1、管理决策期末作业0山西财经大学管 理 决 策期末作业Task 1 翻译 Task 2 案例分析 班级： 项目管理二班 小组： 成员： 日期： 2013/12/23 管理决策期末作业1翻译Group Decision Fiascoes Continue: Space ShuttleChallenger and a Revised Groupthink FrameworkGregory Moorhead,i Richard Ference,i and Chris P. NeckiThis paper reviews the decision situation surroun1g the deci
2、sion to launch the space shuttle Challenger in January 1986 in the light of the groupthink hypothesis. A revised framework is presented that proposes time and leadership style as moderators of the manner in which group characteristics lead to groupthink symptoms.KEY WORDS: groupthink; Challenger; de
3、cision making; group characteristics.INTRODUCTIONIn 1972, a new dimension was added to our understanding of group decision making with the proposal of the groupthink hypothesis by Janis(1972).JaIlis coined the term “groupthink“ to refer to “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deep
4、ly involved in a cohesive in-group,when the members striving for unanimity override their motivation torealistically appraise altemative courses of action“(Janis, 1972, p. 8). Thehypothesis was supported by his hindsight analysis of several political-military fiascoes and successes that are differen
5、tiated by the occurrence or non-occurrence of antecedent conditions, groupthink symptoms, and decision making defects.In a subsequent volume,JaniS further explicates the theory and adds an analysis of the Watergate transcripts and various published memoirs and accounts of principals involved, conclu
6、ding that the Watergate cover-up decision also was a result of groupthink(Janis, 1983). Both volumes propose prescriptions for preventing the occurrence of groupthink, many of which have 群体决策 Fiascoes 继续：航天飞机Challenger 和经修订的群体思维框架格雷戈里穆尔黑德，我理查德费伦斯，我和 Chris P. Necki本文回顾了形势 surroun 曲 1G 到发射挑战者号航天飞机于 19
7、86 年 1 月在群体思维假说的光的决定的决定。修改后的框架提出了建议时间和领导风格的方式版主其中群体特征导致群体思维症状。关键词：群体思维;挑战者;决策;群体特征。引言1972 年，一个新的层面加入群决策的群体思维假设由贾尼斯（1972 ）建议的理解。 JaIlis 创造了“群体思维”一词来指“思维的人从事，当他们的模式深深卷入组，当成员的争创一致重写他们的动机评估行动课程“ （詹尼斯， 1972 年，第 8 页）一个有凝聚力的。被他事后几个政治军事 fiascoes 和成功是由先前的状况的发生或不发生分化，群体思维症状和决策的缺陷分析支持。在随后的体积，詹尼斯进一步阐述理论，并增加了水门事
8、件的成绩单和各种出版的回忆录，涉及校长的账目进行分析，得出的结论是水门事件掩盖决定也为群体思维（詹尼斯， 1983）的结果。两卷提出处方，以防止群体思维的发生，management textbooks. Multiple advocacy 管理决策期末作业2decision-making procedures have been adopted at the executive levels in many organizations, including the executive branch of the government. One would think that by 1986,
9、 13 years after the publication of a popular book, that its prescriptions might be well ingrained in our management and decision-making styles. Unfortunately, it has not happened.On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger was launched from Kennedy Space Center. The temperature that morning wa
10、s in the mid-20s,well below the previous low temperatures at which the shuttle engines had been tested. Seventy-three seconds after launch, the Challenger exploded,killing all seven astronauts aboard, and becoming the worst disaster in space flight history. The catastrophe shocked the nation, crippl
11、ed the American space program, and is destined to be remembered as the most tragic national event since the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963.The Presidential Commission that investigated the accident pointed to a flawed decision-making process as a primary contributory cause. The decision wa
12、s made the night before the launch in the Level I Flight Readiness Review meeting. Due to the work of the Presidential Commission,information concerning that meeting is available for analysis as a group decision possibly susceptible to groupthink.In this paper, we report the results of our analysis
