1、UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENTGenevaCAPITAL FLOWS ANDGROWTH IN AFRICAUNITED NATIONSNew York and Geneva, 2000Note Symbols of United Nations documents arecomposed of capital letters combined withfigures. Mention of such a symbol indicatesa reference to a United Nations document.The
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4、DPB/7iiiCapital Flows and Growth in AfricaPageA. Introduction 1B. Capital inflows of Africa: Trends and patterns 3C. Capital flows and current account financing 131. Capital outflows .132. Reserves .163. Current account financing17D. Stability of capital flows 18E. External financing, growth and aid
5、 dependence 221. Payments deficits and growth 222. Growth and aid dependence.24F. Reorienting policies 32Notes 36Contentsiv United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentList of tables and chartsTable Page1 Capital inflow of sub-Saharan Africa by type of flow, andnet transfer, 19751998 52 Capita
6、l inflow of North Africa by type of flow, and net transfer, 19751998 63 Current account financing and offsetting financial transactionsas a percentage of net capital inflow in 16 African countries,19801989 and 19901998 144 Short-term capital inflow, outflow and net flow of selectedAfrican countries,
7、 19801989 and 19901998 195 Terms of trade, export volume, and purchasing power ofexports in Africa.236 Simulations of growth and aid dependence in sub-SaharanAfrica under alternative scenarios .26Chart1 Total and per capita net capital inflows of sub-Saharan Africa,19751999 82 Net inflow of official
8、 capital into sub-Saharan Africa,19751999: Total and per capita 93 Aggregate net capital inflow and GDP per capitain sub-Saharan Africa, by country, 19901998104 ODA grants and GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa,by country, 19901998 . 115 Annual short-term capital inflow, outflow and net flow ofsel
9、ected African economies, 19801998 .206 Simulations of growth and aid dependence: Capital inflowsunder alternative scenarios.307 Simulations of growth and aid dependence: Current accountdeficits under alternative scenarios 311Capital Flows and Growth in AfricaA. IntroductionThe international communit
10、y has long recognized that developingcountries need a substantial inflow of external resources in order to fillthe savings and foreign exchange gaps associated with a rapid rate ofcapital accumulation and growth needed to overcome widespread pov-erty and to lift living standards to acceptable levels
11、. Among variousdeveloping regions, the need for external financing is nowhere more press-ing than in Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa,1where income levelsare too low to generate adequate domestic resources for the attainment ofeven modest rates of investment and growth. Since private capit
12、al in-flows, in particular foreign direct investment (FDI), lag behind rather thanlead growth, the task of filling the resource gap inevitably falls on officialfinancing. International efforts have indeed been taken over the past threedecades in this regard through both multilateral and bilateral fi
13、nancing.However, while the savings and foreign exchange gaps in Africa havetended to widen since the beginning of the 1980s as a result of a combina-tion of a number of factors, including adverse movements in the terms oftrade and a sharp increase in the import content of growth brought aboutby rapi
14、d trade liberalization, capital inflows have failed to keep pace.While official inflows2have stagnated or fallen, the region has notparticipated in the recovery in private capital inflows to emerging mar-kets that began in the early 1990s. Efforts to integrate the region into theCAPITAL FLOWS ANDGRO
15、WTH IN AFRICA2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Developmentglobal financial system and to attract private flows through a rapid liber-alization of the capital account have resulted not in increased inflows ofsuch capital, but in greater volatility, with attendant consequences forexchange rate
16、instability and misalignments. A number of countries inthe region have experienced considerable financial instability and pay-ments difficulties, but these have been given little attention by theinternational community, largely because, unlike the recent bouts of fi-nancial crisis in emerging market
17、s of Latin America and East Asia, theydid not pose a serious threat to the stability of the international financialsystem and their damage has been confined to the economies concerned.Moreover, an increased proportion of net capital inflows has been used forpurposes other than current account financ
18、ing, i.e. for offsetting financialtransactions (including private capital outflows) and for accumulation ofreserves as a safeguard against speculative attacks on currencies and capitalflight. Consequently, not only has the volume of net capital inflows con-tinued to fall far short of the resource ga
