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5、d.orgExplore RAND-Initated ResearchView document detailsFor More InformationPurchase this documentBrowse Books Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: orderrand.orgThis Occasional Paper results from the RAND Corporations continuing program of self-initiated research. Support for such research is provided, in pa
6、rt, by the generosity of RANDs donors and by the fees earned on client-funded research. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.iiiPrefaceThis occasional paper defines an approach to strategic planning and then illustrates how one might implement the appr
7、oach to define alternative counterterrorism strategies, using RAND researchers and research as a resource. It should be of interest to those in the incoming admin-istration as well as throughout the U.S. government interested in doing strategic planning. The paper is also a resource for those involv
8、ed in defining U.S. counterterrorism strategies inside and outside the U.S. government. This research in the public interest was undertaken by the RAND Corporation using flexible internal research funds. vContentsPreface . iiiFigures .viiTables ixSummary xiAcknowledgments .xvAbbreviations . xviiCHAP
9、TER ONEIntroduction . 1Background . 1Objective 2Organization of This Document . 3CHAPTER TWODefining an Approach to Strategic Planning 5Current U.S. Approach to Planning . 5An Approach to Strategic Planning 6CHAPTER THREEImplementing Our Strategic Planning Approach: Defining Alternative Counterterro
10、rism Strategies 9Step 1: Define Strategic Goal . 9Step 2: Define Dierent “Means” to Achieve Strategic Goal 10Step 3: Define Alternative Counterterrorism Strategies with Means Prioritized .12Counterterrorism Strategy 1 14Counterterrorism Strategy 2 18Counterterrorism Strategy 3 21Step 4: Facilitate C
11、hoice of a Strategy . 24Choosing Among the Counterterrorism Strategy Approaches . 24Steps to Take Once a Strategy Approach Is Chosen 25CHAPTER FOURImplementing the Strategic Planning Approach Within the U.S. Government 27Bibliography 29RAND Research Used in the Counterterrorism Illustration .29Other
12、 References .31viiFiguresS.1. Our Strategic Planning Approach .xii2.1. Conceptual View of Current U.S. Approach to Planning . 52.2. Conceptual View of Government Strategic Planning Approach 62.3. Our Strategic Planning Approach 7ixTablesS.1. Components of Counterterrorism Strategies xiii1.1. Example
13、s of Past Strategic Planning 23.1. Expert Opinions on Which “Means” Should Be Prioritized .133.2. Components of Counterterrorism Strategy 1 143.3. State Department Budget, FY 2009 Budget Request .163.4. Components of Counterterrorism Strategy 2 183.5. State Department Budget, FY 2009 Budget Request
14、203.6. Components of Counterterrorism Strategy 3 . 22xiSummaryThe Need for Strategic PlanningWhile the U.S. government has historically undertaken strategic reviews and produced numer-ous strategy documents, these have provided only very general directions for U.S. policymak-ers. They do not represe
15、nt what might be called strategic planning: the definition of a strategy in which the means are prioritized to achieve an operationally defined strategic goal. Many would argue that the setting of priorities is impossible given the complexity of the world. Priorities can also limit the flexibility g
16、overnment departments claim they need to be able to carry out their missions. There is also widespread appreciation of the diculty of set-ting priorities within the decentralized U.S. policymaking process. Others, however, do see a need for setting priorities. One reason would be to increase the eec
17、tiveness of ones policies in achieving strategic goals. Priorities would also make it possible to allocate limited government resources and provide a compelling foundation for seeking public and congressional support for particular programs. Better eciencies in government activities could also be ac
18、hieved by establishing priorities, and priorities could help achieve coherence in the governments overall activities and operations. The purpose of this study is to define an approach to strategic planning for consider-ation by the U.S. government and to illustrate its application using the example
19、of the critical national security topic of counterterrorism. To do this, we drew on more than twenty RAND research reports and on numerous RAND experts. It is important to note that this exercise is intended to be purely illustrative: We are not advocating any specific roadmap, operational plan, or
20、bureaucratic solution to the counterterrorism challenges discussed here. An Approach to Strategic PlanningOur strategic planning approach has four steps as shown in Figure S.1. The approach aims to systematically define alternative strategies and to suggest how one might go about choosing one of the
21、 strategies, i.e., the considerations that could lead to the adoption of one strategy rather than another.xii A Strategic Planning Approach: Defining Alternative Counterterrorism Strategies as an IllustrationFigure S.1Our Strategic Planning ApproachRAND OP242-S.1Define different “means” to achieve s
22、trategic goalDefine alternative strategies with “means” prioritizedFacilitate choice of strategyDefine strategic goalStep 1 Step 3Step 2 Step 4IIllustrating the Approach: Alternative Counterterrorism StrategiesIn our illustrative case, counterterrorism, we defined the strategic goal (Step 1) as: Pre
23、vent attacks by al Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadist groups from occurring within the United States that are psychologically significant (i.e., attacks involving tens of casualties or smaller frequent attacks).We next defined the full range of available means, or policy tools, making them as spe-cific
24、 and distinct as possible (Step 2). We then asked RAND experts for their views on which of the “means” should be given priority and why. These views tended to diverge based on the experts assessments of the primary requirement for al Qaeda to be able successfully to attack the U.S. homeland. Based o
25、n these varying assessments, we defined three alternative counterterrorism strat-egy approaches, and then selected the means to carry them out, dierentiating those that were “core” priority means and those that could be added, depending on how one views their potential eectiveness in achieving the s
26、trategic goal (Step 3). The strategies are summarized in Table S.2.The final step in our approach to strategic planning is to set the stage for policymakers to choose among the alternative strategy approaches. For counterterrorism, we outlined a number of considerations that could be used to guide t
27、his choice. One is whether one of the assessments of what al Qaeda needs to carry out psychologically significant attacks in the United States is correct in its identification of the primary requirement, and if so, the choice of that strategy approach would follow. Another consideration is how well