13、of the Level Flight Readiness Review meeting as a decision-making situation that displays evidence of groupthink. We review the antecedent conditions, the groupthink symptoms, and the possible decision-making defects, as suggested by Janis (1983). In addition, we take the next and more important ste
14、p of going beyond the development of another example of groupthink to 其中许多已经出现在大众媒体，在对行政决策的书籍，并在管理的教科书。多宣传决策程序，已经通过在许多组织，包括政府的行政部门的行政级别。有人会认为，到1986 年，一本畅销书，其处方可能还有根深蒂固在我们的管理和决策风格公布 13 年后。不幸的是，它并没有发生。1986 年 1 月 28 日，挑战者号航天飞机从肯尼迪航天中心发射升空。温度那天早上是在中间 20 年代，远低于前低的温度在该班车引擎已经过测试。发射后七三秒钟，挑战者爆炸，七名宇航员全部遇难船上，并
15、成为最大的灾难的空间飞行的历史。灾难震惊全国，削弱了美国的太空计划，并注定要被记住作为自约翰 F肯尼迪 1963 年遇刺最悲惨的全国性活动。总统委员会认为调查事故指着一个有缺陷的决策过程中作为主要促成因素。推出的 I 级飞行准备审查会议前的决定是在晚上。由于总统委员会的工作，是有关该会议的信息可用于分析群体决策可能容易受到群体思维。在本文中，我们报告我们的水平飞行准备评审会议，会显示群体思维的证据的决策情况的分析结果。我们回顾了先前的条件下，群体思维症状，可能的决策缺陷，所建议的贾尼斯（ 1983） 。此外，我们采取的超越群体思维的另一个例子的发展做出的重新调查小组决策过程的建议下一个更重要的
16、步骤。管理决策期末作业3recommendations for renewed inquiry into group decision-making processes.THEORY AND EVIDENCEThe groupthink hypothesis has been presented in detail in numerous publications other than Janis books (Flowers, 1977; Courtright, 1978; Leana,1985; Moorhead, 1982; Moorhead Courtright ，1978; Lean
17、a ， 1985;穆尔黑德，1982;穆尔黑德和蒙塔纳， 1986）等众多的出版物，也不会在这里重复。大类 W01 被用作从会议主办证据的框架。在每个类别中的关键要素将随着会议的细节，涉及到每个人都可以提出。从下午 12:36 （美国东部时间） ，以下为不启动挑战者由于高侧风在发射场的决定的会议上（次）发生在白天和晚上， 1986 年 1 月 27 日。讨论通过连接肯尼迪航天中心在佛罗里达州，莫顿聚硫橡胶（ MTI ）在犹他，约翰逊航天中心在休斯敦和马歇尔太空飞行中心电话会议和电传系统继续通过大约午夜 12:00 （美国东部时间） 。 I 级飞行考前复习是在发射前审查的最高水平。它包括三个空间
18、中心和在 MTI ，固体火箭的私人供应商管理的最高级别增压发动机。简要地说明情况， MTI 工程师建议不要启动，如果气温在火箭的 O 型圈密封件均低于 53 华氏度，这是以往任何飞行的最低温度。劳伦斯 B.马洛伊，固体火箭助推器项目于马歇尔太空飞行中心的经理，说：。 。 ，那底线，虽然，最初是聚硫橡胶工程，鲍勃隆德，谁是副总裁兼工程总监，今天谁在这里，建议 51 -L 挑战者无法启动，如果O 型圈温度在启动时预测会比以往任何发射低，那是 53 度。 。 。 管理决策期末作业4launch, and that was 53 degrees . . . (Report of the Preside
19、ntial Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986, p. 91-92).This recommendation was made at 8:45 pm,.January 27, 1986 (Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986). Through the ensuing discussions the decision to launch was made.Antecedent ConditionsThe three primar
20、y antecedent conditions for the development of groupthink are: a highly cohesive group, leader preference for a certain decision, and insulation of the group from qualified outside opinions. These conditions existed in this situation.Cohesive Group. The people who made the decision to launch had wor
21、ked together for many years. They were familiar with each other and had grown through the ranks of the space program. A high degree of esprit de corps existed between the members.Leader Preference. Two top level managers actively promoted their pro-launch opinions in the face of opposition. The comm
22、ission report states that several managers at space centers and MTI pushed for launch, regardless of the low temperatures.Insulation from Experts. MTI engineers made their recommendations relatively early in the evening. The top level decision-making group knew of their objections but did not meet w
23、ith them directly to review their data and concerns. As Roger Boisjoly, a Thiokol engineer, states in his remarks to the Presidential Commission:I was not even asked to participate in giving any input to the frnal decision charts(Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1
24、986, p. 91-92).This testimonial indicates that the top decision-making team was insulated from the engineers who possessed the expertise regarding the functioning of the equipment.Groupthink Symptoms(总统委员会对航天飞机事故， 1986 年，第 91-92 报告） 。这个建议是 20 时 45 分。 1986年 1 月 27 日（总统委员会对航天飞机事故，1986 报告） 。通过随后的讨论中，推出
25、决定做出。先行条件这三个主要的前提条件，群体思维的发展是：一个高度凝聚力的群体，领导者偏好某种决定，本集团向合格的外部意见的绝缘。这些条件存在这种情况。凝聚力的群体。谁做的决定，推出的人已经工作多年在一起。他们熟悉彼此，并通过太空计划的行列中长大。的袍泽高度存在的成员之间。领导者优先。两个顶级经理积极推动他们的亲发射意见反对面前。该委员会报告指出，不同的基金经理在空间中心和 MTI 被推为发射，不管低温。绝缘从专家。 MTI 公司的工程师在晚上比较早的提出自己的建议。顶层决策组知道他们的反对意见，但他们并没有直接见面，检讨自己的数据和关注。正如罗杰 Boisjoly ，一个聚硫橡胶工程师，在他
