1、 1 Parimal G. Patil Against a Hindu God 導 讀（第二 章後 半） 耿晴，Oct.9, 2010 2. The Nyaya argument for the Existence of vara Ratnak rtis description of a “generic” Naiy yika. 2.1 An Informal Description Ny yas argument: structurally similar to the cosmological argument: in two steps; 1 ststep: b/c the world
2、is made up of parts, there must be an intelligent designer; 2 ndstep: the intelligent agent/maker/designer who constructed the world has the qualities that identify him as the God-like being called “ vara” (such qualities include being single, omnipresent, omniscient, and eternal) 2.2 The vara-Infer
3、ence site of inference (pak a): 宗有法 target property (s dhya-dharma): 宗法 reason property (hetu, li ga): 因法 positive example (sa-pak a; 同品): “a property possessor in which the target property i.e., fire has been clearly ascertained” (nicitas dhyadharm dharm ). (i) The object under discussion i.e., our
4、 world/the earth has been constructed by an intelligent agent (buddhimaddhetuka); (ii) On account of being an effect (k ryatva) (iii) Each and every effect has been constructed by an intelligent agent, just like a pot. (iv) And, the world/earth is an effect. (v) Therefore, it has been constructed by
5、 an intelligent agent. (i) states what the person presenting the argument has already inferred to be the case through an inference-for-ones-own-sake. (ii) asserting that the reason property is a “property of the site” (pak adharmat ) (iii) states the inference-warranting relation called “pervasion”
6、(vy pti; 遍滿) and provides an “example” (d nta; 喻) of a locus where this relation is instanced. * To function as an example, the locus cited must be one about which both the proponent of the argument and the “beneficiary” of the argument agree. (iv) expressing the “special consideration” (par mar a)
7、or third awareness of the reason property; expresses that the reason property that is a property of the site of the inference is pervaded by the target property. the “functioning intermediary” (vy p ra), the “functioning component” of the instrument. (v) states the conclusion of the inference and ex
8、presses the culminating effect (phala) of the event. 2 Note: The reason property (hetu) is the instrument. Step ii: the “cause” component of the instrument (?) Step iiias a necessary part of step ivis the “functioning” component of the instrument. 2.3 Certification Conditions Determining that a part
9、icular instrument of inferential awareness is well-functioning requires determining that none of the five possible defects apply to the proposed reason property/instrument. The Naiy yikas account of certification, for both the reason property/instrument and the inferential argument as a whole, can b
10、e understood in terms of three sets of certification conditions (C), the five characteristics of a reason property (P), and the five associated defects (H). 2.3.1 C 1 : Performance Conditions * “Certification condition”: to investigate whether an argument (or, more specifically, a reason property) h
11、as any defects. P 1 : a reason must be known to be a property of the site of the inference. C 1 : defined in terms of H 1a : “unestablished in the site of the inference” (raya-asiddha) A reason property is said to have this defect when the site of the inference in which it is supposed to be located
12、is known not to exist. For example, “The soul ( tman) is ubiquitous, because it has the quality to be perceived everywhere.” Refutation: “since there is no proof for establishing the existence of the soul.”(Kajiyama: 119) 2.3.2 C 2 : Instrument Conditions Instrument conditions= triple conditions (tr
13、ir pali ga; 三相)=P 1 , P2, P3. The occurrence of each of these three conditions would prevent the reason property from well functioning, namely, from the arising of the third awareness, step iv. * C 2.1 =P 1 =T 1 : (pak a-dharmat ; Kajiyama: 65-6; 遍是宗法 性 ; 何: 4) defined in terms of H 1b“unestablished
14、 in itself” (svar pa-asiddha), namely, a reason property is known not to be present in the site of the inference. (67) E.g. “Sound is impermanent because of visibility” like a pot (Kajiyama: 66) * C 2.2 = P 2 = T 2 : (anvaya; Kajiyama: 67-8; 同品定 有性 ： 因法（僅僅 ？） 存在於同品中; 何: 4) (h s?) ( 甲) defined in ter
15、ms of H2 “opposed” (viruddha): 3 A reason property is known to be pervaded (vy pti) by the absence of the target property. More specifically, the defect H2 means that “the reason property is not present in a single similar case (sapak a) and that it is present in at least one dissimilar case (vipak
16、a; 異喻).” (67) ( 乙) defined in terms of H 3b“uncommon” (as dh ra a): A defect that a reason property “is known only to be present in the site of the inference: it is excluded from all similar and dissimilar cases.” (68) E.g. “Sound is impermanent because of its audibility” (Kajiyama: 67) ( 丙) H 3c“no
17、t universal” (aupasa h rin): A reason property in which both P 2and P 3are absent. * C 2.3 = P 3 = T 3 (vyatireka; Kajiyama: 69-70; 異品 定無性 ： 一 切 異 品都不具 有 因法; 何：4) (s h) ( 甲) H 2( 乙) H 3a“common/general”: A defect in which a reason does not meet the requirement that this reason property must be known
18、 to be excluded from all dissimilar cases (vipak a). Or, the reason property is known to be present in the site of an inference, a similar case, and a dissimilar case. ( 乙 1) H 3a1 : “generally inconclusive” (s dh ra a-anaik ntika) ( 乙 2) H 3a2 : “generally inconclusive” (s dh ra a-anaik ntika) E.g.
