1、1Chinas Expenditure for the Peoples Armed Police and MilitiaShaoguang WangIn many countries, official defense budget is only a part of their overall defense spending.1 China is no exception. China watchers in the West know that some categories of military expenditure are missing from the countrys pu
2、blished defense budget, but they are not certain exactly what are excluded and where “hidden resources” of defense financing lie. Consequently, Western estimates of Chinese military expenditures “still largely consist of guessworkand hence contain a considerable margin of error.”2 The paucity of rel
3、iable data has often been attributed to Beijings reluctance to be more forthcoming about its defense spending. No doubt, the traditional preoccupation of with secrecy on the part of China has made it hard for Western analysts to get hold of a sufficient amount of numbers to crunch in this area. It a
4、lso needs to be noted, however, that valuable Chinese-language sources have routinely gone unnoticed in the English-language literature, which turns the knowables into the unknowns. This essay has a very moderate goal. Using official data from previously untapped open sources, it attempts to answer
5、the following three questions regarding Chinas expenses for the Peoples Armed Police and militia: From which sources do the PAP and militia receive their budgetary allocation? How much do Chinas central and local governments spend on the PAP and militia? What determines the level of local PAP and mi
6、litia expenses? Expenditures for the Peoples Armed Police and Militia1 A case study of the United States, for instance, finds that, for FY2003, U.S. Department of Defense budget (about $390 billion) understated the actual total U.S. military expenditure of $520 by about $130 billion. See Jurgen Brau
7、er, “United States Military Expenditure,” paper presented at Conference on Economics and Security Technical Institute of Larissa, Greece, June 2004.2 Richard A. Bitzinger, “Just the Facts, Maam: The Challenge of Analysing and Assessing Chinese Military Expenditures,” China Quarterly, No. 173 (2003):
8、 165-66.2In China, the armed forces are composed of not only the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) but also the Chinese Peoples Armed Police (PAP) and the militia. A paramilitary force, the PAPs key mission is to maintain law and order during peacetime and assist the PLA in war. The PAPs predecessors we
9、re certain PLA units and some special police forces. Starting from 1982, those entities were gradually amalgamated into the newly established PAP.3 Currently this paramilitary force is composed of eight services, which fall into three large categories. First, internal defense units are directly unde
10、r the command of the PAP headquarters. Those lightly- or medium-equipped infantry forces (including local contingents and mobile divisions) are the backbones of the PAP. Second, the Ministry of Public Security and its local bureaus administer frontier defense units, garrison units, and fire brigade
11、units. Third, forest police units, gold units, hydroelectricity units, and transportation units are subject to the dual leadership of the PAP headquarters on the one hand and relevant government agencies on the other. The whole troop of the PAP is believed to be around 1.3 million.4 The militia is a
12、n armed organization composed of men and women not released from their regular duties. A backup force of the PLA and PAP, the militia is expected to help maintain social order, participate in emergency rescue and disaster relief, and perform combat readiness support in peacetime, and to conduct inde
13、pendent military operations, provide combat support and supply manpower for the standing army when war breaks out. The militia has two categories: ordinary and backbone. Male citizens belonging to the age group of 18-35 are normally regimented into the ordinary militia, who receive some basic milita
14、ry training but generally are unarmed. The backbone militia, however, comprised of men and women under the age of 28 who has served in the PLA/PAP and who receive 30-40 days of military training per year. Now the latter is made up of not only traditional infantry detachments but also new specialized
15、 technical detachments (e.g. rapid reaction, naval, anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft machineguns, portable air defense missiles, ground artillery, communications, anti-chemical, 3 Tai Ming Cheung, “Guarding Chinas Domestic Front line: the Peoples Armed Police and Chinas Stability, China Quarte
16、rly, No. 146 (1996): 525-547.4 U.S. Department of Defense, “2000 Annual Report on The Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China,” http:/www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm. 3engineering, and reconnaissance detachments). Although the backbone militia is a smaller force than it wa
17、s 20 years ago, it is still 10 million strong.5 Given the size of the PAP and militia, clearly any study of Chinas defense expenditure would be incomplete if it fails to cover them. Where do PAP and militia get their budgetary allocation? Contrary to some Western speculations,6 expenses for the mili