19、p, but also the proportion of suchinflows used for real resource transfers from abroad has fallen in the past10 years.Given that financial flows are inadequate and volatile and the regionis subject to frequent terms-of-trade and natural shocks, it should come asno surprise that growth continues to b
20、e too erratic and slow to permit anincrease in both living standards and domestic savings. Breaking this vi-cious circle requires, inter alia, a sustained injection of external financingin amounts large enough to give a big push to the region to accelerate andmaintain growth at levels higher than in
21、 the past. This initial big pushcould only come from official sources of finance, and it would need to becombined with policies that recognize the need not only for market-basedincentives, but also for a greater role for the State and for institution building.Such a process would help break aid depe
22、ndence in two ways. First,rapidly rising income would allow domestic savings to be raised fasterthan output, thereby raising total investible resources without additionalexternal financing. Secondly, sustained growth would attract private capi-tal, as a substitute for official financing. In other wo
23、rds, the only feasibleway to end aid dependence is to launch a massive aid programme and tosustain rapid growth for a sufficiently long period so as to allow domesticsavings and external private flows to gradually replace official aid. The3Capital Flows and Growth in Africaexperience of the East Asi
24、an countries that successfully broke out of thevicious circle of poverty and inadequate domestic resources during the1960s and 1970s suggests that if GDP growth could be raised to some6 per cent per annum and sustained at that rate for a period of 1012years, through a large injection of official aid
25、 accompanied by appropri-ate domestic policies, the need for official financing would graduallydiminish as these alternative sources of financing came forward. But ifthe minimum quantum of resources needed to initiate and sustain such aprocess is not provided, aid dependence is likely to continue un
26、abated. Touse a Keynesian metaphor, aid can thus be like a widows cruse: it doesnot get wasted by expending more of it, but attempts to spare it can trans-late the cruse into a Danaid jar which can never be filled up.This paper addresses these issues. The next section reviews recenttrends in the cap
27、ital inflows of Africa and is followed by an analysis ofthe use of such inflows for offsetting financial transactions and real re-source transfers. Section D examines the size and stability of short-termcapital flows. Section E presents various scenarios to analyse the possi-ble evolution of domesti
28、c savings and private capital inflows through aprocess of rapid and sustained growth made possible by, inter alia, a largeinjection of foreign aid and the implications of this process for aid de-pendence. The final section briefly discusses the policy approach neededto ensure that aid is effectively
29、 translated into investment and growth,keeping in mind the policy mistakes made both during the pre- and post-adjustment periods.B. Capital inflows of Africa:Trends and patternsAs examined in some detail in TDR 1999, capital inflows of devel-oping countries as a whole have gone through three distinc
30、t phases sincethe mid-1970s. The period from 1975 to the early 1980s saw a rapid in-crease in the total capital inflow mainly as a result of a surge in syndicatedbank lending; official financing was also sustained, even though its share4 United Nations Conference on Trade and Developmentin the total
31、 fell. This expansion came to an abrupt end in the early 1980swith the outbreak of the debt crisis when the share of private inflows intotal inflows fell as a result of reduced bank lending. The 1990s wit-nessed a sharp increase in total capital inflows, which reached 5 per centof GNP of recipient c
32、ountries, again as a result of a surge in private flows,notably portfolio and foreign direct investment, while official flows de-clined. However, this upsurge represented no more than a recovery afterthe blighted years of the 1980s, and a return to the levels observed in the1970s and early 1980s.In
33、sub-Saharan Africa, total net capital inflows as a proportion ofGNP have followed a somewhat different path. Unlike the trend in emerg-ing markets, in SSA such inflows registered a moderate increase in the1980s, compared to the 1970s, and fell somewhat in the 1990s (table 1).However, this pattern is
34、 strongly influenced by Nigeria, the largesteconomy in the region. Excluding Nigeria, total net capital inflows werelower in the 1990s than in the 1970s, although they recovered from thedepressed levels of the 1980s. North Africa experienced a dramatic de-cline in capital inflows as a proportion of
