1、西南财经大学博士学位论文上市公司实际控制人财务行为的治理效应研究姓名：万立全申请学位级别：博士专业：财务管理指导教师：郭复初20090301上市公司实际控制人财务行为的治理效应研究为对策研究部分，最后一章是全文的总结。各章的主要内容如下：第一章为导论，主要对论文进行简要介绍，具体包括研究背景与问题的提出、研究思路、研究的主要内容以及创新与不足之处。第二章为文献综述，主要包括Berle和Means范式(简称BI_M范式)和LLsV范式下的委托代理关系综述。在BM范式下的委托代理关系综述中，主要综述所有权广泛分散下的股权结构与公司绩效的关系。在LLSV范式下的委托代理关系综述中，主要综述股权集中时
2、控制性股东的所有权特征与公司价值的关系以及控制性股东与控制权私人收益的关系。第三章为理论基础和制度背景。该章把委托代理理论作为文章的理论基础，在分析马克思的“三权分离“理论的基础上论述马克思的委托代理理论，并基于契约观论述西方的委托代理理论。在制度背景部分，主要阐述我国资本市场从股权分置到股权一致的变迁、国有资产管理体制从“五龙治水“到统一的国有资产出资人代表制度的建立、民营企业直接上市和间接上市并存的上市制度安排。第四章利用模型分析BM范式和LLSV范式下委托代理成本，对于BM范式下股东与经营者之间的委托代理成本用无差异曲线加以分析，对于LLSV范式下控制性股东与中小股东的委托代理成本，首先
3、分析控制性股东分离所控制公司的所有权与控制权的三种手段，并分别从投资项目的非效率选择、控制权转让的非效率选择、投资政策和企业规模的非效率选择、公司价值的“壁垒效应“等四个方面论述控制性股东给中小股东带来的代理成本。第五章论述我国上市公司实际控制人财务行为特征与上市公司价值的关系，该章在对实际控制人类型进行再界定的基础上，分析实际控制人的所有权、控制权、所有权与控制权的分离、控制链、实际控制人类型等五个方面的特征，并检验这些实际控制人特征对上市公司的“激励效应“、“壁垒效应一、“放权力假说和新型国有资产监管体制的效率。第六章讨论实际控制人财务行为特征与控制权私人收益的关系。该章首先在归纳关于控制
4、权私人收益观点的基础上，从控制性股东监督行为的二重2内容摘要性入手，通过剖析控制性股东治理效应的两面性，指出控制权私人收益可以分为控制权正常收益与控制权超额收益两种。然后，对控制权私人收益的计量公式加以改进，并引入公司治理环境变量，实证分析实际控制人的属性、公司治理环境和股权分置改革对控制权私人收益的影响。第七章论述后股权分置时代对实际控制人监管的新思路。该章在第五章和第六章实证分析的基础上，指出后股权分置时代实际控制人与上市公司关系的变化以及实际控制人的若干不当行为，然后，针对不同类型的实际控制人在国家经济中的地位、作用、比重的差异，提出“区别对待，分类监管一的监管思路，尤其重点论述了国资委
5、的约束与激励机制的构建。第八章为全文总结，包括研究结论与启示、研究的局限性及未来进一步研究的方向和课题。文章的改进与创新之处主要体现在如下几个方面：第一，论述了马克思关于委托代理理论的基本原理。应用马克思的经典论述剖析委托代理理论，指出马克思关于财产的所有权、占用使用权与监督管理经营权的三权分离理论是西方委托代理理论的理论基础，在马克思主义看来，委托代理关系的产生是大规模分工和协作生产的必然规律。第二，论述了实际控制人对上市公司的治理效应，分析了新型国有资产监管体制的效率。在研究我国上市公司实际控制人财务行为特征与上市公司价值关系时，对实际控制人的类型进行再界定，从实际控制人对上市公司的所有权
6、、控制权、所有权与控制权的分离、控制链、实际控制人类型等五个方面剖析实际控制人对上市公司的“激励效应”、“壁垒效应一，通过比较国资委控制的上市公司与非国资委控制的国家控制公司的公司价值差异，间接说明新型国有资产监管体制的效率，并说明国家控制公司控制链的增加是政府解决政企不分的一种手段。第三，探讨了控制权私人收益的两分法理论观点，改进了控制权私人收益的计量公式。在研究实际控制人财务行为特征与控制权私人收益的关系时，在综述国内外关于控制权私人收益文献的基础上，把国内外对控制权私人收3上市公司实际控制人财务行为的治理效应研究益的定性分析归纳为两种相互冲突的观点，并从控制性股东监督行为的二重性入手，通
7、过剖析控制性股东的治理效应的两面性指出，可以将控制权私人收益分为控制权正常收益与控制权超额收益两类。在实证分析部分，改进了控制权私人收益的计量公式，引入公司治理环境变量，实证分析实际控制人的属性、上市公司所处地区的治理环境以及股权分置改革对控制权私人收益的影响。第四，阐述了分类监管的新理念，提出了完善国有资产出资人代表监管体系的新设想。在论述后股权分置时代对实际控制人监管的思路时，针对两类实际控制人在国民经济中的不同的地位、作用和比重，提出“区别对待，分类监管“的监管思路。即，国家控制的实际控制人的监管问题关键是规范其机构建设，并完善其激励机制。而对于非国家控制的实际控制人，主要是抑制其关联交
8、易等侵占中小股东的行为。在构建国资委的监督机制时，提出从外部监督和内部监督两个方面入手构建监督国资委的体系，并提出机构设想，即剥离国资委的行政监督职能，整合各种监督资源，在人大下面设立国有资产监督委员会；在内部监督机构上，设想在国资委现有管理职能机构之外将原有国资委内部行使监督职能的部门集中起来成立国有资产监管局。在激励机制方面，指出建立以物质激励为导向的激励框架体系，并提出递延津贴的构想。第五，提出了交叉持股下计算间接持股比例的新方法。在论述实际控制人分离所控制公司的所有权与控制权的手段时，使用代数分析法，利用矩阵运算，考虑交叉持股下公司间的递推关系计算交叉持股下间接持股比例，力求做到准确计
9、算“全部间接持股“比例，克服简化计算“部分间接持股一比例的弊端。由于本文关于后股权分置时代实际控制人财务行为对上市公司的影响及其监管的研究是一种探索性质的研究，难免存在一些不足之处，主要有：第一，在方法论上，由于作者知识的缺陷，未能引入博弈论的相关知识进行分析。实际上，在股改中以及股改后，实际控制人与中小股东的博弈过4内容摘要程都不会停止。在后股权分置时代，实际控制人与中小股东的博弈是否会影响到他们的代理成本呢?本文并未涉及到。第二，关于公司治理环境变量的替代变量的选择。公司治理环境的考虑因素很多，有法律方面的，也有非法律方面的。在法律方面，有立法方面的，也有执法方面的因素。本文在选择公司治理
10、环境变量的替代变量时未能综合考虑这些因素，这可能会影响到本文的实证分析结论。关键词：实际控制人财务行为 监管委托代理理论公司价值AbstractJay RRitter-the famous American fillance expert(2005)pointed OUt thatCompared to past study paradigm,one of the latest developments of financialresearch is more and more focusing on the research aboutlaw and finance”Indeed,forei
11、gn scholarsstudies on principal-agent relationship about listedcompany experienced a change from studying agent conflict between shareholderand manager to studying agent conflict bf2tween controlling shareholder(it is alsoknown as actual controller)and minority shareholderIn China,a growing numberof
12、 scholars have also begun to turn research perspective about principalagentconflict to agent conflict between actual controller and minority shareholderAccording to statistics，by the end of 2008 more than 95of the originalstateowned listed company completed reform of non-tradable sharesWith thebanni