18、tia forces are already included in Chinas official defense budget (guofang zhichu). According to Chinas “Headings in Government Revenues and Expenditures” (Ministry of Finance, various years-b), the official defense budget covers six categories of expenses, namely, expenses for the PLA (junfei), def
19、ense-related R China Security Review Commission, Report to Congress of the U.S: The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China, Chapter 9, “The Defense Budget and the Military Economy,” July, 2002.7 State Council State Council, Guanyu shixing fens
20、huizhi canzheng guanli tizhi de jueding Decision to implement tax-sharing system, 1993, http:/www.law- 8 State Council, Guanyu shixing fenshuizhi canzheng guanli tizhi de jueding Decision to implement tax-sharing system, 1993, http:/www.law- 4Table 1: Division of Funding ResponsibilityCentral LocalD
21、efense budgetPLA Defense-related R&D Military mobilization Pilot recruitment Defense-related construction projects Militia procurements Militia operating PAP budgetInternal defense units Garrison units Fire brigade units Frontier defense Gold units* Forest police units* Hydroelectricity units* Trans
22、portation units* *Expenses for gold, forest, hydroelectricity, and transportation units used to be listed under different ministries. After 2000, they are incorporated into the PAP budget.Source: Ministry of Finance, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo yusuan shouzhi kemu PRC Headings in Government Revenues a
23、nd Expenditures, Beijing: China Public Finance Press, various years.How much do China central and local governments spend on the PAP and militia forces? Figure 1 shows the central and local expenditures for the PAP. The total amount increased from barely 1.2 billion yuan in 1984 to nearly 24 billion
24、 in 2003 (current price), which meant an average annual growth rate of almost 18 percent. The annual growth rate was very high between 1989 and 1997, normally in the neighborhood of 20 to 30 percent. Since then it has slowed down. By the beginning of the new century, the growth rate fell into single
25、 digit. The year 2000 was exceptional because the funds for gold, forest, 9 Ministry of Finance, Difang caizheng juesuan wenjian ziliao Documentary Materials on Sub-national Fiscal Final Accounts, Beijing: China Public Finance Press, various years.5hydroelectricity, and transportation units began to
26、 be incorporated into the PAP budget from elsewhere. Figure 1: Central & Local Expenditure for the PAPPAP Expenditure (Billion Yuan)0510152025301984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003Central LocalSource: Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo caizhe
27、ng nianjian China Public Finance Yearbook, Beijing: China Public Finance Press, various years.The local PAP spending has consistently been small in absolute terms (Figure 2). By 2003, it amounted only to 2.4 billion yuan for all the provinces. On average, each province spent less than 100 million yu
28、an for PAP operation. However, the local share in the total PAP spending has been growing, from about 2.5 percent in 1996 to 10 percent in 2003.Figure 2: Local Expenditure for the PAP6Local Expenditure for the PAP (Billion Yuan)00.511.522.531996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003Source: Ministry of
29、Finance, Zhongguo caizheng nianjian China Public Finance Yearbook, Beijing: China Public Finance Press, various years.No data are available with regard to the expenses on weapon and equipment procurement for the militia, which are supposed to come from the central budget. As far as militia operating
30、 expenses are concerned, they have been quite small. As illustrated by Figure 3, before Li Denghuis 1995 visit to the United States aggravated tension across the Taiwan Straits, the growth curve of the militia operating expenses was more or less flat. Given high inflation rates in the early 1990s, s
31、uch expenses were actually falling rather than rising in real terms. After 1996, the local spending on militia forces began to grow. Despite the fact that the outlay more than tripled in the following seven years, however, it remained below 2.3 billion yuan by 2003, on a par with the local PAP spend
32、ing in the same year. Figure 3: Local Expenditure for the Militia7Local Expenditure for the Militia (Billion Yuan)00.511.522.51989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003Source: Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo caizheng nianjian China Public Finance Yearbook, Beijing: Chin
33、a Public Finance Press, various years.Due to its tiny size, the local spending on the militia never accounted for more than 1 percent of the total office defense budget prior to 2002. Even in 2002 and 2003, the share barely exceeded 1 percent (Figure 4).Figure 4: Central & Local Defense ExpenditureD