28、the strategy approaches measure up to what we know about al Qaedas history of operations and what has worked or not worked in terms of U.S. actions. Yet another consideration is whether al Qaeda currently has, or in the near future will have, the capabilities that match the primary requirement ident
29、ified in each Summary xiiistrategy. A final consideration is how well the United States could be expected to implement the strategy approach. If a strategy approach is chosen, then steps would be needed to implement the strategy, including decisions about exactly what the prioritized means will comp
30、rise, what programs will be employed, what funds will be allocated, and how the counterterrorism strategy will be integrated with other U.S. national security policies.Implementing the Strategic Planning Approach Within the U.S. GovernmentHow might our strategic planning approach be implemented with
31、in the U.S. government national security policymaking process? In real-world policymaking, the intellectual steps in our strategic planning approach would need to be undertaken in a very dierent environment from that at RAND: one where ocials from many departments and agencies bring expertise as wel
32、l as strong bureaucratic interests, where decisionmaking responsibility is highly decen-tralized, and where resistance exists not only to making choices but also to making changes in existing policies. Implementing our strategic planning approach inside the U.S. government will, there-fore, require
33、a top-down decisionmaking process, orchestrated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Aairs, on behalf of the President, and with the personal engagement of the department secretaries and agency heads. The choice of a strategy would be informed by a background paper that would fles
34、h out each of the steps in our strategic planning approach for the chosen national security topic. The key step is defining the alternative strategies. These need to be analytically derived, based on assessments of the factors that might threaten achievement of the strategic goal. The strategies sho
35、uld not be bureaucratically driven and they should not, as is often the case in the government, represent a single bureaucratic-consensus option and a number of “straw man” alternatives. Table S.1Components of Counterterrorism StrategiesComponents Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3Assessment of what a
36、l Qaeda needs to be able to inflict psychologically significant attacks in the United StatesMaintain active network of individuals and groups with access to resources and communicationsSecure territory and establish a base to plan, train, and acquire resourcesMotivate leaders and recruits to underta
37、ke violent attacksOverall strategy approach Disrupt violent jihadist groups activities through counterterrorism opera-tionsDeny jihadist groups safe havens and resourcesReduce influence of purveyors of jihadist ideasCore priority means Assist friendly govern-ments in their ability to operate on thei
38、r own against violent jihadist groupsAssist states in extending governance, infrastructure, and security throughout their territoriesExploit weakened theological justification for violence; disrupt and capture motivational leaders; encourage defections from jihadist groupsOther possible priority mea
39、nsProvide U.S. operational assistance; capture or kill highly skilled operational leaders Seek to deny money, recruits, and conventional weapons to jihadist groups in countries with ungoverned territories Break up cooperation between al Qaeda and local jihadist groups xiv A Strategic Planning Approa
40、ch: Defining Alternative Counterterrorism Strategies as an IllustrationIn the end, even if a single strategy with prioritized means is not chosen, going through the steps in our strategic planning approach has advantages. It can help clarify what one aims to achieve for the specific national securit
41、y policy topic, uncover underlying assumptions, and illuminate the critical and contentious issues. Most importantly, it would mean a decision to pursue all means without any prioritization was undertaken not by default but, rather, con-sciously, because it was identified as being the best available
42、 course of action.xvAcknowledgmentsThis Occasional Paper benefited from the support and assistance of many RAND researchers. In illustrating our approach to strategic planning, we enlisted counterterrorism experts across RAND and drew on their analyses that spanned the multiple ways the nation is co
43、nfronting the threat posed by violent jihadists. Our thanks go to each of these experts for their time and insights, and their many analyses that we drew upon are noted in the report. Paul Steinberg was a tremendous resource in helping us organize this paper and in clarifying our thinking and presen
44、tation. We want also to thank C. Ryan Henry for his careful and thorough review of our report. We also appreciated the support Dick Neu gave to our eort along the way, oering his insights on the motivations of terrorists and where priorities in our policies need to be focused. Finally, we wish to th
45、ank all those who supported the publication of the paper, and especially Steve Kistler, our editor. The content and conclusions of the paper, however, remain solely the responsibility of the authors. xviiAbbreviationsDoD Department of DefenseFMF Foreign Military Financing (U.S. State Department prog
46、ram)FY fiscal yearIMET International Military Education and Training (U.S. State Department program)MANPADS man-portable air-defense systemNSC National Security CouncilWMD weapons of mass destruction1CHAPTER ONEIntroductionBackgroundU.S administrations have pursued strategic planning for decades. Ge
47、orge Kennan is remem-bered for launching the nations Cold War strategic planning when he recommended that “the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansionist tendencies.”1Presidents from
48、that time on have conducted reviews of policies for the design of strategic nuclear and conventional forces (see Table 1.1).All of the strategy reviews described in the table followed a similar process: Alternative strategy options were defined, the force structures needed for each were enumerated,
49、and the combination was analyzed with reference both to cost and to the threat the strategies were intended to counter. An examination of these strategy reviews reveals that while the process sometimes resulted in the selection of a strategy, the strategies tended to be comprised of gen-eral goals and a list of the multiple ways in which they might be implemented. In other words, although the reviews produced general directions for U.S. policies, and in some cases minor refinements in past policies, none produced a comprehensive strategy that prioritized the key “means”