35、GNP during the 1980s comparedto the 1970s, a trend that has also continued in the 1990s, largely due to asharp decline in private inflows (table 2).Net transfers show a similar trend in SSA: they were lower in the1980s than in the previous decade, and the decline generally continuedduring the 1990s
36、despite a fall in interest payments on external debt. Thus,almost 40 per cent of net capital inflows into SSA (including Nigeria) inthe 1990s were transferred back to creditor countries as interest paymentsand profit remittances. For North Africa the turnaround in net transfers iseven more dramatic:
37、 following a sharp drop in the 1980s, they becamenegative in the 1990s, implying a net transfer of resources from the re-gion.In spite of the efforts to attract private capital, such inflows as aproportion of GNP have been on a downward trend in both SSA and NorthAfrica.3Long-term bank lending has c
38、ompletely disappeared since themid-1980s, and in SSA private inflows have mainly consisted of FDI andshort-term bank lending, while equity inflows have been somewhat moreimportant in North Africa. However, most countries in the region have5Capital Flows and Growth in AfricaTable 1CAPITAL INFLOW OF S
39、UB-SAHARAN AFRICA BY TYPE OF FLOW,AND NET TRANSFER, 19751998(Percentage of GNP)Including Nigeria Excluding Nigeria1975 1983 1990 1975 1983 1990Type of flow 1982 1989 1998 1982 1989 1998Total net inflow 8.6 9.9 9.3 11.5 10.0 10.6Official inflows 4.7 6.8 7.5 7.2 8.0 9.1ODA grantsa1.7 3.3 5.4 2.6 4.0 6
40、.4Official credit 3.0 3.5 2.1 4.6 4.0 2.7Bilateral 1.6 1.8 0.4 2.5 2.1 0.6Multilateral 1.4 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.9 2.1Private inflows 3.9 3.1 1.8 4.3 2.0 1.5Interest payments 1.5 3.2 2.7 1.8 2.7 2.3Profit remittances 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2Net transferb5.7 5.6 5.5 8.6 6.3 7.1Source: UNCTAD secretariat calcu
41、lations, based on World Bank, Global DevelopmentFinance, 2000 (CD-ROM).a This item corresponds to “Grants” as defined by the World Bank in the sourceand excludes funds allocated through technical cooperation.b Net capital inflow less interest payments on external debt and profit remittances.failed t
42、o attract FDI, which has been concentrated in a handful of oil andmineral-rich countries. While private inflows averaged about 4 per centof GNP for developing countries as a whole, the proportion was less than2 per cent in SSA.Official inflows, including ODA grants and bilateral and multilat-eral le
43、nding, as a proportion of GNP rose in SSA both during the 1980s6 United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentTable 2CAPITAL INFLOW OF NORTH AFRICA BY TYPE OF FLOW,AND NET TRANSFER, 19751998(Percentage of GNP)Type of flow 19751982 19831989 19901998Total net inflow 13.0 4.9 3.2Official inflows 5
44、.8 2.4 2.4ODA grantsa1.3 0.7 1.7Official credit 4.5 1.7 0.7Bilateral 3.3 1.0 0.1Multilateral 1.2 0.7 0.6Private inflows 7.2 2.5 0.8Interest payments 2.8 3.7 3.4Profit remittances 1.2 0.5 0.4Net transferb9.0 0.7 -0.6Source: See table 1.a This item corresponds to “Grants” as defined by the World Bank
45、in the sourceand excludes funds allocated through technical cooperation.b Net capital inflow less interest payments on external debt and profit remittances.and 1990s. The trend was flat in North Africa. Overall, while ODA grantshave risen over the past three decades, multilateral and bilateral lendi
46、nghas either fallen or stagnated. Despite their limited volume, official in-flows have accounted for an increasing proportion of total capital inflowsdue to even sharper declines in private capital. As a result of the exclu-sion of SSA from the boom of the 1990s in private inflows, together withthe
47、stagnation and decline in official flows, the share of the region in totalcapital inflows of developing countries declined to a mere 10 per cent inthe 1990s from more than 20 per cent in the 1980s.7Capital Flows and Growth in AfricaIn per capita terms there was a pronounced downward trend in bothtot
48、al and official capital inflows (chart 1).4From a level of less than $20per head in the mid-1970s, total net inflows of SSA had more than dou-bled by the end of the decade, reaching $43 per head in 1983. However,they started falling subsequently and the decline accelerated in the 1990s;at the end of
49、 the decade per capita inflows were less than $30. While partof the decline during 19941998 reflects the effect of the appreciation ofthe dollar vis-vis the currencies of most other donors on the dollar valueof ODA disbursed in these currencies, it cannot alone explain the overalldownward trend in official inflows.5In real terms the decline is even more pronounced: at the end of the1990s, real per capita inflows were less than half those of the late 1970sand early 1980s. Per capita official inflows of SSA rose both in nominaland real terms in the second half of the