13、ng of non-tradable shares，China capital market starts to show a full sharecirculation characteristicsUnder this background,a number of changes of actualcontrollerS financial characteristics of the former state-owned listed companieshave taken placeThen,it is necessary to study what kinds of impacts
14、resultingfrom actual controllerS financial behaviors after post-non-tradable share periodMoreover,in China,state-controlled company and non-state-controlled oneco-exist,there are many forms of actual controllersTherefore，it is necessary tofurther study whether there ale differences among companys im
15、pact of differenttypes of actual controllersThrough analysis of these impacts，we call findcountermeasures to regulate actual controllerBecause healthy development ofcapital markets can not be separatedeffective supervision to actual controller,only this，can China capital markets orderly develop and
16、the interests of listedcompany and minority shareholders widely maintainNow,research literatureA Study On Governance Effect ofActual Controllers Financial Behaviorabout share reform has not been斑ly involved in these issues，In view of氇is，based on the latest research paradigm彻at is,LLSV)，this paper di
17、scusses theimpacts of actual country controller and actual non。-country controller,and exploresupervision countermeasures to themThis paper is composed of eight chapters,and divided into four parts：theoretical analysis，empirical analysis，countermeasure study and summaryChapters 1 to Chapter 3 are th
18、eoretical analysisChapters 4 to Chapter 6 areempirical part Chapter 7 is cohlllten蛰eaSLlle study,and chapter8 is a summary ofthe触l text11埭main contents of the chapters arc as follows：Chaptcrl is in镣oducfion皿It briefly introduces this thews。聪s chapterincludes research backgrounds and presentation of
19、questions，research ideas，research contents,innovation and deficiencies。Chapter2 is literature review,which reviews principal-agent relationship ofBerle and Means paradigm圆-M paradigm,for short)and LLSV paradigm弧esummary of B制paradigm about principal-agent relationship is mainlyrelationship between o
20、wnership structure and corporate performance under thewidely dispersed share structure曩瓣review Of LLSV paradigm mainly focuses onprincip越*agent relationship between actual controller and company value,豁wellas the mlationship between controlling shareholder and private benefits of contr01Chapter3 is
21、theoretical basis and system background。This chapter llSe$principal*agent theory as theoretical basis，discusses principal-agent theory ofMarxism on the basis of锰一right separationtheory,and based on contract view,itexpounds principalagent theory of WestIn background part,it mainly describeschanges fr
22、om stock fight splitting to equity line On China capital market,establishment of state-owned assets management system fromWulong-water-system to a unified state-owned assets management system,andco-existing listing institutional arrangements for private enterprises On directmarket and indirect oneCh
23、apter4 analyzes principal-agent costs of BM model and LLSV paradigm姆model analyzingFor B捌paxadigm,this chapter analyzes principal-agent costbetween shareholder and manager with nodifference-curveFor LLSV paradigm,2this chapter analyzes three insmmlents to separate ownership and control rightunder th
24、e control of controlling shareholder,then discusses four kinds of agencycosts caused by controlling shareholder to minority one，which are。investmentprojectschoice nonefficiently,control transferS choice non-efficiently,investment policies and business scales options non-efficiently,“entrenchmenteffe
25、ctabout company valueChapter5 deals with relationship between actual controllerS features andlisted company value in ChinaThis chapter redefines actual controllers type，analyses five characteristics of actual controller,which are actual controllerSownership，actual controllerS control ri龇separation o
