1、3GPP TR 41.031 V8.0.0 (2008-12)Technical Specification3rd Generation Partnership Project;Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects;Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+);Fraud Information Gathering System (FIGS)Service requirements - Stage 0(Release 8)GLOBAL SYTEM FOR
2、MBIE CMUNICATINSRThe present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP TM) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP.The present document has not been subject to any approval process by the 3GPP Organizational Partners and shall not be implemented.
3、This Specification is provided for future development work within 3GPP only. The Organizational Partners accept no liability for any use of this Specification.Specifications and reports for implementation of the 3GPP TM system should be obtained via the 3GPP Organizational Partners Publications Offi
4、ces.3GPP3GPP TR 41.031 V8.0.0 (2008-12)2Release 8KeywordsGSM, Security3GPPPostal address3GPP support office address650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia AntipolisValbonne - FRANCETel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16Internethttp:/www.3gpp.orgCopyright NotificationNo part may be reproduced except
5、as authorized by written permission.The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media. 2008, 3GPP Organizational Partners (ARIB, ATIS, CCSA, ETSI, TTA, TTC).All rights reserved.UMTS is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its members3GPP is a Trade Mark of
6、 ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational PartnersLTE is a Trade Mark of ETSI currently being registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational PartnersGSM and the GSM logo are registered and owned by the GSM Association3GPP3GPP TR 41.031 V
7、8.0.0 (2008-12)3Release 8ContentsForeword .41 Scope.52 Normative references53 Definitions and abbreviations .53.1 Definitions .53.2 Abbreviations.54 Fraud Information Gathering System overview .65 The need for fraud detection systems and controls.65.1 Outline of present situation65.2 General Princip
8、les75.3 Capabilities 75.4 Service conditions75.5 Information Delivery Time75.6 Subscriber Data Volumes 86 Interface between HPLMN and FDS87 Security of the system.8Annex A: Change History93GPP3GPP TR 41.031 V8.0.0 (2008-12)4Release 8ForewordThis Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generati
9、on Partnership Project (3GPP).The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and
10、an increase in version number as follows:Version x.y.zwhere:x the first digit:1 presented to TSG for information;2 presented to TSG for approval;3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancemen
11、ts, corrections, updates, etc.z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.3GPP3GPP TR 41.031 V8.0.0 (2008-12)5Release 81 ScopeThis Technical Report describes the requirements (at a stage 0 level) of the Fraud Information Gathering System (FIGS)
12、. FIGS provides the means for the HPLMN to monitor a defined set of subscriber activities.The aim is to enable service providers/network operators to use FIGS, and service limitation controls such as Operator Determined Barring (ODB) and Immediate Service Termination (IST), to limit their financial
13、exposure to large unpaid bills produced on subscriber accounts whilst the subscriber is roaming outside their HPLMN. HPLMNs may also choose to collect information on subscriber activities whilst their subscribers are within the HPLMN.2 Normative referencesThe following documents contain provisions w
14、hich, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. For a non-specific reference, th
15、e latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same Release as the present document.1 GSM 01.04: “Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Abbre
16、viations and acronyms“.2 GSM 02.33: “Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Lawful Interception - stage 1“.3 Definitions and abbreviations3.1 DefinitionsFor the purposes of this report the following definitions apply:monitored activities: subscriber activities that must be reported t
17、o the HPLMN. These can be call related events (e.g. call-set-up, call termination) or the invocation of call related and call independent supplementary services (e.g. Call Hold, Call Waiting, Call Transfer, Call Forwarding, Unstructured Supplementary Service Data).Home Network: The home PLMN includi