34、efense Expenditure (Billion Yuan)0204060801001201401601802001989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003Central LocalSource: Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo caizheng nianjian China Public Finance Yearbook, Beijing: China Public Finance Press, various years.Determinants of
35、 Local PAP & Militia Spending8What determines the level of local PAP and Militia expenses? It is reasonable to believe that three factors are important: the size of population, the size of economy, and the location of province. The size of population represents a demand-side factor: provinces with l
36、arger populations may need larger PAP and militia forces to maintain social order. The size of economy is likely to play a role on the supply-side: economically strong provinces can afford to finance larger PAP and militia forces. In addition, since both the PAP and militia perform certain national
37、defense functions, provinces along the coastline and borderline are expected to spend more on them. Figure 5: Size of Population & PAP Expenses, 2003Population and PAP Expenses01000020000300004000050000600000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000Population (10000)PAP Expenses (10000 Yuan) GuangdongSource: Minis
38、try of Finance, Zhongguo caizheng nianjian China Public Finance Yearbook, Beijing: China Public Finance Press, various years.Surprisingly, neither size of population nor size of economy can adequately explain the level of provincial PAP expenditure. To be sure, provincial PAP expenditure is positive
39、ly correlated to the size of population and the size of economy. Nevertheless, such relationships do not seem to be statistically significant (Figures 5 and 6). Among all the provinces, Guangdong appears to be an outlier. Its PAP spending has always been several times higher than that in any other p
40、rovince, not just in 2003. Guangdongs geographic location may partially explain why it spends so much more on the PAP forces compared with others. Due to its proximity to Hong Kong and Macau, the number of inbound and outbound visitors passing through various border crossings in Guangdong 9surpasses
41、 that of any another province. Moreover, it has the longest coastline (3,368.1 km.) among all the costal provinces. As Figure 7 shows, like Guangdong, other provinces on borderline and coastline also tend to spend more on the PAP than inland provinces. In terms of per capita expenses, among the top
42、eleven spenders, only one is not on border. Conversely, all those on the bottom of Figure 7 save one are inland provinces.Figure 6: Size of Economy & PAP Expenses, 2003GDP & PAP Expenses01000020000300004000050000600000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000GDP (100 Million Yuan)PAP Expenses (10
43、000 Yuan) GuangdongSource: Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo caizheng nianjian China Public Finance Yearbook, Beijing: China Public Finance Press, various years.Figure 7: Location & PAP Expenses, 20031010 The budgets of Shanghai and Henan have contained no allocations to the PAP, and the budget of Beiji
44、ng has presented only a negligible amount under the heading of PAP expenses in recent years. Perhaps the central government pays the bill for those three places. 10Per Capita Expenses on PAP0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10HenanShanghaiBeijingHebeiAnhuiShaanxiGuizhouShandongHubeiGansuHunanJiangxiShanxiGuangxiT
45、ianjinSichuanJiangsuLiaoningNingxiaQinghaiJilinZhejiangChongqingHeilongjiaYunnanFujianXinjiangNeimengHainanGuangdonTibetProvinceYuanBorder provincesInland provincesSource: Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo caizheng nianjian China Public Finance Yearbook, Beijing: China Public Finance Press, various year
46、s.In contrast to the local PAP spending, the size of population and the size of economy are strong predicators of local militia spending, which is evident in Figures 8 and 9. Whether a province is on border or not is also a determinant of the level of its militia spending, but apparently not as sign
47、ificant as in the case of the PAP. Figure 10 demonstrates that, in terms of per capita expenses, six out of the seven top spenders are border provinces, while seven out of the eight bottom spenders are inland provinces. Figure 8: Size of Population & Militia Expenses, 200311Population and Militia Ex
48、penses05000100001500020000250000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000Population (10000)MilitiaExpenses (10000Yuan)Source: Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo caizheng nianjian China Public Finance Yearbook, Beijing: China Public Finance Press, various years.Figure 9: Size of Economy & Militia Expenses, 2003GDP
49、 and Militia Expenses05000100001500020000250000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000GDP (100 Million Yuan)MilitiaExpenses (10000Yuan)Source: Ministry of Finance, Zhongguo caizheng nianjian China Public Finance Yearbook, Beijing: China Public Finance Press, various years.Figure 10: Location & Militia Expenses, 200312Per Capita Expense on Militia0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5JiangxiHenanAnhuiShaanxiShandongGuizhouGansuHebeiJiangsuHunanChongqingShangha