threats. Increase in number and speed of the Interceptors Increase in the capabilities and numbers of radars Concerns about possible prior damage to nuclear forces from pre-emptive strikes. Interceptors
44、 with small nuclear weapons Result Military planners may recognize that the current US missile defense system has limited capabilities, but they will have to consider and plan for possible future expansions and upgrades of the system. One way to deal with such circumstances would be for China to exp
45、and its nuclear forces and to also increase its emphasis on countermeasures. Hence, the US preoccupation with missile defenses that have little capability coud create the worst of two worlds for both China and the US, US defenses that are not reliable, and a Chinese reaction that would be expensive
46、and dangerous to the security of both China and the US. An example from history. Vast expansion of US nuclear strike forces in response to the Russian Moscow missile defense 51 A National Defense Strategy Based on Provably False Assumptions Assumptions Used by the DoD for GMD Performance Cannot Poss
47、ibly be Known Hence, Actual Performance of the GMD is Unknowable The Record of “Proven Reliability” of the Navys SM-3 Interceptor Actually Shows that the SM-3 Will Be Highly Unreliable in Actual Combat Conditions Missile Defense Theorists Technology is Already in-hand Current Missile Defense Systems
48、 Work US Assumptions About Robust Missile Defenses will Cause Proliferators to Give Up 52 If People Were Serious About the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States What Could Be Done Instead? 53 If There Is a Real Threat What Is It? The Only Long-Range Ballistic Missiles that Can Be Built by Ir
49、an and North Korea Would Use Liquid Propellant Rocket Technologies from the 1950s and 1960s. These Technologies Use Heavy Airframes, Low Energy Rocket Propellants, and Rocket Motors of that Have Relatively Low Exhaust Velocities (Specific Impulses) The Rockets Would Be Very Big Weighing Between 90 to 120 Tons and Would Have to be Assembled at Known Launch Sites. Hence, They Could Easily Be Targeted and Shot Down Shortly After They Are Launched.