18、ng non-GSM elements such as the Fraud Detection System (FDS), customer service systems and billing.3.2 AbbreviationsAbbreviations used in this report are listed in GSM 01.04.For the purposes of this report the following abbreviations apply:FIGS Fraud Information Gathering SystemFDS Fraud Detection S
19、ystemThis is not necessarily an automatic system but may be one that requires human intervention.IST Immediate Service Termination3GPP3GPP TR 41.031 V8.0.0 (2008-12)6Release 84 Fraud Information Gathering System overviewA number of proposals have been suggested for a Subscriber Supervisory System (S
20、SS) for which specifications were produced from May 1995 through to December 1996. Following joint review between SMG1 and SMG10, it was agreed that the system should be re-specified to take account of network operator and manufacturer needs for a Fraud Information Gathering System (FIGS). This repo
21、rt provides an outline of such a system.This report describes a method by which the Home Network can be provided with data on the activities of its subscribers in a VPLMN. The Home Network can make inferences about what the subscriber is doing and then take decisions on what the subscriber should be
22、 allowed to do. This report does not address any Fraud Detection systems or the intelligence that is used to advise the HPLMN on the controls to be applied to a subscriber.Figure 1 shows the flow of messages between the HPLMN and the VPLMN and between the HPLMN and the FDS.FraudDetctionSystem HPLMNF
23、IGS etFIGS Dat VPLMN1VPLMN3FIGS etFIGS DatVPLMN2Figure 1: Flow of messages between the HPLMN and the VPLMN and between the HPLMN and the FDS5 The need for fraud detection systems and controls5.1 Outline of present situationModern telecommunications networks, particularly mobile networks provide the
24、potential for fraudsters to make use of telecommunication services (Voice, Data, Fax etc.) without the intent to pay. A number of different scenarios are exploited and it is up to the network operator or service provider to detect misuse where it occurs and to stop it at the earliest possible opport
25、unity.The scale of frauds can be many thousand of ECU per day on a single account when International or Premium rate numbers are called. The most common types of fraud that effect networks like GSM are related to the ability to sell calls at below market price using stolen air-time/equipment where t
26、he user of the equipment does not intend to pay the network operator or service provider. Fraudulent subscribers often avoid payment by obtaining a handset and a subscription to a GSM network by fraudulently giving details and justifications to the network operators/service provider. If there are no
27、t good controls within the network the subscriber can make a large volume of calls to expensive destinations and accumulate a large bill.3GPP3GPP TR 41.031 V8.0.0 (2008-12)7Release 8Roaming, in co-ordination with advanced services such as call transfer and multi-party calls, complicates the issue fu
28、rther, requiring control of the customer within the VPLMN. Many simultaneous calls can be set up and large bills accumulated in a short time. At present no system exists within the GSM network architecture for speedily transferring information on subscriber activity from the VPLMN to the HPLMN.In th
29、e future, SIMs may roam to non-GSM networks, further broadening the area over which control is required. It is recognised that if FIGS is implemented in non-GSM networks that suitable inter-working units will be required to translate commands and information.5.2 General PrinciplesThe PLMN network sh
30、ould be able to supply relevant information to the HPLMN network so it can make a decision on whether to terminate a call or to change the Operator Determined Barring (ODB) configuration for the specific subscriber. This decision will be carried out by the HPLMN or service provider. It is recognised
31、 that there is a limit to the type and volume of information that can be transferred between the VPLMN and the HPLMN. Therefore the requirement for the system is that distilled and standardised information must be supplied between the VPLMN and HPLMN.5.3 CapabilitiesThe following minimum capabilitie