26、f ownership and controlri幽 control chain, actual controllerS type and tests “incentive effects”，“entrenchment effect，decentralization hypothesisof these characteristics tolisted company,and dissertates that new state-owned assets supervision andmanagement system is more efficientChapter6 discusses r
27、elationship between actual controllerS characteristicsand private benefits of contr01Firstly,this chapter sums up different views ofprivate benefits of contr01Secondly,from monitoring behavior duality ofcontrolling shareholder,this chapter analyses two sides of controllingshareholderS treatment effe
28、cts，and points out that private benefits of control c觚be divided into normal benefits of control and extra benefits of contr01Then,thispaper improves measurernent formula,introduces corporate governanceenvironment variables，and empirically analysis the impact of agtBal controllerSproperties，corporat
29、e governance environment and share-trading reform to privatebenefits of contr01Chapter7 deals晰m new ideas on regulation to actual controller atpost-non-tradable share periodBased on empirical analysis of Chapters4 andChapters5，this chapter points out that great changes have taken place thatrelations
30、hip bet、n actual controller and listed company as well as someimproper conducts of actual controller at post-non-tradable share periodThen,inview ofactual controllersdifferent status、role、proportion in the national economy,3A Study On Governance Effect of Actual ControllerS Financial Behaviorthis ch
31、apter raises new regulatory thinking-“differential treatmentclassificationsupervisionIn particular,it deals、析t11 construction of constraints and incentivemechanisms of SASACChapter8 is the summary of the thesisThis part includes conclusion andenlightenment of the study,limitations and future directi
32、ons for further research7Improvement and innovation of the article are mainly reflected in thefollowing areas：1This paper analyzes basic contents of Marxist principal-agent theoryOnthe application of MarxS classic analysis to principal-agent theory,this paperpoints out that MarxStri-rightseparation
33、theory,namely a theory aboutseparation of property ownership，occupation right and monitoring，management,operating right provides theoretical base for Western principalagent theoryTheemergence of principal-agent relationship is an inexorable law under largescaledivision of labor and collaboration pro
34、duction2T11is paper discusses actual controllerS governance effect to listedcompanies，analyses efficiency of new state-owned assets supervision andmanagement systemIn studying relationship between actual controllerS featuresand company value，this paper re-defines actual controllerS type，analyses fiv
35、echaracteristics of actual controller,including actual controllerS ownership，controlright,separation of ownership and control ri龇control chain，actual controllerStype and testsincentive effects”，“entrenchment effect，“decentralizationhypothesis”By comparing value difference between SASAC-controlled li
36、stedcompanies and non-SASAC-controlled ones which are also controlled by state，this paper indirectly indicate that new state-owned assets supervision andmanagement system is efficiency111e longer control chain,the better companyvalue，control chain is a means of solution to solve inspiration of China
37、governmental functions and enterprise management3s paper raises dichotomy theory views about private benefits of control，and improves measurement formulaIn studying relationship bctwecn actualcontrollerS characteristics and private benefits of control，this paper reviewdomestic and foreign literature