26、的言论指出，以总统委员会：我什至没有要求参加 giving 任何输入到 frnal 决定图表（总统委员会对航天飞机事故， 1986 年，第91-92 报告） 。这证明表明最高决策层团队从谁拥有有关设备的运作的专业知识的工程师绝缘。管理决策期末作业5群体思维症状Janis identified eight symptoms of groupthink. They are presented here along with evidence from the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Accident (1
27、986).Invulnerability. When groupthink occurs, most or all of the members of the decision-making group have an illusion of invulnerability that reassures them in the face of obvious dangers. This illusion leads the group to become over optimistic and willing to take extraordinary risks. It may also c
28、ause them to ignore clear warnings of danger.The sojid rocket joint problem that destroyed Challenger was discussed often at flight readiness review meetings prior to flight. However,Commission member Richard Feynman concjuded from the testimony that a mentality of overconfidence existed due to the
29、extraordinary record of success of space flights. Every time we send one up it is successful. Involved members may seem to think that on the next one we can lower our standards or take more risks because it always works (Time, 1986).The invulnerability illusion may have built up over time as a resul
30、t of NASAs own spectacular history. NASA had not lost an astronaut since 1967 when a flash fire in the capsule of Apoll0 1 killed three. Since that time NASA had a string of 55 successful missions. They had put a man on the moon, built and launched Skylab and the shuttle, and retrieved defective sat
31、ellites from orbit. In the minds of most Americans and apparently their own, they could do no wrong.Rationalization. Victims of groupthink collectively construct rationalizations that discount warnings and other forms of negative feedback. If these signals were taken seriously when presented, the gr
32、oup members would be forced to reconsider their assumptions each time they re-commit themselves to their past decisions.詹尼斯确定了八个症状的群体思维。他们在这里提出一起从总统委员会对航天飞机事故（ 1986）报告的证据。无懈可击的错觉。当发生群体思维，大多数或所有决策小组的成员有刀枪不入的一个错觉，以为可令他们在明显的危险面前。这种错觉导致本集团成为乐观，并愿意承担非常大的风险。它可能也会使他们忽视的危险明显的警告。该 sojid 火箭关节的问题，摧毁挑战者往往在讨论之前，
33、飞行飞行准备检讨会议。然而，委员会成员理查德费曼从过度自信的心态存在由于太空飞行成功的非凡记录的证词concjuded 。我们送一上来它的每一次成功。参与成员似乎认为就下单，我们可以降低我们的标准或冒更大的风险，因为它总是工作（时间， 1986） 。无懈可击的错觉可能已经建立了随着时间的推移，作为美国航空航天局自己的历史壮观的结果。美国航空航天局自 1967 年以来，当在 Apoll0 1 的胶囊火光一闪杀害了三名没有失去一名宇航员。自那时以来，美国航空航天局有 55 成功使命的字符串。他们把一个人送上月球，建造和发射太空实验室和航天飞机，并回收有缺陷的卫星从轨道上。在大多数美国人显然对自己的
34、头脑，他们可以做的没有错。合理化。群体思维的受害者共同构造打折警告和其他形式的负反馈合理化。如果这些信号被认真对待的时候提出，小组成员将被迫每次他们管理决策期末作业6重新致力于其过去的决定重新考虑他们的假设。In the Level I flight readiness meeting when the Challenger was given final launch approval, MTI engineers presented evidence that the joint would fail. Their argument was based on the fact that i
35、n the coldest previous launch (air temperature 30 degrees) the joint in question experienced serious erosion and that no data existed as to how the joint would perform at colder temperatures. FJight center officiajs put forth numerous technical rationalizations faulting MTIs analysis. One of these r
36、ationalizations was that the engineers data were inconclusive. As Mr. Boisjoly emphasized to the Commission:Discussions became twisted (compared to previous meetings) and no one detected it. Under normal conditions, MTI would have to prove the shuttle boosters readiness for launch, instead they foun
37、d themselves being forced to prove that the boosters were unsafe. Boisjolys testimony supports this description of the discussion:. . . This was a meeting where the determination was to launch, and it was up to us to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was not safe to do so. This is in total re