19、, “This living body is endowed with a soul, because it has breathing and other characteristics like another living body and unlike a jar.” (Kajiyama: 113-4) ( 丙) H 3c“not universal” (aupasa h rin): A reason property in which both P2 and P3 are absent. Note: H 3“inconclusive” (anaik ntika) 2.3.3 C3:
20、Argument Conditions C 3 =P 4 3.2.1 A Dissimilar Case Growing grass as a counter-example: Opponent: growing grass is an effect, but its maker does not exist. Naiy yikas response: “non-observation is not always an appropriate criterion for determining whether or not a property is present in a particul
21、ar locussince the non-observation of the target propertycould be due to its being spatially remote (de a-viprak a) temporally remote (k la- viprak a).” Naiy yika: the maker of growing grass is said to be “essentially remote” (svabh va-viprak a). 3.2.2 Deviation Opponent: doubt about the exclusion of
22、 the reason property from dissimilar cases (sa digdha- vipak a-vy v tti) cannot be ruled out. It is always possible that a potential counter-example exists. E.g. “This man is not free from desire, because he speaks, as a Ching: the man on the highway”; for all the cases in which “being not free from
23、 desire” is absent are the cases in which “speaker-ness” is also absent, like a piece of rock. This inference is wrong, because “though both the qualities are excluded from a piece of stone, yet we do not know whether speaker-ness is absent from a piece of stone because of the absence of the state o
24、f being free from desire, or it is so simply by nature. Thus, this is a case of inconclusiveness (anaik ntika) because of a dubious negative pervasion.” (Kajiyama: 70) Naiy yikas response: “There is no doubt about the exclusion of the reason property from dissimilar cases, since an effect-cause rela
25、tionshipis established for an effect the reason property and an intelligent-possessor the target property” (81) The nondeviation rule (avyabhic raniyama) applies only to two sorts of relations: the “identity- mode” (t d tmya) and the “production-mode” (tadutpatti) of pervasion. (81) Note: the effect
26、-cause relation, Naiy yikas assert, is established, in part, through the observation (upalambha) of the reason property in a finite number of loci The issue with Induction? 6 3.2.3 Scope of the Reason Property Opponents: we should distinguish between “effects in general” or “all effects” (k rya-m tr
27、a) and “a restricted class of effects” (k rya-vi e a). The reason property should be limited to just a specific class of effects, namely, “those with the property being an effect from the observation of which there could be an awareness of its having been made, even for one who did not observe its b
28、eing made.” (84-5) Opponents: “the Naiy yikas reason property is inconclusive, since pervasion can be established only for this specific class of effects and not for effects-in-general.” (85) Naiy yikas response: it is necessary to further analyze the terms in the phrase “an awareness of having been
29、 made.”(85) By “an awareness of having been made,” the opponents could not mean “an effect about which it has been determined that its production depends upon the activity of something other than itself (apek itaparavy p ra).”(85-6) Naiy yika: the awareness that an effect “was made by a person” is t
30、he awareness either of someone who knows the pervasion relation between “being an effect” and “being made by a person” or of someone who does not. (a) They argue further that for the former there will certainly be the awareness of an intelligent agent from an effect-in general. (b) For the latter, t
31、hey concede that the inference is impossible! But this would make even well- known inferences under suspect. (86) Patil: the strategy of the Naiy yikas in 3.2.3 is to expose “internal inadequacies in the opponents account of the limiting quality an awareness of having been made.” (87) Ching: compare
32、 the discussions here in 3.2 with the following comments by J na r mitra: If you, in order to remove the fallacy that h effect-ness, is found in the vipak a i.e., in what has not a visible intelligent agent as its cause, imagine an invisible agent, how can you establish the vy pti, since it is depri
33、ved of confirmation by the negative vy pti? Or, if you, hoping to establish the negative vy pti, rely on a visible agent, then h, effect-ness is clearly seen in the vipak a, because grass etc. grows without it i.e., the operation of a visible agent. (Kajiyama: 100) 4 Conclusion 4.1 The vara-Inferenc
34、e as a Hybrid Argument The hybrid argument of the Naiy yikas: using elements from both cosmological argument and argument from design. (88) Three steps in the vara-argument: 7 (1) begin with a contingent (and usually uncontroversial) existential fact, such as the existence of the universe or of comp
35、lex well-functioning lifeforms. (89) -This fact in the varaargument is both more normative than those appealed to in cosmological arguments, and less normative than those appealed to in the argument from design. (90) (2) a principle that is supposed to account for the existential fact in step 1. The
36、 principle in the vara-argument is a version of the causal principle. (3) an explanatory argument to the effect that the fact expressed in step 1 is to be finally accounted for by the intentional actions of a God-like being. A few important issues in the vara-argument: (a) what the target property o
37、f their argument is supposed to be? an agent-in-general, an intelligent agent, and/or an intelligent agent who is vara? (91) There is a gap that needs to be closed between step 2 and step 3 in the vara-argument. The Naiy yikas proposal is to solve the gap-problem with a design argument in step 3. (b
38、) the vara-argument requires that each and everything that comes into existence have a cause. It also restricts the kind of “cause” that is relevant, by ruling out non-intelligence-possessing ones. Ching: also ruling out multiple agents! 4.2 Satisfaction, Certification, and Justification The deontol
39、ogical and procedural dimensions of the debates: Deontological: have a prima facie epistemic responsibility to show their opponent that none of the known defeaters apply to the reason property. Procedural: reflective knowing-event is based upon the practice of certification, i.e., the practice of sh
40、owing that a set of defects does not apply. certification is how an agent comes to know that a particular first-order awareness-event is warranted. (98) 參考書目： 何建興， 陳 那邏輯 理 論 探析 ， 佛學 研 究 中心學報 第七期 ，2002. Kajiyama, Y uichi, 1998. An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: an annotated translation of the Tarkabh of Mok karagupta. Wien: Arbeitskries Fr Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitt.