38、s about private benefits of control，divides these4literatures into two conflicting viewpointsFrom supervision duanty of controllingshareholderS behavior,this paper analyses governance effect of controllingshareholder,points out that private benefit of control can be divided into normalbenefits of co
39、ntrol and extra benefits of contr01In empirical analysis parts，thispaper improves measurement formula,introduces corporate governanceenvironment variables，and empirically analysis the impact of actual controllerSproperties，corporate govemanee environment and share-trading reform on privatebenefits o
40、f contr014This paper puts forward new ideas on classification regulatory,raises newideas to improve stateowned assets supervision and management systemIndealing with new idea of regulating actual controller at post-non-tradable shaleperiod，in view oftheir different status、role、proportion in the nati
41、onal economy,this paper puts forward new regulatory thinking-differential treatment,classification supervision：功e key questions to regulate state actual controller areto norm its institution-building，and to improve its incentive mechanismAs fornon-state actual controller,the key questions are mainly
42、 to check its related partytransagtions，which invade and occupy the interests of minority shareholdersInbuilding supervision mechanism of SASAC，this paper puts forward two-prongedsystem from external and intemal supervision to construct supervision of SASAC，and proposes institutions ideaThat is，we s
43、hould strip administrative supervisionfunctions of SASAC，integrate its monitoring resources，establish State-ownedAssets Supervision and Commission under National People of CongressIninternal supervision bodies，we should set up State-owned Assets SupervisionBureau that brings existing management func
44、tions of SASAC institutions togetherIn incentive mechanism,we should establish material-incentiveorientedframework and establish deferred benefits5This paper raises new method about calculating indirection shareholdingratio under cross-shareholdingUsing algebraic analysis method，this paper utilizesm
45、atrix operations and takes account of recursive relationship among companies tocalculate indirection shareholding ratio under eross-shareholdingThis method Can5A Study On Governance Effect ofActual ControllerS Financial Behaviorprecisely calculate indirect shareholding ratio，andwhich simpnfy calcula
46、te indirect shareholding ratioBecause the study on financial characteristic and supervision of act-tlalcontroller in post-non-tradable share period is an exploring research,inevitablythere are some deficiencies，which mainly include：1In methodology,due to authorS knowledge defect,this paper fails toi
47、ntroduce relevant knowledge with game theoryIn fact,the game between actualcontroller and minority one will not stop during and after reform of non-tradablesharesWill the game between actual eontroUer and minonty shareholder affecttheir agency cost after post-non-tradable share period?This question
48、has not beeninvolved2There are some problems concerning alternative variables to substitutecorporate governance enviromentWe should consider many factors，which arenot only legal aspects，but also non-legal onesOn legal aspects，there alelegislation factors，as well as law enforcement onesIn choice of c
49、orporategovernance environment variable，this article c粗not substitute for acomprehensive consideration of these factors，which may affect empirical analysisconclusions6Key words：Actual Controller；Financial Behavior；Supervision；Principal-agent Theory；Company Value西南财经大学学位论文原创性及知识产权声明本人郑重声明：所呈交的学位论文，是本人在导师的指导下，独立进行研究工作所取得的成果。除文中已经注明引用的内容外，本论文不含任何其他个人或集体已经发表或撰写过的作品成果。对本文的研究做出重要贡献的个人和集体，均已在文中以明确方式标明。因本学位论文引起的法律结果完全由本人承担。本学位论文成果归西南财经大学所有。特此声明学位