38、verse to what the position usually is in a preflight conversation or a flight readiness review. It is usually exactly opposite of thai . . . (Repori of the PresidentialCommission on the Space Shuttle Accident, 1986, p. 93).Moraliry. Group members often believe, without question, in the inherent mora
39、lity of their position. They tend to ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decision.In the Challenger case, this point was raised by a very high level MTI manager, Allan J. McDonald, who tried to stop the launch and said that he would not want to have to defend the decision to launch. He
40、 stated to the Commission:. . . I made the statement that if were wrong and something goes wrong on this flight, I wouldnt 在一级飞行准备会议时，挑战者给予最终批准上市， MTI 公司的工程师提出的证据表明，联合将会失败。他们的论据是基于，在最寒冷的先前推出的（空气温度 30 度）有问题的联合经历了严重的侵蚀和没有数据存在，如何联合将在较低温度下进行的事实。FJight 中心 officiajs 提出了许多合理化的技术断层 MTI 的分析。其中一个合理化的是，工程师的数据是
41、不确定的。由于 Boisjoly 先生强调委员会：讨论成为扭曲的（相比于以往的会议） ，没有人发现它。在正常情况下， MTI 必须证明航天飞机的助推器准备发射，相反，他们发现自己被强迫证明助推器不安全。 Boisjoly 的证词支持的讨论这样的描述：。 。 。这是一个会议的地方是决心发动，这是由我们来证明超出了怀疑，这是不是安全的这样做了一层阴影。这是总的反向到什么位置通常是在预检谈话或飞行准备检讨。它通常是完全相反的泰国。 （总统的Repori 委员会在航天飞机事故， 1986 年，页。 93 ） 。道德。集团成员往往认为，毫无疑问，其立场的内在道德。他们往往忽略了他们的决定的伦理和道德后果
42、。在挑战者的情况下，这点是提出了很高的水平 MTI 经理，艾伦 J.麦当劳，谁试图阻止发射，并表示他不希管理决策期末作业7望要捍卫发射的决定。他说委员会：我认为，如果我们错了，不顺心的事，这个航班，我不希望必须要站want to have to be the person to stand up in front of board in inquiry and say that I went ahead and told them to go ahead and fly this thing outside what the motor was qualified to . . . (Repo
43、rt of the Presideruial Comrrusszon on the Space Shuttle Accidem, 1986, p. 95).Some members did not hear this statement because it occurred during a break. Three top officials who did hear it ignored it.Stereotyped Views of Others. Victims of groupthink often have a stereotyped view of the opposition
44、 of anyone with a competing opinion. They feel that the opposition is too stupid or too weak to understand or deal effectively with the problem.Two of the top three NASA officials responsible for the launch displayed this attitude. They felt that they completely understood the nature of the joint pr
45、oblem and never seriously considered the objections raised by the MTI engineers. In fact they denigrated and badgered the opposition and their information and opinions.Pressure on Dissent. Group members often appjy direct pressure to anyone who questions the validity of the arguments supporting a de
46、cision or position favored by the majority. These same two officials pressured MTI to change its position after MTI originally recommended that the launch not take place. These two officials pressured Mrfl personnel to prove that it was not safe to launch, rather than to prove the opposite. As menti
47、oned earlier, this was a total reversal of normal preflight procedures. It was this pressure that top MTI management was responding to when they overruled their engineering staff and recommended launch. As the Commission report states:_ At approximately 11 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, the ThiokoUNASA
48、 ielecon ference resumed, the Thiokot managemeru stating that they had reassessed the problem, that the temperature 起来的板前的调查，说我继续告诉他们先走的人的声明和飞这个东西之外什么电机是合格的。 （该Presideruial Comrrusszon 的航天飞机 Accidem ，1986 年报，第 95 页） 。有些成员没有听到这个说法，因 为它休息时发生。谁是听到了三个高层官员忽略了它。千篇一律他人的意见。群体思维的受害者往往有任何人有竞争的观点的对立的刻板看法。他们认为，
49、反对派是太傻还是太软弱理解或有效地处理这个问题。两个负责推出的前三名美国航空航天局官员显示这种态度。他们认为，他们完全了解的接头问题的性质和从来没有认真考虑过 MTI 工程师提出的反对意见。事实上，他们诋毁和纠缠反对派和他们的信息和意见。压力异议。小组成员经常直接压力的人谁质疑的支持，受到广大青睐的决定或位置参数的有效性。这些相同的两位官员施压改变立场后，台扬原本建议推出不会发生。这两位官员施压人员证明它是不是安全启动，而不是为了证明相反。如前面提到的，这是正常的预检程序总的逆转。正是这种压力最重要的是管理是在回应时，他们否决了他们的工程技术人员，并建议推出。正如委员会报告指出：管理决策期末作业8大约在晚上 11 点东部标准时间时， 干扰恢复， Thiokot 指出，他们已重新评估的问题，即温度的影响 effects were a concem, but that the data was admittedly inconclusive . . . (p. 96).This seems to indicate that NASAs pressure on these Thiokol officia