32、s are required. See figure 1.Within the Home Network:- to mark a subscriber, defined by the IMSI or MSISDN, as being under FIGS control (“FIG Set“);- to receive from the VPLMN the data described below;- to remove the monitoring of a subscribers activities (“FIGS Unset“).Within the VPLMN:- to transmi
33、t to the HPLMN information (FIGS Data):- at the start of a call;- at the end of a call;- during a call for long calls or at the mid-call invocation of supplementary services.5.4 Service conditionsThe following service conditions shall apply:- FIGS shall not modify the VPLMNs service;- FIGS should no
34、t alter any standard GSM functionality seen by the customer or effect the service quality;- If the VPLMN network does not have the resources to support a FIGS Set command it shall respond accordingly to the HPLMN.5.5 Information Delivery TimeThe need for up to date information is a critical part of
35、any fraud information system. The sooner data is transferred to the HPLMN, the sooner fraud can be stopped. Therefore the proscribed information shall be transferred from the VPLMN to the HPLMN within two minutes of the occurrence of a FIGS-monitored eventThe information shall preferably be transfer
36、red from the VPLMN to the HPLMN over existing communication links (e.g. SS7 signalling links).3GPP3GPP TR 41.031 V8.0.0 (2008-12)8Release 85.6 Subscriber Data VolumesIf the support of FIGS is causing overload within the VPLMN the FIGS system shall not permit the marking of new subscribers. The VPLMN
37、 should therefore handle up to a realistic limit any requests for marking of subscribers and be able to support the associated data transfer. The setting of this limit is outside the scope of this report.Each VPLMN should limit the number of subscribers that each HPLMN may request to be monitored us
38、ing FIGS. Otherwise an HPLMN may take more than its “fair share” of the FIGS processing capability of a VPLMN.A mechanism shall be required whereby a VPLMN can charge an HPLMN for the bulk data transfer made to that HPLMN.6 Interface between HPLMN and FDSThe interface between the home network and th
39、e networks fraud detection and processing systems shall be through a specific interface. This will be used to present information to the fraud detection systems. The contents of messages sent on this interface shall be specified but not the transfer mechanism. This is in line with the approach used
40、for the X-interface as specified in GSM 02.33.The FDS will indicate to the HPLMN subscribers that should be subject to FIGS monitoring. This information will update the HPLMN HLR.Information, as listed in subclause 5.3 gathered from the VPLMN will be transferred to the FDS system. Following processi
41、ng of this information, the FDS system can take no action or can advise the home network to do one of the following:a) update ODB categories;b) instigate an Immediate Service Termination (IST);c) mark the subscriber as not being required to be monitored under FIGS.7 Security of the systemIt is expec
42、ted that there will be a need for authentication, data integrity and confidentiality of the commands and data transferred between PLMNs.These issues are for study under other work items within the SMG10 work programme.3GPP3GPP TR 41.031 V8.0.0 (2008-12)9Release 8Annex A:Change HistoryChange historyS
43、MG# Spec Version CR New Version Subject/CommentNo Phase 1 versionSMG#22 01.31 1.0.0 To SMG#22 for informationSMG#23 01.31 2.0.0 To SMG#23 for approvalSMG#23 01.31 2.0.0 R96 5.0.0 TS approved by SMG#23SMG#25 01.31 5.0.0 R98 7.0.0 The report was converted to version 7.0.0 because the work item is rela
44、ted to Release 98. Version 5.x.y was withdrawn (SMG#25)SMG#26 01.31 7.0.0 A001 R98 7.0.1 CR 01.31-A001 (Editorial) approved by SMG#267.0.1 - R99 8.0.0 The report was converted to version 8.0.0 because the work item is related to Release 99.Change historyTSG SA# Spec Version CR New Version Subject/Co
45、mmentSP-11 01.31 8.0.0 - Rel-4 41.031 v 4.0.0 Upgrade to Release 4 (3GPP numbering)41.031 4.0.0 - Rel-4 4.0.1 May 2001: change from TS layout to TR layout.SP-16 41.031 4.0.1 - Rel-5 5.0.0 June 2002: Upgrade to Release 5SP-26 41.031 5.0.0 - Rel-6 6.0.0 December 2004: Upgrade to Release 6SP-36 41.031 6.0.0 - Rel-7 7.0.0 June 2007: Upgrade to Release 7SP-42 41.031 7.0.0 - Rel-8 8.0.0 December 2008: Upgrade to Release 8
