1、大连轻工业学院硕士学位论文服装供应链中制造商与代理商的激励机制研究姓名：谢萌申请学位级别：硕士专业：服装设计与工程导教师：钱晓农;霍云福20070401AbstractSince 1980s, the supply chain management has become a very important part in management gradually. The purpose of SCM is mainly to devote to the rationalization and optimization of logistics, information flow and fun
2、ds flow in the whole chain by the cooperation and division of node enterprises, and improve the competence of the whole chain. So the key factor of the SCM is just the cooperation of all enterprises in a supply chain. The settlement of the strategic partnership of supply chain enterprise can better
3、guarantee the whole competitiveness of the supply chain effectively. But the cooperation among the supply chain enterprises is always very weak in reality because of the information asymmetry, information twist, market uncertainty and other reasons. In order to better maintain and develop the cooper
4、ation of supply chain enterprise, it is very important to set up an effective incentive mechanism in each stage and adopt all kinds of measures to incentive all the enterprises. There are various characteristics in fashion industry, such as outstanding style, evident season, short period of circling
5、 time, small quantity, many items, short time of delivery, etc. So, it is absolutely necessary for the suppliers, manufactures, marketers and retailers to work out a more effective cooperation and incentive mechanism.Thus, the theme of this paper is to study on cooperation incentive mechanism of man
6、ufacturers and agents in supply chain of garment industry.Firstly, we analyze contemporary supply chain of fashion industiy, describe background and influence of the research, and simply generalize the contents and structure of this paperSecondly, fashion supply chain and its cooperation is discusse
7、d. First of all, we interpret the concepts of supply chain and supply chain management (SCM).Then, we explain the target and contents of SCM in fashion industry with the general idea of SCM .Finally, with the uncertainty of the fashion supply chain, we develop the concept of cooperation and incentiv
8、e mechanism of fashion supply chain.Then, we analyze the principal-agent mode in the clothing distribution system. To begin with, we explain the principal-agent theory, then we expound the current condition and classification of the principal-agent mechanism in clothing distribution system.Furthermo
9、re, we do a certain research on the incentive mechanism of the principal-agent in fashion. Above all, we present the definition of incentive and incentive mechanism. Then, we discuss whether the incentive mechanism is operated in the clothing distribution system or not with the theory of economics,
10、game theory, and mathematical model building. mMoreover, we figure out a complete set of incentive measures of principal-agent in clothing distribution system. Finally, we put the incentive mechanism into effect by the means of contract and take three model for example.At last, we generalize all the
11、 problems discussed above. By discussion and analysis, we summarize previous problems objectively, and propose the further studying orientation in terms of the imperfect and limitation of this paper.Key words: Garment. Supply Chain Management, Incentive Mechan i sm, Principal-Agent, Manufacturers, A
12、gents关于硕士学位论文使用授权的说明论文题目：服链中葡!造商与代理商的激Ml机制研究本学位论文作者完全了解大连轻工业学院有关保留、使用学位论文的 规定，大连轻工业学院有权保留并向国家有关部门或机构送交论文的复印 件和磁盘，允许论文被查阅和借阅，可以将学位论文的全部或部分内容编 入有关数据库进行检索，可以采用影印、缩印或扫描等复制手段保存、汇 编学位论文，并且本人电子文档的内容和纸质论文的内容相一致。 保密的学位论文在解密后也遵守此规定。 是否保密（！)，保密期至 ： 年今月 /3日为止0, v0，M “ 0，c 0,c“:0,即委托人和代理人都是风险规避者或是风 险中性者，努力的边际效用是
13、递减的。假定分布函数G(的、生产技术:c(a，的和 冗 (fl,0、 以及效用函数v(?r-s(x)和 u(s)-c(a)都是共同知识，即委托人和代理在有关这些技术关系上认识是一致的。 委托人的问题是选择a和对最大化期望效用函数(F)，满足 约束条件m和m,即-(F)max Jv(咖，的- s_ 喻 (/?) u(s(x(a,mgW0-c(a)u(办( fl，的)射的 c/没 JV 办(，的没- cOAVtie 其中，（P)为委托人的期望效用函数；（J均称为个人理性 约束，表明代理人从接受 合同中得到的期望效用不能小于不接受合同时能够得到的最大期望效用；称为保留效 用，含义为代理人不接受合同时能够得到最大的期望效用，其值由代理人面临的其他市 场机会决定；（/C)称为激励相容约束，给定委托人不能观测到代理人的行动a和自然状 态0，在任何激励合同下，代理人总是选择使自己的期望效用最大化的行动a,因此， 任何委托人希望的行动都只能通过代理人的效用最大化行为实现，换言之，如果a是
